

JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Manoly R. Lupul: *The Tragedy of Canada's White Ethnic*

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak: *Feminism in Ukrainian History*

Thomas M. Prymak: *Herzen on Poland and Ukraine*

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Myroslav Yurkevych: *A Forerunner of National Communism—
Lev Iurkevych*

L. Rybalka: *The Russian Social Democrats and the National
Question*

Guide to Research, Reviews, Letters

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Manoly R. Lupul

THE TRAGEDY OF CANADA'S WHITE ETHNICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL POST-MORTEM

Last October, I presented a paper in Edmonton on "The Political Implementation of Multiculturalism" to the biennial conference of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association. The paper indicted the federal government, and in particular Prime Minister Trudeau, for failing to create the climate and atmosphere that would give the policy of multiculturalism a high profile and enable it to rise above the superficial levels of folk dance and song, ethnic studies and immigrant orientation.

In probing the reasons for the prime minister's indifference, it suddenly struck me that although Trudeau is white, he is not ethnic. Although he does refer to himself as a French Canadian, being a tenth-generation *Canadien* on his father's side, he is not *French*. He is, at best, a French-speaking Canadian, a francophone—which in shorthand can come down to us as "French," but it would be a great mistake to forget that it is shorthand we are using. The only "French" in Canada are recent immigrants from France. With time, it might be appropriate to refer to such immigrants as French Canadians, but that would depend on the extent to which they embraced the lifestyle of mainstream North American society. If they drew minimally from that society—economically mainly—they would be French forever. But not so their children. Because of the school, if nothing else, their children would become French Canadians, assuming, of course, that contact with the home remained close. Their children's children—the grandchildren—might be French Canadians (depending on how and where they were raised), but more likely they would prefer to see themselves as Canadians of French origin, and subsequent generations in a province like Quebec would refer to themselves only as *Canadiens* (today Québécois) and see themselves even as a nationality distinct from the French of France.

How much the well-travelled, cosmopolitan Trudeau draws on the culture of contemporary France, I cannot say; what is clear,

however, is that the average *Canadien* hardly knows that France exists. To the vast majority of Québécois, the values, politics, attitudes and daily routine of the French are as alien as is their language. The Québécois are francophone Canadians—at best French-speaking Canadians; they are not ethnic French, because they are now at a great distance from the French of France.

From here it was just a short step to another, much larger, general category in Canada—the Anglo-Celts—whom we also never identify as ethnics. We simply do not speak of the ethnic Irish or the ethnic Welsh or the ethnic Scottish or the ethnic English. The Irish, Welsh, Scottish or English—even as immigrants—are never referred to as ethnics. They may be members of cultural groups with distinct languages (or dialects), characteristics and customs, but when they come to Canada, they come not as ethnics or “foreigners”—the long-time pejorative and now unacceptable equivalent of ethnic, according to the Gage *Dictionary of Canadian English*. The Anglo-Celts come as members of founding peoples, whom they join and with whom they blend in quickly. And because the Anglo-Celts in Canada are the largest category and are almost everywhere the majority (or nearly so), and because the majority determines what is desirable, such blending is regarded as desirable and is much encouraged, except where, as in the case of visible minorities, it is impossible.

It follows naturally that those European nationalities—foreigners vis-à-vis the Anglo-Celts—that blend most easily are most desirable. And if they also blend eagerly, as do those from northern Europe—the Nordics from Scandinavia, Germany and northern France (especially Normandy and Brittany)—they are the very best of immigrants and doubly welcome. Not only do they mix easily, but they do not upset the population mix. They quickly cease to be mindful of life in the old country, and their term as white ethnics is short—lasting often no longer than the first immigrant generation and very seldom past the third. By the fourth generation only a handful are actual members of the ethnic or cultural group; for most, the characteristics and customs of the group are highly romanticized and heavily stylized, if present at all. Among them, the loss of the ethnic language is total.

While thus musing, I heard a news broadcast refer to the “Boat People” from Vietnam as “ethnic Chinese.” This seemed appropriate, because they had not come from China (in which case, they would have been simply Chinese), and despite their similarity to the Vietnamese, they had not assimilated and become Vietnamese for reasons that need not trouble us here. Nor would they be assimilated in Canada. Because of their facial features,

they could never voluntarily cease being ethnic Chinese in Canada—an unfortunate or fortunate fate, depending on how much one wishes to lose oneself in North America's mainstream society. Only such Chinese as wish to disappear (for whatever reasons) will be unhappy, for they are too visible to disappear. The Chinese in North America are so different that they are expected to have minimal contacts with North Americans and to live apart forever, or at best to live in both cultural worlds with a minimum of tension for themselves and others. As members of a visible minority, they cannot escape themselves; they wear their ethnic identity literally on their sleeves, as did the Jews and others during the war in Nazi Germany. In Canada, the same is true of the native peoples and, of course, of the blacks and a great variety of other peoples from the Third World.

In between the non-ethnics, the disappearing white ethnics and the visible ethnics is a fourth group, in which fall the ethnic Ukrainians as distinct from all those Ukrainians who still live in Ukraine. The rest of this paper will deal mainly with this fourth group, the category known between the two world wars as the non-preferred peoples, whose immigration had to be discouraged or at best carefully regulated and confined as much as possible to domestics and farm laborers. Into this category fall all the peoples from southern, central and eastern Europe, with their strange, unpronounceable names derived from what are perceived to be a multitude of impossible languages. They round out the complement of "first peoples," "founding peoples" and "visible peoples," to use today's fashionable terminology. Their tragedy is that of any outcast or pariah.

And they themselves compound the tragedy immensely when they fail to recognize that almost seventy-five per cent of the Canadian population, though white, is not ethnic, and that at least a further ten per cent sheds its ethnicity as quickly as it does its coat. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the country's population can never really appreciate the aspirations of the white ethnics, let alone share them. In these circumstances, to swell the number of ethnics to one-third of the country's population and then actually to refer to that number as "the third force" is to be very foolish. With hindsight, it was ludicrous to flaunt such statistics in the face of authority or to try to build a political movement such as multiculturalism upon such quicksand. The numbers simply do not add up, and in politics that is the bottom line—unless you are first peoples, with the special feelings that can be aroused because of original occupancy, or visible peoples, obliged to ward off the never-ending barbs of racism. The white ethnics did not make the

bottom line because they all too frequently invoked census figures that did not reflect the real Canadian world.

We should not be surprised, therefore, that the new Canadian constitution gives white ethnics nothing that it does not give to all other men and women, and very much less than it gives "the first peoples," "the founding peoples" and "the visible peoples." In fact, in terms of any *rights* that could be assigned to the cultural and linguistic aspirations of white ethnics, they can claim nothing. The "first peoples" got—or will soon get—the rights (including the linguistic right) needed to survive as a group; the "founding peoples" have been given the right to survive as a group wherever they are a minority; and the "visible peoples" will survive because they cannot do otherwise. They cannot disappear; they must only be assured of the conditions to persevere, and this they have been given through the guarantee of freedom from discrimination on the basis of color. For the white ethnics, the right to a linguistic underpinning for their culture has been denied. On the one hand they are not sufficiently different to merit attention, and on the other most are too similar to the majority whites to warrant attention. It is not the business of government—and even less of the national constitution—to perpetuate ethnicity. The latter is the property of the first, immigrant generation, which too must be (and is) protected from discrimination on account of ethnic origin. But in subsequent generations ethnicity normally declines, and it is not the task of government or of the nation's fundamental law either to reverse this or to try to establish a state of equilibrium between the cultures of the Old and New Worlds. The state can hardly assume the responsibility of preparing a great variety of bilingual and bicultural individuals if the bilingualism and biculturalism to be encouraged is outside the parameters of the two indigenous, non-ethnic Canadian cultures.

Such reasoning is, of course, natural in an English-French bilingual and bicultural country. Whether it has any place in a society that professes multiculturalism—that declares all cultures to be equal, as the federal government did in October 1971—is another matter. *Multiculturalism was advanced by bicultural individuals with access to language, which gave their second culture a meaningful base.* Multiculturalism was advanced in a multilingual setting. The multilingual underpinning was as essential to meet cultural needs as was official bilingualism to meet communicative needs. It is true that the constitutional charter of rights and freedoms "shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada." But if the biculturalism is watered down for lack of a guaran-

teed linguistic base, what kind of multiculturalism will we be preserving and enhancing? If all cultures are equal, are not all languages also equal for cultural purposes, language being an integral part of each culture? In a multicultural society, each individual must have the opportunity by *right* to acquire such languages as will meet his communicative *and* cultural needs. That right the clause below (presented in the brief of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution) would have provided:

Citizens of Canada shall have their children receive their primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the majority of the population of the province in which they reside and in any other language(s) in accordance with the expressed desire of parents in any area of the province in which the number of children of such citizens is sufficient to warrant the provision out of public funds of minority language educational facilities in that area.

The above clause, however, did not prevail, because all cultures in Canada are not and cannot be equal, if the reference is to the actual cultural context in which human beings in Canada live out their lives. The culture of the ethnic Ukrainians, for example, is hardly equal to the two indigenous, non-ethnic cultures of Canadian mainstream society in the latter's power to influence values, attitudes and understandings. They may be qualitatively equal, but quality hardly makes up for sheer presence—for an environment that affects one's thought and behavior on a daily basis. It is equally clear that the staying power of the ethnic Ukrainian is hardly equal to that of the Anglo-Celt in Alberta or of the francophone in Quebec. The democracy of cultures implies the democracy of cultural groups, which in actual fact does not exist—but the believing white ethnics want so much to believe in egalitarianism that they mistake the will to believe for the reality itself. And the clever politicians respond in kind, feigning to give all while withholding language—the most essential cultural prop.

For the ethnic Ukrainians, failure to obtain the constitutional amendment has a significance all its own. The amendment would have recognized ethnic-Ukrainian consciousness as a positive good to be encouraged and developed. Ukrainians (I am now using shorthand) were playing for high stakes indeed—nothing less than the entrenchment in the Canadian constitution of the centuries-old Ukrainian predicament. In refusing them, Canada's national government was indicating that it was not interested in the survival of the ethnic Ukrainians as a minority. Their predicament was

theirs alone; it was none of the nation's business. Prime Minister Trudeau came into politics to save his own people, not the ethnic Ukrainians. And since neither the Conservatives nor Saskatchewan's Attorney-General, the influential Roy Romanow, raised the issue, the Ukrainians did not stand a chance. But all should know what Canada's Ukrainians were refused—the basis for survival as a group in all parts of Canada where their numbers are sufficient. I am not surprised we lost; indeed, I would have been surprised had we won. The non-ethnics who govern us have never been willing to take seriously the difficult "Ukrainian Question." Our first settlers found this out immediately after the First World War. Nothing has changed since. The Diefenbaker phenomenon was an aberration. Diefenbaker's real concern was with the spread of communism west into eastern Europe. He had nothing to say about communism above the Black Sea before the late 1950s—and when he discovered it, it was to reap political benefits at home. He did not have the same intensity about Ukraine's freedom as, say, Czechoslovakia's. The white ethnics—being helpless and without friends—are always being taken in by one politician or another. Prime Minister Trudeau was not the first.

It is clear, then, that with Trudeau Canada's Ukrainians, as the most numerous of the white ethnics, were courting tragedy from the outset. It is only regrettable that it took so long to arrive at a new constitution and to reach the moment of truth. With the latter, we enter a new era, one in which it would be a mistake to ignore the central fact of assimilation in North American life. One cannot wish it away with slogans like "We do not believe in assimilation, we prefer integration." It is better to face reality, which comes through daily in well-known statistics about steadily declining religious affiliation, the rapid loss of Ukrainian as a mother tongue, and the equally rapid increase in intermarriage. Intermarriage is certainly a form of integration, but it is assimilative too. And in North America it is a natural phenomenon with which parents interfere at their peril. Every agency in mainstream society encourages it for everyone, except between whites and the visible minorities.

Ours is a homogenizing society. It is rooted in mass production, whose success depends on as much uniformity as possible. The emphasis on standardization affects our attitudes and values, including the value placed on ethnicity, which is one difference North Americans have been taught to live without. Attitudes and values can be changed, of course, but the forces stressing assimilation will always overwhelm their opposite, because our society cannot survive without assimilation and because today's non-eth-

nics have been here a long time and are far more numerous. This is precisely why they are non-ethnics. Their ethnic cultures were transformed into our mainstream culture, but it would be foolish to remind them of this, because today *they feel no ethnicity*. You can ascribe ethnicity to an eighth-generation Englishman from Ontario. He cannot stop you. But it will do you no good, for the essence of ethnicity is what sets you apart from mainstream society, and the Englishman, wherever he may be in Canada, even as an immigrant, feels and is very much a part of mainstream society. Even the Englishman in Quebec is no exception. He would be scandalized if you referred to him as an ethnic—and in the North American context this is understandable.

Parenthetically, however, on the subject of intermarriage, it is also true that ethnically conscious Ukrainians in Canada have the advantage as spouses over Canadians without an ethnic consciousness in instilling an ethnic-Ukrainian consciousness in their children—and this perhaps indefinitely, *provided* there is a Ukrainian-language stream in the school system of mainstream society. By themselves, most mixed-marriage homes can seldom withstand the school's assimilative influences, and few non-ethnically conscious spouses will be comfortable with Saturday schools, which cater essentially to immigrants and, like all things immigrant, carry little or no status in North America. Since it is primarily the ethnically conscious Canadians of Ukrainian origin who seek such Ukrainian-language streams, it should surprise no one that it was the Ukrainians who pushed to have the minority-language educational clause in the constitution liberalized. The others, not surprisingly, hardly stirred, perhaps justifying Prime Minister Trudeau's indifference and certainly making his job much easier.

But I digress. If assimilation is a dominant fact of North American life and the ethnic category keeps disappearing, only to be replenished by a steady stream of immigrants from "the old country," the almost total absence of immigration from Ukraine contributes mightily to the tragedy of the white ethnics. Immigration of ethnically conscious Ukrainians from South America and of ethnic Ukrainians from Poland, now in Austria, is one option, but for that skilful organization is needed, a point to which we shall return. But if the immigrant is the truest ethnic (as he is) and if multiculturalism is rooted in ethnicity, then not only is multiculturalism as a phenomenon of ethnic consciousness essentially meaningless to most individuals past the second generation (that is, the first Canadian-born generation), but the appeal of multiculturalism would be greatest to members of the first, immigrant generation.

Both are borne out by reality. The francophones and Anglo-Celts, as non-ethnic, have not identified with multiculturalism. They throw no multicultural festivals, and when they participate, it is as folk troupes doing habitant or Highland dances, Irish jigs, or Welsh choral numbers, very rarely in Gaelic. The English do not participate. At a recent conference in Winnipeg on multiculturalism and education, the renditions of the decidedly old-looking German choir were most unsteady, the Vietnamese and Caribbean dancers were as prominent as the Polish singers and dancers and the Scottish pipers and drummers. The Ukrainians, as is now usual, provided the finale. The numerous francophones of St. Boniface sent no one; at the end, two francophones of unknown provincial origin protested loudly the absence of simultaneous translation during the after-dinner speech by Lloyd Axworthy, the federal minister of manpower and immigration—and the shouting was probably justified. The federal policy is “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework,” and the framework, at least during that particular evening, was decidedly Anglo. The generous sprinkling of benevolent Anglo-Celts thoroughly enjoyed themselves—as they have for decades when observing folklore on display, conducting immigrant orientation sessions and English-as-a-second-language classes, undertaking ethnic studies, and encouraging love, tolerance and charity for all. No fundamental questions were raised.

The appeal of multiculturalism to immigrants is borne out by their membership on such bodies as the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM) and the Alberta Cultural Heritage Council, where they usually make up at least one-half of the representatives. The Anglo-Celts are seldom represented by anyone past the first Canadian-born generation. Most often, their representatives are émigrés, ten to thirty years removed from the British Isles. The francophones of Quebec have so resented the ethnicity implicit in multiculturalism that Quebec's representation on the CCCM has been one-quarter of Ontario's, with the francophones barely visible. The CCCM has been much concerned with taking multiculturalism to the Anglo-Celts and the francophones, but apart from enlisting a few professors and teachers, the results have been disappointing. *No member of any Establishment—whether political, economic, artistic, journalistic, athletic or educational—has taken multiculturalism seriously. Maclean's*, for example, has still to carry its first positive article on the subject. To the *Edmonton Journal* we are still a bicultural society, except in August when Heritage Days roll around.

In these circumstances, council members and bureaucrats

become very frustrated churning out recommendations, most of which go nowhere, because they can go nowhere. Non-ethnics will not support meaningful ethnicity for fear either that their own status will become compromised by something they cannot feel or that their own power may even be diluted by having to share it with white ethnics, not to mention the deadly serious "first peoples" and the aggressive visible minorities. Not surprisingly, ambitious but frustrated ministers of the crown charged with the responsibility for multiculturalism shift the emphasis to racial discrimination to make their work more meaningful. And with multiculturalism so rooted in immigration, the shift is natural. What could be more sensible than looking after those immigrants, in the process of immigrant orientation, who are experiencing the largest problems of adjustment.

It is now conventional wisdom that Canada's Ukrainians of *all varieties* were the major force behind the multiculturalism movement. Yet this very variety has spelled subsequent disaster. As tragic as it has been for Ukrainians to ignore the dominant role of the non-ethnics in Canadian society, to fail to recognize the motivation of the disappearing ethnics, and to appreciate the predicament of the visible ethnics, the tragedy has been made much worse by the utter inability of Canada's organized Ukrainians to recognize *and* to cope with the fact that the Ukrainian group is far from homogeneous. There is much reference to "*nasha hromada*" as if it were really an objective reality unaffected by the severe fragmentation of three major immigrations, several generations, the normal social-class structure, and a multitude of organizations. Ukrainians are at best a community of communities, a rich diversity that they do not know, because they do not want to know its true nature and dimensions. Ukrainians are disturbed—even angered—by it, because they know it enfeebles them. Yet they will not get together—not even on such all-essential or generally accepted necessities as bilingual classrooms. In Edmonton, the Parents' Advisory Committee looks after children in the Catholic schools; the Ukrainian Bilingual Association, after those in the non-Catholic schools—and the twain supposedly shall never meet. At the hearings of the Federal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Edmonton in the fall of 1964, the Ukrainians presented five briefs. The Catholics had theirs and the Orthodox theirs, and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, of course, represented everyone, to the utter dismay of media reporters and other observers! Ukrainians simply will not submerge their differences, and in matters of the greatest magnitude not only must they prevail, but their opponent must not. If they cannot annihilate

him, they must so shame or hobble him that he will cease to be a power. As a result, one cannot say that Ukrainians care much to develop strategies that would make them a force in Canada. Most, it appears, can get far more excited about events in Ukraine than about developments in Canada. And that is perhaps natural when you consider that so many of the most involved in Ukrainian life in Canada are first- and second-generation Canadians with little appreciation of the significance of their entering the cultural debate in the early 1960s.

In articulating the multicultural position through briefs, delegations and conferences, the Ukrainians entered the big league of the Canadian political process. For the first time, they were determined to affect *national* policy—to affect policy that would change the very way in which Canada was viewed. Canada's identity, they insisted, was multicultural because of its ethnic pluralism. Canada's identity must reflect its human reality (or at least its alleged human reality). The undertaking was a tremendous one. Ukrainians were, in fact, stepping for the first time out of their varied community ghettos onto the stage of a national forum, speaking as if with one voice and as if all were equally interested and enthusiastic. This is certainly how it appeared to the outsider, and it was in no one's interest to say or to do anything to change that impression. But when the federal government capitulated in October 1971, so virtually did the Ukrainians. They did not realize that they had moved out of the era of political advocacy (at which they were very good) into a new era of sustained political-power politics (at which they have shown themselves to be woefully inadequate). They had established themselves as a legitimate special-interest group, but no one then could have predicted how little stomach they had for the prolonged trench warfare that is the usual way of life of every pressure group on the national stage. The role that had been assumed required a seriousness of purpose that was not forthcoming.

Continued commitment was essential, because all governments, being in the hands of non-ethnic politicians, were at best lukewarm to the implementation of multiculturalism, and the losses, to refer only to the federal level (the losses at most provincial levels were even worse), were tremendous. Consider only this single, unfulfilled recommendation from the *First Annual Report of the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism*, released late in 1975:

It is recommended that in the implementation of its multiculturalism policy, the federal government make funds available to relevant

provincial departments for the teaching of languages other than English and French, and that these funds be used:

- a) To aid all schools and institutions which carry on a satisfactory language program . . . in the language and culture of an ethno-cultural group.
- b) To furnish teaching materials . . . on the arts, crafts, music, customs, literature, and history in the languages of interested groups.
- c) To train teachers . . . in languages spoken in Canada . . .
- d) To cover the costs of transporting students, renting buildings, and establishing school libraries.
- e) To assist in the establishment of . . . language camps . . . and . . . post-secondary language immersion centres.
- f) To assist interested organizations to advertise and promote language and culture classes, including the use of consultants in provincial departments of education to explain, organize and coordinate such classes.
- g) To begin the teaching of languages at the pre-school level . . .

Significant also has been the disparity between the funding of bilingualism and multiculturalism. In 1979-80 it was \$190,179,000 (with \$175 million for "Official Languages in Education") against \$7,783,000. In recent years, the one million francophones outside Quebec have received federal grants in support of their organizations averaging \$12 million to \$13 million annually. Few other groups have benefited; the Ukrainians, hardly at all. And in the constitutional distribution of powers, Ukrainians are recognized only symbolically—a good indication, incidentally, of the symbolic nature of the multiculturalism policy they were given in the first place.

The frustration for some has, of course, been tremendous. But why should the federal government act differently? *Is there anyone or anything ethnic, let alone Ukrainian, big enough to make the government act differently?* Non-ethnics are not charitable to ethnics—especially to white ethnics who really ought to know better than to parade their ethnicity to the nth generation. Ukrainians are certainly in no position to change their minds. The non-ethnics now know what they had always supposed: that Ukrainians are incapable of carrying on effective political action over any extended period of time. They may have a myriad of organizations, but they really are *not organized* at all. While excellent at developing Ukrainian festivals and classes in Ukrainian dancing, cuisine, Easter-egg painting and other arts and crafts, where the emphasis increasingly has been on making everything more beautiful, more perfect, more effective, they have failed to carry over

the same interest and enthusiasm and the same sense of sophistication into making more efficient organizations in Canada that have *political* as well as cultural goals. And this includes not just such traditional organizations as the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (SUS), the Ukrainian Catholic Brotherhood (BUK), the Ukrainian National Federation (UNO), the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (LVU), and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, but the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation as well. In its membership, finances and commitment, the federation is weak, poor and lukewarm, when what is most needed are many members, much money and deep dedication.

To explain this political ineptitude is not easy, but primacy of place probably belongs to what might be termed an impulse toward anarchy. Ukrainians seem determined to self-destruct—almost as if they had little will to live and were bent on genocide. They discuss their problem in Canada endlessly and can even quote a battery of statistics on their decline and their losses. Doing so is almost therapeutic, a kind of catharsis, but they seem incapable of devising any coordinated action that would reverse the losses and stem the decline. The incessant backbiting and tensions between Toronto, Winnipeg and Edmonton, and now between east and west, are perhaps normal in the Canadian circumstances, but *Ukrainians cannot afford the luxury of behaving like normal Canadians*. Their predicament makes them abnormal. But sadly, only the last immigration seems capable of appreciating that predicament, and they are the most divided of all!

At times it almost seems as if the least attractive part of the Ukrainian heritage is finally catching up with the Ukrainians. Apart from very brief periods in the tenth to thirteenth, the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries, they have been essentially a stateless people, and as such have not experienced the discipline that obtaining and holding power generates. Yet without that discipline, compromise is impossible, and without compromise and consensus, no coordinated action, the very basis of effective organization, can emerge. But perhaps the problem is really much deeper and even less flattering. Perhaps Ukrainians really do not know how to do things. Their roots, after all, are essentially rural, and even in urban centres they have been primarily working-class. With little opportunity to acquire administrative and political experience, they have a poor understanding of the political process, and such exceptions as do exist take little or no interest in Ukrainian organizations.

But whatever the reasons, the fact does remain that Ukrainians are quick to make their views known on any matter affecting

culture, language and national identity, but have neither the strength nor the stamina to follow through. Yet it is on the national level that one is up against the toughest players with the most effective back-up support. Naturally, it is there also that the absence of such support is most noticeable and also most embarrassing.

Well, then, what do we do and where do we go from here? These are essentially political questions, beyond this paper, which is basically analytic. I have tried to indicate the present situation of white ethnics like the Ukrainians—a situation that first must be well understood before future directions are charted. The goal is to spur discussion and further analysis in the belief that the present is a time for introspection, not action. In fact, further action should be contingent upon the quality of analysis. If it is good, the road ahead will be clear; if it is poor, there will be no reason to stir at all.

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak

FEMINISM IN UKRAINIAN HISTORY

At first glance, feminism would appear to have played a small role in Ukrainian history. As an ideology advocating women's liberation, feminism tends to arouse skeptical reactions, in much the same fashion as nationalism elicits weary sighs and raised eyebrows from many nationals of independent states or of dominant nations within an empire, who take their own national assertion for granted but consider the contemporary striving of others for national self-assertion to be cultural and political infantilism. Feminism and Ukrainian history? What could be more irrelevant? What could be less timely, given the many pressing needs of the Ukrainian nation, Ukrainian scholarship, and various groups of the Ukrainian diaspora?

A detailed analysis of the history of the Ukrainian women's movement, however, belies this contention. A closer look at feminism, moreover, reveals similarities between feminism and nationalism. Both have advanced the importance of an entity—Ukraine or women—whose existence as a valid and separate unit has been questioned. Both Ukrainians and women have had to justify their quest for autonomy within political and social systems that relegate them to subordinate positions. Both have had to face similar drawbacks: the lack of an institutional base, accusations of selfish exclusiveness, and charges of pettiness. The instruments for promoting both ideologies frequently have been limited to education and literature. The major issue for both has been how to achieve autonomy and legitimate self-worth, and how to gain some measure of individual independence.

Ukrainian women helped to create a nationally aware secular intelligentsia. But in the face of blatant political and national repression, of violation of basic human rights, Ukrainian women's organizations considered that the assertion of the rights of the nation had to be their first priority. For any Ukrainian in the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, being Ukrainian meant being hostile to the ideology that provided support for Russian tsarism and consciously accepting a progressive world view. All

Ukrainian patriots were progressive in their outlook and democratic in their politics. The recognition of the basic equality of men and women was an integral part of their orientation.

Ukrainian women managed to avoid the rigidly doctrinaire thinking that frequently doomed the Eastern-European intelligentsia to sterile discussions. They were neither expected to develop an ideology nor conditioned to such discussions. Instead, they concentrated on the "small deeds" approach, doing what needed to be done regardless of its scope. Failure to provide ideological justification for their work did not harm them, but failure to see the broader implications of feminism made them blind to the importance of their own work. Some eastern-Ukrainian women activists even denied being feminists, because they identified feminism with a narrow political liberalism. Zinaida Mirna, a woman activist originally from the Kuban, stressed that there was no conflict between the women's movement and dedicated patriotism:

In whatever forms the women's movement manifested itself in Ukraine, it strove for everything for which a true democracy aimed—an equal measure of freedom and responsibility for each individual as a precondition for the greater consciousness of the self and the better performance of one's duties toward the national community.¹

Although sexual equality was taken for granted within the Ukrainian patriotic milieu, a patronizing attitude within it toward women can nevertheless be detected. Concomitantly, the women downplayed their own importance and deferred to the men, even in defining the role of women.

What, after all, does the traditional role of the mother entail? Peasant women could never afford the luxury of just looking after husbands and children. They also ran the internal economy of the household, worked in the fields, and did extra work or fashioned handicrafts to supplement the family income. In the early stages of industrialization, the backbreaking labors in the fields were replaced by equally difficult work in the factories, or by taking in borders, laundering or sewing to earn money. Taras Shevchenko understood the reality of the life of peasant women when he wrote: "I do not know why they call a quiet peasant home a paradise." Even the widely quoted

U nashim rai na zemli
Nichoho krashchoho nemaie
Iak taia maty molodaia

¹ *Zhinka* (Lviv), 1937, no. 7.

is a poem on the loneliness of the mother, her unrequited love for her child. It ends with a doomsday prediction for the mother:

I liubytymesh neboho,
Poky ne zahynesh
Mezhy psamy na morozi
Denebud pid tynom!

Shevchenko died eight years before Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill published *On the Subjection of Women*, five years before 1,500 British women signed the first petition for woman suffrage, and in the year in which the Russian Empire formally abolished serfdom. He saw in a woman—Mariia Vilinska Markovych Zhuchenko, better known as Marko Vovchok—his spiritual successor.

The issue of sexual equality emerged in societies where women had the education and leisure time to formulate it. It emerged at a time when progress was glorified, the nuclear family was becoming the norm, and industrialization brought major changes in the lives of the masses. The "sexual equality" that resulted became a double burden for women who tried to fulfill the idealized role of mother and wife while pursuing community- or career-oriented goals.

Feminist thought distinguishes between four broad socio-psychological historical stages. In the pre-Bronze Age, it seems that birth, lactation, and the ability to bleed without dying endowed women with powers mysterious enough to create matriarchal systems. Later, these powers, no longer mysterious, became proof of the uncleanness and weakness of women and justified their subordination. In modern times, sexual equality was circumscribed by existing societal prejudices. Hence, even when legal equality was achieved, women could not make full use of it, because psychological, biological and societal barriers tended to perpetuate inequality. New feminism is searching for the means to best actualize the potential of both males and females without doing violence to the individual. This stage is predicated on the ability of the individual to achieve a sense of autonomy, authenticity and self-worth. Feminism, therefore, is a striving for individual autonomy and an attempt at ensuring the objective conditions for its realization. The ominous-sounding "liberation" is nothing but the Ukrainian "vyzvolennia" or "vyzvolnyi rukh," which elicits a surge of justified pride in our hearts. It connotes the legitimate quest for liberty, equal opportunity, and the right to individual autonomy.

Significantly, the first and still major feminist novel in Ukrainian literature, Olha Kobylanska's *Tsariwna* (The Princess), pub-

lished in 1896, stressed the attainment of personal authenticity and autonomy. This process was complicated by the fact that the heroine was a woman. As a woman who was denied education and travel, Kobylanska was more aware of the seductions of subordination lurking for women. Yet, autonomy was neither predicated on nor determined by the sex of her heroine. Mykyta Shapoval, an eastern-Ukrainian political activist, realized that the striving for autonomy and individual authenticity was at the core of Kobylanska's writing and used her as a model for his own quest for authenticity.²

Women's equality is most likely to be achieved during some serious crisis. When society, as a congregate of families, is itself threatened, everyone does what has to be done and not what he or she has been accustomed to doing. Throughout its history, Ukraine has been under virtually continuous pressure, which has frequently threatened its very survival. Women in frontier societies had to be more self-reliant and independent than women in stable societies. Frontier societies were characterized by independence, individualism and anarchy, attributes that Ukraine exhibited throughout the stages of its incorporation into the Russian Empire.

The situation in Western Ukraine was slightly different. After the eighteenth century, methods of social control there were more subtle. Politically, Western Ukrainian territories, especially Galicia, were under a parliamentary system, more or less. The opportunity for legal political activity for the Ukrainians in the nineteenth century, however, was not accompanied by the emancipation of women. The discrimination against women led to the formation of the first Ukrainian women's organizations in 1884 and gave rise to feminist literature. The issues raised by the Ukrainian feminists nearly one hundred years ago still remain relevant today.

What were the interests of the Ukrainian women, and how did they see themselves in the national picture?

In the Russian Empire, and to a lesser degree among the Poles, the discussion of the "women's question" became popular in the 1860s. It was closely tied to the questions of women's education, service to the common people in the countryside, and growth of an active opposition to tsarism. In theory at least, the women in the Russian Empire had control over their wealth. The women of the upper classes and the intelligentsia, therefore, once they broke with the traditional concepts of tsarism and class stratification, were more

² Shapoval, "Doba khatianstva," in *Ukrainska khata* (New York, 1955), pp. 35-6.

likely to be accepted into the mainstream of the opposition movement than was the case elsewhere in Europe. Since neither men nor women in the Russian Empire had political rights, the idealized version of the struggle for political liberty had them side by side.

In the Habsburg Empire, on the other hand, all women, children and the insane were specifically disenfranchised, but some men, and after 1907 all adult males, had the vote. A few western-Ukrainian women had been making political statements and writing minor literary works since 1848. The emancipation discussion, however, did not develop fully until the late 1870s. Then it was raised within the context of Western European socialism. The first Galician feminists were also socialists.

Like other socialists, the Ukrainian socialist men were very doctrinaire on the issue of women. Although they formally supported women's liberation, they insisted that women's inequality was inherent in the capitalist structure. It could be remedied solely through a socialist transformation of the system, and only through the labor movement. They considered feminism as such to be a bourgeois whim of spoiled ladies.

The major theoretician of Ukrainian feminism, however, openly claimed to be both a socialist and a feminist. Natalia Ozarkevych Kobrynska (1851-1920) was probably the first woman to point out the threat of the "double burden" of women that would come about when economic necessity forced them into the labor market while unchanged family roles left them with all the traditional household and child-rearing tasks. This is the major issue raised by women still today. In her debates with Klara Zetkin, the official specialist on women's affairs in the social-democratic movement, as well as with all the Ukrainian socialists, Kobrynska argued that socialism without feminism would be, at best, the liberation of only half of humanity. The socialists outside Galicia ignored her, while the Ukrainian socialists scoffed at her and sought out younger women who had not yet come to realize that the issue was not the nature of the economy, but woman's position as a person.

Kobrynska clashed with the socialists on doctrinal and tactical questions. She argued that change could be effective only if it was gradual and encompassed broad masses of the population. She saw the priests, their wives, and the first generation of the secular intelligentsia in Galicia as the natural transmission belts of new ideas to the village. These people, she stated, should not be alienated by useless rhetoric about class warfare, proletarian liberation, and free love. In Galicia, she quipped, the proletariat was made up of the widows of priests. Free love in the conditions of women's

economic dependence would only be another means of male domination. As partial means for accomplishing women's emancipation, she advocated the establishment of communal kitchens and child-care facilities. The latter—community child-care facilities, which Kobrynska saw as the kernels of the newly emerging communal society—became a standard desideratum of all women's organizations. The fact that mothers had to work in the field had led all too frequently to the tragic neglect of children for anyone to question the utility of day-care centres.

Criticism by Ukrainian socialists, compounded by their personal animosity toward this self-educated widow of one priest and daughter of another, goaded Kobrynska to stress her socialism. This deprived her of the support of the vast majority of women, who were non-socialist. At the same time, her insistence on feminism cost her the support of the young women socialists.

In 1884, Kobrynska organized the first women's rally and the first non-church-oriented women's society in Western Ukraine. She worked for woman suffrage. She was in the forefront of attempts at gaining access to secondary and higher education for women. She repeatedly and unsuccessfully tried to create a central organization of Ukrainian women. She also sought to establish a women's press and promoted a women's literature to help women become fully participating members of their communities. Generally, she ended up running and financing the publication ventures herself.

The exception was the first women's almanac, *Pershyi vinok* (the First Garland), published in 1887. It contained contributions by Ukrainian women from both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and demonstrated their solidarity. Ivan Franko and, more importantly, Olena Pchilka gave it their active support. Unfortunately the almanac's planned second volume, which was to include the work of the young Lesia Ukrainka (1871-1913) and the memoirs of Uliana Kravchenko (1860-1947), never appeared.

It would have been impossible for Kobrynska to publish the *First Garland* (she would have preferred a more prosaic title, such as the "Ukrainian Women's Almanac") without the financial support of Olena Pchilka. Olena Pchilka was a strong-willed and independent woman who was accustomed to working in adverse conditions; lacking Kobrynska's brooding nature and sensitivity, she did not care that she was considered an assertive, even pushy woman. An author, ethnographer and publisher in her own right, she did not involve herself in purely feminist work until 1905.

A closer look at Olena Pchilka brings to light the less tangible means by which the seemingly equal participation of eastern-

Ukrainian women in the national movement was tempered. Her husband, a shy and retiring government bureaucrat, was fascinated by her energy; although some of her actions made his professional life difficult, he did not stand in her way. But her brother, Mykhailo Drahomanov, who, under the guise of enlightened rationalism, set up the principles by which his own household was run and his daughter educated, was quite critical of his sister. She was not very intelligent, he wrote to Franko, but she made up for it by hard work. This about a woman who educated her four children at home lest they become Russified in the state-run schools; who translated the classics of literature for them into Ukrainian; who developed a "great books" reading program for them; who was the first woman to publish a book on ethnographical ornaments. Her life style simply made men uncomfortable. Drahomanov was quick to point out that he was for women's rights, provided someone minded the children. In his opinion, his sister spent too much time on public matters. He also considered her literary output, in which she portrayed positive, nationally conscious, educated women, lacking in real substance. Olena Pchilka, however, maintained that her protagonists "are drawn from real life, but I do not choose the types of heroines of [Marko] Vovchok, or [Panteleimon] Kulish, or even of Shevchenko—those gentle sweethearts, sisters, wives; I choose rather the figure of the woman patriot."³

Lesia Ukrainka, Olena Pchilka's famous daughter, grew up surrounded by active women. Yet, she questioned the validity of the women's movement in general. Like many successful women, she maintained that anyone could achieve what he or she wanted by dint of hard work and talent. Lesia, who always thought her own talent to be inferior, saw her own household tasks as most natural. She took care of her younger sisters, sewed, embroidered, made jams. At public meetings she knitted quietly until asked to speak. This deference was carried over into her public life. In 1905 Lesia Ukrainka was the one who kept drafting the by-laws of the new, legal organizations. Like other women, she also gravitated toward clerical work, courier duty, and other subordinate functions.

³ Unpublished letter of Olena Pchilka to Omelian Ohonovsky, in Lviv, Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv, Kolektsiia Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka, f. 390, opys 1, p. 74. Drahomanov wrote on 1 February 1888: "It was not without fear that I read her autobiography, but I'm calm now; there is nothing indecent there, although certain details are superfluous." A few weeks earlier, he wrote: "I'm apprehensive about Pchilka, although, to tell you the truth, if I were not concerned about her children, some difficulty with the police would do her some good." *Lysty do Ivana Franka* (Lviv, 1908), pp. 115, 107-8.

The first modern political organizations of the Ukrainians were predictably all male. (So was the Kiev Hromada, which survived until 1917; it functioned as an influential old-boys' club, which justified the exclusion of women by recalling the traditions of the Sich.⁴) The Ukrainian movement in the nineteenth century, however, was so dependent upon the activism of a small number of families that the women perforce had to play a role in it. Frequently, because they were not employees of the government, they were able to do more work than the men. The women were considered by the Okhrana, the Russian secret police, to be more dangerous and more revolutionary than the men, although this opinion may reflect the male bias of the police itself.

Women were active in the major political currents in the Russian Empire—national, democratic, liberal, social-revolutionary, socialist and communist. They were most visible in the terrorist movement, to which many dedicated their energies and even their lives. Catherine Breshko-Breshkovskaia, “the grandmother of the revolution,” came from Ukraine. Sofiiia Perovskaia, who was hanged in 1881 for her complicity in the assassination of the tsar, was remembered in Ukraine as a descendant of the last hetman of Ukraine, Rozumovsky.

Ukrainian women, like women all over the world, agonized over their choice of priority—the family or the cause. Breshkovskaia abandoned her infant for the revolution; Perovskaia had no life beyond the revolution. Sofiiia Lindfors-Rusova, the politically active educator, was jailed when her children were small. She brooded over the effect her absence might have on her children, but resolved the conflict by convincing herself that unless radical change were brought about in the Russian Empire, the lives of her children would be miserable anyway. Mariia Tkachenko-Livvytska, the wife of one of the presidents of the Ukrainian National Republic in exile and the mother of another, wrote openly about the difficulty she had choosing between motherhood and political activity.⁵

Educational opportunity, self-education and writing accustomed the Ukrainian women to public activity. Writers in Ukraine

⁴ The reality was much more prosaic: Volodymyr Antonovych remarried, and his new wife did not fit into the clique. So the Hromada, to avoid unpleasantness, excluded women. Ie. Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* (New York, 1955), p. 93. Maria Livvytska, *Na hrani dvokh epokh* (New York, 1972), p. 61, errs, when she considers Lesia Ukrainka to have been a member of the Hromada.

⁵ *Na hrani dvokh epokh*, pp. 155-6.

were always public figures, creators as well as symbols of the modern Ukrainian ethos. The best women writers, however, were those who renounced the joys of family life: Lesia Ukrainka, Olha Kobylianska, Olena Teliha. Olena Pchilka, who tried to combine both writing and family life, was one of the most active feminists in eastern Ukraine. In 1905 she, along with other women, forced the Russian feminists to recognize the right to national self-determination. Ukrainian political activists and writers have consigned this manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism by the women to complete obscurity.

Frequently, men have extolled their own picture of women instead of the actual achievement of women. Stepan Smal-Stotsky, in an article in honor of Kobylianska's fortieth anniversary as a writer, wrote about the woman who never married or bore children: "The intrepid struggle of Kobylianska has nothing in common with the emancipation movement, for the highest ideal of women that Kobylianska puts forward throughout is the *ideal of a good wife, a good mother*."⁶ Not only was this untactful, it was incorrect; but Smal-Stotsky's authority could not be challenged. At this time, in the 1920s, even a Ukrainian chapter of the Association of Women with a Higher Education disintegrated because the women could not stand the ridicule.

In times of crisis, individual women rose to the occasion. Young Galician women, protesting the unqualified support for the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Ukrainian political parties, initiated a national emergency fund early in 1913. It was to be used to transform the impending war into a national liberation struggle.⁷ During the First World War, Olena Stepaniv was the first woman to enlist in the Austrian army in preparation for the Ukrainian one. In that crisis of crises, the formation of Ukrainian governments in 1917 and 1918, women in eastern Ukraine were elected to positions of authority. Real power, however, eluded them. They gravitated toward welfare and educational work. In western Ukraine on 1 November 1918, women volunteers were turned down for military and civil service, and a male officer was detailed even to run the kitchen. Later in the year, women complained publicly in *Dilo*, the most prestigious Galician Ukrainian

⁶ Olha Kobylianska: *Almanakh u pamiatku ii soroklitnoi pysmenytskoi diialnosti 1887-1927* (Chernivtsi, 1928), p. 278.

⁷ *Vidhuky: Organ ukrainskoi molodi*, February 1913, pp. 1-2; on the resolution of the political parties supporting the Austro-Hungarian Empire see Kost Levytsky, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukrainiv, 1848-1914*, part 2 (Lviv, 1926), p. 634.

newspaper, about the lack of representation of women in the higher levels of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic.

We must not belabor the issue: the story of Ukrainian women is similar to the story of women elsewhere. Full emancipation has not been achieved yet.

Ukrainian feminism, as an ideology and as an organizational principle, was saved—ironically—by the Bolsheviks. We must go forward and backward in time to see the irony of this phenomenon.

The Bolsheviks suppressed the feminists and established their own variants of women's organizations. None of the prominent Ukrainian women were in the leadership of the party *zhinvidily*. The *zhinvidily*, which were to mobilize the women for communism, were disbanded in 1930, the year that Olena Pchilka, an open critic of Bolshevik policies in Ukraine, died. Collectivization, Russification, the famine and the purges completely discredited not only communism, but many aspects of socialism. Feminism freed from the socialist ideological strait jacket came to attract women.

Owing to the above, as well as to the experiences of the Ukrainian national-liberation struggle, the coming together of various organizations of Ukrainian women, and the international contacts that were made through women's organizations, by 1921 Ukrainian women outside the Soviet Union were ready to form an effective women's organization. The Women's Union (Soiuz Ukrainok)—founded in western Ukraine, which was then under Poland, but representing an even larger number of Ukrainian women outside that territory—was significant in the general European context. Symptomatically, few of its members realized its singular characteristics. It was a mass organization that pursued effective and moderate programs promoting social and economic change. It brought together women of different social classes and political views. Together these women carried out programs that enjoyed popular support. Their activities helped peasant women to improve their economic position and to increase their earning potential. It also made them aware of social and political concerns. Peasant women, like the women of other social classes, became nationally aware and active.

For Ukrainian women, feminism was a pragmatic movement that promoted economic, personal and cultural progress. It did not challenge God, country or family. Rather, it expanded the social role of women by appealing to them to engage in enlightened service to God and country. But unlike the quasi-fascist and integral-nationalist organizations—which the union denounced vehemently, openly and early—the union never lost sight of the needs of the autonomous individual.

To illustrate the type of work done by the women and the influence of feminism in Western Ukrainian society in the interwar years, it is most convenient to look at the work of Olena Simenovykh Kysilevska, who died in Canada in 1954, and of Milena Rudnytska, who after 1945 tried unsuccessfully to continue the same kind of feminism in Europe, Canada and the United States.

Kysilevska, by her own account, became a feminist at the age of six, when she found out that men could vote and women could not. She was the youngest participant in the first Ukrainian women's rally in 1884. She founded and edited, in the 1920s, *Zhinocha dolia* (Women's Fate), a simply written and very effective journal in Kolomyia, which served as a means for organizing women for over a decade. It dealt with manageable, practical subjects. Its common-sense approach was reinforced by contributions from her brother, who lived in the United States, in which he extolled the virtues of hard work for all social classes.

Kysilevska's treatment of feminism cut through the maze of subtle arguments. She argued simply that since emigration and seasonal migratory labor were no longer options open to the peasants, the only way they could survive was by more intensive and rational farming. This could be done only through the participation of educated women. Otherwise, a low standard of living, frequently reduced to bare marginal existence, would be the lot of the peasants. Education, a larger public role, and political participation for women were preconditions for effective modernization. Without a women's organization it would be impossible to reach the peasant women with the information they needed to implement more rational agricultural techniques. Kysilevska helped develop a training program for the women activists, who tirelessly travelled through the Galician countryside setting up branches of the Women's Union.

At first, Ukrainian men did not oppose the Women's Union. Indeed, some aided the effort, not because they necessarily favored equality for women, but because of economic considerations. Much of Poland's economy was controlled (if not owned) by the interwar Polish government, which allocated little of its revenues for the needs of those areas where Ukrainians lived. The Ukrainians, therefore, had to rely upon their own community organizations for basic social services. In 1921, the same year in which the Women's Union was established, the network of Ukrainian economic cooperatives started under the Austro-Hungarian Empire was centralized. The cooperatives traded extensively in dairy products and eggs, the production of which was primarily in the hands of the women in

the peasant household. Unless these women could be persuaded to sell to the cooperative rather than to the local private merchants, the cooperatives had little chance for expansion. So, throughout the 1920s, the cooperatives, as well as the major cultural organization of the Ukrainians, Prosvita, assisted women's organizational efforts.

The interests of Ukrainian peasant women were very practical. Kysilevska, along with others, offered instructions on what to plant and when, how to fertilize, how to run a household and a garden more efficiently, how to cook, and what to clean and how. She offered suggestions on making down jackets as an inexpensive substitute for the unaffordable furs and coats, and provided specific instructions on energy-saving insulated containers in which cereals could finish cooking in their own steam. The advice given Ukrainian women in the 1920s could be repeated in Eastern Europe today: do not overcook vegetables, serve a varied diet (recipes were provided), bathe frequently, encourage outdoor activities for infants and children, install insulated windows that could be opened. The column of advice from the "New World" (by Kysilevska's brother) stressed self-reliance, small beginnings, ingenuity and willingness to take on menial work regardless of one's status.

In no uncertain words, *Zhinocha dolia* defended the right of the mother to free time and her need to grow intellectually. It stated that other members of the family, especially boys, should share in housekeeping duties. Mothers should set aside time for themselves and not deny themselves excessively when it came to clothing and cultural entertainment. They should organize day-care centres or at least arrange for shared baby-sitting.

Cooking and sewing courses organized by the Women's Union were extremely popular. They taught peasant women marketable skills and helped vary the diet and dress of the peasants. Quite a number of villages—where the women formed informal cooperatives—invested in modern cooking gadgets.

The growth of literacy, agitation by the political parties, the expansion of community organizations, the repressive Polish policies that blocked upward mobility for the Ukrainians, and the existence of a parliamentary process contributed to a massive expansion in the public awareness of the Western Ukrainian women. The peasant women quickly saw the connection between their daily existence and the exercise of political rights. Unless appropriate legislation was passed, women's concerns would go unheeded. Kysilevska and Rudnytska stressed the meshing of the family with society and the state, and the crucial role of women.

"There are many economic, educational, child-care and other issues that women understand better than men," Kysilevska editorialized.⁸

By early 1930, more than 50,000 women in Galicia alone were active in the Women's Union. Many more joined the affiliated organizations in other parts of Poland and elsewhere. The women's organizations actively fostered the political participation of women. Rudnytska, who headed the Women's Union from 1927 to 1939, was active politically and was elected to the Sejm, the lower house of parliament. Kysilevska and Olena Levchanivska, the latter from Volhynia, served in the Senate. Other members of the union were very active in various political parties.

The second decade of the Women's Union was marked by a growth of more specific feminist concerns. The quality of feminist writing rose, and the new women's newspaper, *Zhinka* (Woman), founded in Lviv in 1935, tackled issues of interest to educated women: the expansion of job opportunities, job equality, career training, living alone, personal growth, sex education, the underrepresentation of women in central organizations, generational conflict, and the like. Self-confidence, a work ethic, and a positive approach to life were consciously fostered in an attempt to eradicate the sluggishness and drudgery of both peasant existence and women's life in general. Poetry and music, conventions, and marches and mass exercises were used to promote such attitudes. The goal was to foster women who would be capable and willing to participate in all aspects of national life.

But the more women assumed public roles, the more they experienced sexist discrimination first-hand. Inflation and the Depression eased women out of the work force and generated a tendency to pay women less than men.

Rudnytska emerged as the chief theoretician of feminism in interwar Poland. Politically, her conception of feminism fitted into the democratic-liberal framework, which was shared by many, although by no means all, members of the union. Rudnytska stressed not just the compatibility, but also the organic connections among feminism, nationalism and motherhood. A good mother was also a good citizen. If the interests of the mother were limited only to the house, however, the potential of the child would be stunted. Rudnytska reminded Ukrainian women that it was their own laziness and lack of ambition that underlay their second-rate status in society.

⁸ *Zhinocha dolia*, September 1925, p. 5.

In many ways Rudnytska was an atypical Western Ukrainian woman: she was coolly rational, understood political power, and lacked popular sentimentality to such a degree that she did not resort to the popular device of quoting poetry in her speeches. She was, moreover, separated from her husband, and although she was baptized a Catholic, her religiousness was largely pro forma until probably the 1950s. Nevertheless, Rudnytska was a popular, effective and charismatic president of the union who was able to work with women of different political convictions.

A very dramatic manifestation of women's power was the successful Women's Congress in Stanyslaviv in 1934. While the men were only talking about convening an all-Ukrainian congress, the women demonstrated their power and solidarity. The resolutions passed at the congress underlined the importance that women ascribed to themselves and the women's movement:

Underlining the postulates of the women's movement in general—the equality of high moral standards of women and men—[the Ukrainian women's movement] stresses the equal responsibility of women and men for the size and quality of the new generation, its health, strength and upbringing.... Since the family is the social and biological unit of the nation... we demand the upgrading of the position and dignity of the woman as mother and the assurance of equal rights for both mothers and fathers. Yet, although we value very highly the calling of the woman as mother, the Congress nevertheless goes on record against the contention that motherhood is the sole vocation for the woman in society and the sole measure of her worth as a person.... Women's movements are not yet a completed stage in history: their tasks are not only the struggle for the external conditions necessary for the growth of women, but also the drawing of women into roles in which they could be jointly determinantal and jointly responsible elements in the life of the nation.⁹

As the strength of the women's movement grew, so did open opposition to it. The Cooperative Association tried to create a separate women's affiliate. Lay Catholic intelligentsia tried to subvert the ratification of a new statute of the Women's Union through a last-minute inclusion of a fundamentalist religious clause. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was in many ways a youth-oriented movement, stressed that each

⁹ *Rezoliutsii Ukrainskoho zhinochoho kongresu, Stanyslaviv, 23-27 VI, 1934 (Lviv, 1934).*

woman was important since she could be a potential mother of sons. Without questioning this aspect of the OUN program, the women became not only mothers, but also dedicated colleagues, bearing this double burden with exemplary fortitude, if not foresight. But the union survived this three-pronged attack.

Feminism—expressed through an organization of women for equality and for the expansion of their role in society—contributed to the success of the Ukrainian national renaissance and aided the modernization of Ukrainian society. The women were able to achieve some of their goals before the Second World War put an end to the activities of the Women's Union. By encouraging women to become active in community life, feminism increased the number of active and conscious Ukrainians. Whether Ukrainian women's organizations today, both in Ukraine and elsewhere, are continuing to promote the growth of women or whether they isolate them in certain types of activity, is a matter for debate, not lecture.

Thomas M. Prymak

HERZEN ON POLAND AND UKRAINE

Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) was probably the most influential Russian journalist of the nineteenth century. He was the single most important founder of that intellectual, social, and political movement called "populism." This movement espoused a peculiar Russian vision of socialism. It affirmed the idea of progress, yet planned to avoid the perils of Western European capitalism by using the primitive Russian village commune as the basis for a future socialist reorganization of society. This theory of a "separate path" to modernity, prosperity and equality is the basic idea of Russian populism. Together with a deep commitment to individual and popular liberty, this theory of "Russian socialism" forms the main thrust of Herzen's journalistic writings.¹

Herzen had been an admirer of the West. But first-hand experience as an émigré in Western Europe, the horrors of nineteenth-century urban life, with its factory system, and the failure of the revolutions of 1848 persuaded him to turn his eyes toward Russia and America. Europe was old and burdened with the dead weight of tradition, but Russia and America were young and just

¹ There is no complete biography of Herzen in English. But there are several detailed treatments of him in the general histories of the populist movement, beginning with Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution* (London, 1960), pp. 1-35, and ending with Adam Ulam, *In the Name of the People* (New York, 1977), pp. 31-52. There is a full but very stiff Soviet biography: I. E. Elsberg, *Gertzen: Zhizn i tvorchestvo* (Moscow, 1963), and a popular one in Polish: W. and R. Śliwowski, *Aleksander Hercen* (Warsaw, 1973). M. Malia's widely acclaimed *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961) deals only with Herzen's intellectual formation. The more recent work by Edward Acton, *Alexander Herzen and the Role of the Intellectual Revolutionary* (Cambridge, 1979), leaves much to be desired. There is a good bibliography of the relevant Soviet scholarship in V. A. Diakov's article on Herzen in *Slavianovedenie v dorevoliutsionoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 119-20.

entering the arena of world history. Russia had its village commune, and America, its spirit of liberty; both had vast empty lands that would become the backdrop to future chapters in the book of history. Thus there were two sides to Herzen's psyche. His negative attitude toward Europe put him in a bloc with the conservative Moscow Slavophiles, who idealized Russia, the commune, and the tsar. Yet Herzen's basic faith in the idea of progress marked him off from the Slavophiles and put him in the camp of the radicals, socialists, and revolutionaries, who were seeking to turn the world upside down and to set things right once and for all.²

Herzen developed a commitment to national as well as purely social liberties. Under the influence of the Decembrists, Herzen had acquired an interest in the idea of a Slavic federation. His appreciation of the federal concept was deepened by his study of the French social theorist Pierre Proudhon, who was at that time the most influential exponent of local control and individual liberty. His understanding of federalism was deepened by an acquaintance with the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, whose *Democracy in America* was filled with praise for local democracy and the American federal system. Herzen wanted to see all Slavs united in a voluntary federation that would protect the rights of each nation and in which no nation would lord it over another.³ On the other hand, in his newspaper *Kolokol* (The Bell),

² Both the "revolutionary democrat" Herzen and the ideologue Marx are sacred figures in the Soviet pantheon, even though Herzen sided with Marx's opponent Pierre Proudhon on most of the basic questions of socialism, and Marx (who had no love for either Slavs or Slavophiles) described Herzen as "half a Russian but wholly a Muscovite" who prophesizes that "Europe needs rejuvenating with the help of the knout and a compulsory injection of Kalmuk blood." For a brilliant analysis of the Herzen-and-Europe theme, see Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy* (Oxford, 1975), esp. p. 587, n. 7. For a provocative exposé of Marx's national prejudices, see Nathaniel Weyl, *Karl Marx: Racist* (New York, 1979).

³ On Proudhon and Herzen, see R. Labry, *Alexandre Ivanovich Herzen* (Paris, 1928), pp. 338-40. As early as 1837, Herzen was familiar with de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. In 1861, it was translated into Russian and published in Kiev by a group of Ukrainian federalists, who sent Herzen a copy. See his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 30 vols. (Moscow, 1954-66), 8:296, and R. Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia* (Princeton, 1972), p. 72. For a general account of Herzen as federalist, see D. von Mohrenschildt, *Toward a United States of Russia* (London and Toronto, 1981), pp. 167-77.

which he had set up in London with the help of Polish émigrés and exiles, Herzen championed the right of the Poles and the Finns to national independence—if they insisted upon it. He considered the partition of Poland to be an injustice and a crime that had to be righted. But he urged the Poles to consider seriously the Slavic alternative. Perhaps federalism would help to solve the difficult question of the borderlands, where a mixed population lived.⁴

When Herzen first arrived in the West, he found many Poles there to greet him. Following the failure of the November Insurrection of 1831, almost the entire Polish intellectual and political elite had fled to Western Europe.⁵ This "Great Emigration" was divided into two large factions. First, there was the aristocratic grouping led by Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770-1861). This wing of the emigration had its centre in the Hotel Lambert in Paris, which the "old prince" had made his home. The goal of the Hotel Lambert wing was the restoration of Poland within the boundaries of 1772 with the diplomatic or military aid of the Western powers. An aristocrat by birth, Herzen moved easily in noble circles and had, in fact, some contacts with the Hotel Lambert.⁶ Moreover, some of the conservatives around Czartoryski seemed to be rather flexible on the vexing question of Poland's eastern frontiers. A few of them even espoused an independent "Ruś," or Ukraine, federated

⁴ G. Kurpisowa's *Aleksander Hercen a emigracja polska w latach 1847-1870* (Gdansk, 1964) is a good general treatment of Herzen and the Poles. See pp. 64-5 on the late 1850s. Also see I. M. Beliaevskaia, "Polskoe natsionalno-osvoboditelnoe dvizhenie i Gertsen (1860e gg.)," in *Literaturnoe nasledstvo* 64 (Moscow, 1958), pp. 751-78, which is one of the better Soviet accounts.

⁵ On the Great Emigration, see S. Kalembe, *Wielka emigracja* (Warsaw, 1971); S. M. Falkovich, *Ideino-politicheskaia borba v polskom osvoboditelnom dvizhenii* (Moscow, 1966); and the relevant parts of P. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland* (Seattle, 1974), pp. 105-79.

⁶ On Czartoryski, see the account of the conservative historian M. Kukiel, *Czartoryski and European Unity* (Princeton, 1955). On Herzen and the Hotel Lambert, see the remarks of S. Kieniewicz in *Przegląd historyczny*, 1956, no. 2, pp. 435-9, and H. Wereszycki, "Stosunki Hotelu Lambert z Hercenem i Bakuninem w przededniu powstania styczniowego," *Przegląd historyczny*, 1957, no. 2, pp. 234-69. More generally see R. Slivovsky, "Gertsen glazami poliakov," in *Problemy izucheniia Gertsena* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 370-92, which gives a good review of the Polish literature.

with Poland and Lithuania. But their hostility to Russia precluded any real cooperation.⁷

The other wing of the Great Emigration was radical and revolutionary. Its main organization was the Towarzystwo Demokratyczne, or Democratic Society, based in London. These exiles, too, hoped to restore Poland within the boundaries of 1772, but through a political and social revolution. They came to be called "Reds" in contrast to the "Whites" of the Hotel Lambert. Herzen shared the radical disposition of this group, and his best friend among the Poles, Stanisław Worcell (1799-1857), was one of its leaders.⁸ Unfortunately, the Democrats did not share Herzen's ideas about federalism. They stood more clearly in the Jacobin tradition of highly centralized revolutionary government, and they would not talk about any frontiers other than those of 1772. To the members of the Democratic Society, a Russian Ukraine, or even an independent Ukraine, was out of the question. By and large, the Poles simply could not think in any terms other than those of a restored Polish Commonwealth. To them, "Litwa" and "Ruś," by which they meant Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine, were integral and inseparable parts of Poland.

To the Catholic and Polish-speaking gentry of these areas, this made perfect sense; to the Orthodox countryfolk and the

⁷ The two most important "Ukrainophiles" in the Polish emigration were the Cossack enthusiast Michał Czajkowski (1804-86), who had "turned Turk" and led the Ottoman Cossacks against the Russians in the Crimean War, and the eccentric ethnographer Franciszek Duchiniński (1816-93), who proposed that the Russians were not really Slavs at all, but ethnic Finns. Of lesser importance was Henryk Krasiniński (1804-76), who wrote several books in English on Polish-Ukrainian topics. On Krasiniński, see *Polski słownik biograficzny*, 15: 174-5; on Duchiniński, see I. L. Rudnytsky, "Franciszek Duchiniński and His Impact on Ukrainian Political Thought," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4 (1979-80): 690-705. On Czajkowski, see the biography by J. Chudzikowska, *Dziwne życie Sadyka Paszy: O Michał Czapkowski* (Warsaw, 1971). In English, there is only the biographical outline by Thomas M. Prymak, "The Strange Life of Sadyk Pasha," *Forum* (Scranton, Pa.), no. 50 (1982), forthcoming.

⁸ See Peter Brock, *Polish Revolutionary Populism* (Toronto, 1977), an intellectual history that unfortunately breaks off at the 1850s. B. Nikolaevsky, in "Za vashu i nashu volnost!" *Novyi zhurnal* 4 (1944): 261-9, has suggested that the ideas of the radical Polish historian Joachim Lelewel about the primitive Slavic commune may have, in part, inspired Herzen's populism. Both Brock, p. 91, and Malia, *passim*, treat this hypothesis with caution.

Russian and Ukrainian educated classes who claimed to speak for them, it did not.⁹ During the 1840s and 1850s, a veritable national awakening had begun in Ukraine. By 1860, the poet Shevchenko was a celebrity, and the views of the historian Mykola Kostomarov about two Rus' nationalities were becoming known. These personalities, who had once headed the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius (which espoused a pan-Slavic federation with its capital in Kiev), were now active with other Ukrainophiles in the Ukrainian Hromada in Saint Petersburg. They had no sympathy for a renewed Commonwealth that was to include Ukraine,

⁹ The Poles remained an influential but distinct minority. Statistics are not easily obtained for the middle of the last century. However, a very detailed census was carried out in 1897 and is analyzed in W. Wielhorski, "Ziemia ukraińska Rzeczypospolitej: Zarys dziejów," in *Pamiętnik Ki-jowski* (London, 1959-64), vol. 1, in the chapter "Liczoność polaków na Rusi na przełomie w. XIX i XX," pp. 86-90. The following table is based on information therein:

	Volhynia Gubernia	Podolia Gubernia	Kiev Gubernia
Ukrainians	67.1%	75.1%	78.5%
Poles	9.9%	8.8%	2.9%
Jews	13.4%	12.3%	12.3%
Germans	5.8%		
Russians	2.7%	2.6%	5.4%
			(3.8% without the city of Kiev)
Total population (excluding military)	2,939,000	2,984,000	3,526,000

In the first months of Polish demonstrations in 1861, the conservative Russian Pan-Slavs warmly greeted the Poles; but after the mass demonstration of October 1861 at Horodko near Lublin, where the Poles and their sympathizers claimed the borders of 1772, Pogodin, Aksakov, and others reacted fiercely and protested to the Czech leaders Rieger and Palacky and to the French liberal Guizot on behalf of the Orthodox countryfolk of "Rus'." Rieger and Palacky responded by reproving the Poles for these pretensions. See M. Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism* (New York, 1956), pp. 180-1, citing M. Pogodin, *Stati politicheskii i polskii vopros 1856-67* (Moscow, 1876), *passim*.

and in the public debate of the early 1860s, they made their views known.¹⁰

Herzen was well aware of the Ukrainian position. He knew that the Ukrainian leaders resented their subservience to Moscow, and that they did not approve of the dominance of the "Muscovite-Russian" language. He did not underestimate the importance of Shevchenko, for he knew that Shevchenko was, in Herzen's own words, "a political figure and a fighter for freedom" as well as a poet. For his part, Shevchenko returned the admiration, sketching a portrait of the Russian journalist into his personal diary under the entry for 10 December 1857.¹¹

* * *

"Russia and Poland" was first published in *Kolokol*, Herzen's free Russian newspaper in London, on 15 January 1859. At that time *Kolokol*'s popularity was at its height, and it was rumored that the tsar himself read it.¹² Alexander II had already begun

¹⁰ On the Cyrillo-Methodians, see G. Luciani, *Le livre de la genèse du peuple ukrainien* (Paris, 1956); K. Kostiv, *Knyhy buttia ukrainskoho narodu* (Toronto, 1980), contains the Luciani text and an English one as well. No general study of the Ukrainian national awakening exists, but G. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Ševčenko* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) is a good starting point. M. Zerov's *Leksii z istorii ukrainskoi literatury* (Toronto, 1977) (which was written in the 1920s), is also a good source of information. For an introduction to the Polish-Ukrainian theme, see J. Lobodowski, "Polish-Ukrainian Literary Relations," in *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1963), pp. 1092-7; and S. Kieniewicz, "Stosunki polsko-ukrainskie w latach 1820-1870," in *Sesja naukowa w trzechsetną rocznicę zjednoczenia Ukrainy z Rosją, 1654-1954* (Warsaw, 1956), pp. 131-57. On the late 1850s and early 1860s, see Z. Markiewicz, "Taras Shevchenko na tli polsko-ukrainskoho zbyzhennia," *Suchasnist*, 1961, no. 4, pp. 19-30; he maintains that this was a hopeful period for Ukrainian-Polish cooperation.

¹¹ I. Borshchak, "Hertsen, Ukraina i Shevchenko," *Ukraina* (Paris), 1950, no. 3, pp. 183-4. Also, see T. V. Polianina, "A. I. Gertsen ob Ukraine," *Lvovskii Universitet: Trudy Kafedry rossiiskoi literatury*, 2 (Lviv, 1958): 26-43, which should be compared with Y. Slavutych, "Alexander Herzen and Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 16 (1960): 342-8.

¹² "Kolokol," *izdanie A. I. Gertsena: Sistematizirovannaia rospis* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 5-10. A few excerpts from "Russia and Poland" appeared in English translation in *Forum* (Scranton, Pa.), no. 4 (1967-68), p. 25.

his program of reform and had announced the approaching emancipation of the serfs. Thus, the terms of the emancipation and the new forms of local government were public issues and ones that Herzen was keen to speak out on. The immediate stimulus for the article was a critical piece in the Paris-based *Przegląd rzeczy polskich* (Survey of Polish Affairs). This newsletter was similar to the organ of the Democratic Society, *Demokrata Polski*, but was strongly under the influence of Ludwik Mierosławski (1814-78), one of the Polish heroes of 1848 and a patriotic military man who held very strong views about the permanence of the borders of 1772. The piece criticized Herzen for suggesting that a free Poland should remain together with a free Russia, and for thinking that the tsar's reforms could lead to a real solution to the problems confronting Eastern Europe. *Przegląd rzeczy polskich* accused Herzen of denying that "Ruś" and "Litwa" were integral parts of Poland and of wanting to push the borders of Poland back to the Vistula basin.¹³

Herzen's emphatic reply is contained in two "letters" to his Polish critic. The second is translated below. Herzen believed that Slavic federalism is the ideal, but that Poland should be independent if that is really what the Poles want. Moreover, he applied this same principle to Ukraine. The Ukrainians have their own language and traditions, and if they do not wish to be part of either Poland or Russia, then so be it. They, too, have a right to independence. Nevertheless, a pan-Slavic federation is the preferable solution.

Herzen's appeal was not warmly received by the Poles. Both *Demokrata polski* and *Przegląd rzeczy polskich* rejected the federal idea and stood by the frontiers of 1772. Only the increasing tensions in Poland, where revolution could break out any day, eventually pushed the "Red" faction toward an agreement with the *Kolokol* group. In September 1862, Herzen and the Polish representatives of a recently formed, underground "Central Committee" in Warsaw finally came to an agreement. In return for the support of those circles of Russian officers that were inclined toward revolution, the central committee agreed that the non-Polish nationalities within the territory of the former Commonwealth should have the right to decide their own future. During the negotiations, this was

¹³ See the works cited in n. 4 and A. Slisz, "Współpraca polskich i rosyjskich sił postępowych w polskiej prasie emigracyjnej i konspiracyjnej lat 1859-1864," in *Z dziejów współpracy rewolucyjnej polaków i rosjan w drugiej połowie XIX wieku* (Wrocław, 1956), pp. 9-70, esp. pp. 40-3.

interpreted as a promise by the Poles to hold a plebiscite in Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine.¹⁴

Meanwhile, in Western Europe there was little interest in the ethnic problems of the East. Liberals had a romantic attachment to the Polish cause, while conservatives could seldom bring themselves to dwell upon the lot of unlettered and unknown rustic peoples. Nevertheless, even here Herzen's exposition of the vexing borderland problem, and the public debate of which it was a part, produced some slight movement of opinion. Both in France and in England a voice or two was raised on the issue. The discussion was not entirely in vain.¹⁵

In contrast to the Poles and their West European sympathizers, the Ukrainians' response to Herzen's appeal was very positive. It was, in fact, one of real jubilation. Kostomarov penned an enthusiastic letter thanking Herzen and reiterating that "the disputed lands do not belong to either the Pole or the Russian." Kostomarov also accepted the idea of a federal union of all Slavs "even under the sceptre of the Russian tsar, if this tsar becomes the sovereign of free peoples and not the autocrat of a voracious Tataro-German Muscovy."¹⁶

At the time Herzen's "Russia and Poland" was written, the concepts of federalism and national liberation were new and little known. At the same time, however, the problem of nationality was looming ever larger. There was much confusion between the older,

¹⁴ M. K. Dziewanowski, "Herzen, Bakunin, and the Polish Insurrection of 1863," *Journal of Central European Affairs* 8 (1948-9): 58-78. M. Drahomanov, in his *Istorieskaia Polsha i velikoruskaia demokratiia* (Geneva, 1881), p. 113, wrote that Herzen's appeal of 1860 "did not have the slightest effect upon Polish society."

¹⁵ Charles de Montalembert's well-known brochure in praise of Poland, *Une nation en deuil* (Paris, 1861), p. 22, notes the oppression of the non-Polish peasantry in the eastern borderlands and suggests that this oppression has been weathered by the population "qui doivent éveiller la plus vive sollicitude des patriots polonais." Two years later, Lord Salisbury noted that Poland oppressed its subject peoples. See L. Namier, *1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals* (New York, 1964), p. 94. More generally, see E. Birke, *Frankreich und Ostmitteleuropa im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 1960).

¹⁶ "Ukraina," *Kolokol*, 15 January 1860. Drahomanov took great interest in this letter and reprinted it in Geneva in 1885. It is also available in English translation in D. Doroshenko, *Survey of Ukrainian History*, ed. O. Gerus (Winnipeg, 1975), pp. 542-3.

religious and historic, conceptions of the nation and the newer, linguistic and ethnic, ones.

A good example of the prevailing confusion was the inconsistency in the use of the term "Rus' ". The Poles used it to refer to ancient and modern Ukraine, but not to Muscovy. Kostomarov and the Ukrainians were inclined toward the Polish view but, in their public writings at least, did not accept it completely. This was left to a later generation. Meanwhile, Herzen used "Rus' " when referring to the lands of all the peoples we now call "the Eastern Slavs." At the same time, he used "*Malorossiiia*" or "*Ukraina*" when referring specifically to the Ukrainian territories.¹⁷

The problem also occurs on another level. For example, Herzen used "*Rossiiia*" when referring to official, bureaucratic Russia, as well as to the Russia that holds out its hand in friendship to Poland. Thus, the distinction between the revered "*sviataia Rus'*" of the Moscow Slavophiles and the hated official "*Rossiiia*" of Germanic Saint Petersburg became somewhat blurred. It was not Herzen who suggested renaming the empire "Petrovia," but had this proposition been accepted, it might have clarified the issue somewhat and brought out the distinction between official "Petrovia" and unofficial Rus'. As it was, Herzen's vocabulary reveals a hazy sense of national identity, typical of those nineteenth-century Russians who could not make up their minds whether their identity was to be defined principally by their state, by their religion, or by their ethnicity. This is not a problem for the contemporary Russian or Ukrainian. He has lost his feeling for the Orthodox religion and has accepted the Petrovia concept embodied in the new name of his state, "the Soviet Union." For him the question

¹⁷ "*Malorossiiia*" was a term used only among the educated elite. In the beginning, it had the connotation of "the original Rus' " (just as Asia Minor was "the original Asia" for the Greeks). But in the nineteenth century, as the term "*Ukraina*" gained currency, "*Malorossiiia*" came to acquire a derogatory connotation and was dropped entirely during the revolutions of 1917. See I. Borshchak, "Rus', Mala Rosiya, Ukrayina," *Revue des etudes slaves* 24 (1948): 171-7. On the use of the term "Ukraine" there is a very thorough linguistic study: Iaroslav Rudnytsky, *Slovo i nazva "Ukraina"* (Winnipeg, 1951). For the Polish use of the term "*Ruś*" and the Ukrainian response, see Kostomarov's article "Otvety na vykhodki gazety (Krakovskoi) 'Czas' i zhurnala 'Revue contemporaine'" *Osnova*, February 1861, pp. 121-5, and the discussion in Rudnytsky's "Franciszek Duchński"

has been reduced to that of ethnicity.¹⁸ But in the nineteenth century, Herzen and others found it difficult to face the matter straight-forwardly. In fact, Herzen tried to gloss over the problem of ethnicity by using the village commune and Orthodoxy as the defining national characteristics. Yet even he could not escape the centrifugal ethnic pull of the others Slavs and did not press these points. In the final analysis, he took refuge in a sympathetic but highly idealized vision of federalism.

The polemic over "Russia and Poland" tells us a great deal about the development of feelings of nationality in Eastern Europe. For Herzen, federalism meant the rejection of the bureaucratic state and reflected his feelings of affinity for all Slavdom. For the Poles, federalism was a suspicious intrigue; at best it could only be a new form of the past glories of the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had excluded Muscovy. Kostomarov and the Ukrainians stood closer to Herzen in their views. They, too, felt the first stir of ethnicity and welcomed the vision of federalism; but they did not know the final direction in which this would take them. For many people the matter remains unresolved even today. But in the future Herzen's "Russia and Poland," which conceded that Poland and Ukraine had the fullest of national rights, would often be cited by the parties that felt most aggrieved.

¹⁸ On the concept of Petrovia and the weakness of the Russian national identity, see Nicholas Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West in the Teachings of the Slavophiles* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), and *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia* (Berkeley, 1959). As Roman Szporluk has recently shown, for the ethnic Russian the dilemma of the state and Russian ethnic identity is still far from dead. See, for example, his "History and Russian Nationalism," *Survey*, 1979, no. 3, pp. 1-17.

Alexander Herzen

RUSSIA AND POLAND

A Reply to the Author of the Article "Alexander Herzen and the Free Russian Press in London" (Second Letter)*

Dear Sir,

"Blood and tears, desperate struggle, and terrible victory have united Poland with Russia.

"Piece by piece Rus' tore away the living flesh of Poland. It tore away province after province, and like an inevitable disaster, like a black cloud, moved closer and closer to her heart. Whatever she could not take by force, she took by cunning and by gold. She yielded to her natural enemies and divided up the spoils with them.

"On account of Poland, Russia committed her first black sin. The partition of Poland will remain upon her conscience . . .

"... Through this gloomy series of events, through the steaming blood, above the gallows and above the heads of the tsar and his executioners, shines a new day. From behind the *forced* union, a *free* union can be seen. From behind the union of Russia swallowing up Poland can be seen a union based on the recognition of the equality and independence of both. Unwillingly chained together, these prisoners have peered more and more closely at each other and have recognized that they are brothers. Blood has spoken and family enmity is fading."

This is what we said in 1853.¹

And then, in 1854: "What does Poland want? Poland wants to be a free state. She is prepared to be *united* with Rus', but with a Rus' that

* This a translation of the complete Russian text, printed in *Kolokol*, 15 January 1859. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Prof. George Epp of the Canadian Mennonite Bible College at the University of Manitoba, who kindly advised me on the translation of certain unusual terms, and of Roman Senkus, who checked the manuscript and translated the passages dealing with Swiss federalism and with German nationalism.

¹ These ideas appear as early as 1851. See Herzen's "Letter to Michelet," in B. Dmytryshyn, ed., *Imperial Russia* (New York, 1967), p. 202, and the discussion in von Mohrenschildt, pp. 167-72.

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is also free In order to unite with Rus', she needs *total liberty*. The absorption of Poland by Tsarist Russia is an absurdity, violence [itself]." Demanding that Russian soldiers swear not to take up arms against Poland, we said to them: "Not the tsar, but the conscience of the people, the repentance of the people, demands this oath, and if ruin awaits you on account of this, it is holy. You will fall as a sacrifice to redemption, and with your martyred blood you will seal the unbreakable, free union of Poland and Russia as the beginning of a free association of all Slavs in a *single and discrete* Assembly of the Land."²

Our opinion on the Polish question was clearly declared in these words, written on two different occasions, before the [Crimean] War and in the heat of it. It remains unchanged. In such a spirit I attempted to bring together the propaganda of both countries; in this spirit Stanislaw Worcell extended his hand in friendship.

Poland, like Italy or Hungary, has the *full, inalienable* right to exist as a state *independent* of Russia. Whether we want a free Poland to break away from a free Russia is another question. No, *we do not want this*, and can one desire such a thing at a time when exclusive nationalities and international enmities constitute one of the main obstacles restraining free human development? I deeply hate all centralization and am convinced that federations of related peoples produce an incomparably broader basis for a state than does the disintegration of a single race into separate parts. Federal unification must be a free gift. Russia *does not have a right* to Poland; she should *earn* what she has taken by force, and she must *make amends* for what was done by her representatives. We may grieve about it if Poland should not wish this union. We may disagree with her, but we cannot refuse to grant her will without renouncing all our basic convictions. It seems to me that this is clear.

But if it is clear that we recognize this right, then perhaps it is necessary to clarify why we do not want these two peoples to break off completely with each other.

We believe that Poland and Russia can go hand in hand down a single path to a new, free social life. It is our opinion that Poland and Russia are in an entirely different situation from that of Lombardy and Austria. Different paths lie before Lombardy and Austria. The downfall of Austria is the necessary condition for the life of the peoples welded together by her into a unit. Austria is not a nation. Austria is a police measure, a disjointed administration. It is joined to nothing living and does not rely upon itself; without its parts it does not exist. It is the greatest historical spectre that ever appeared. Everything here is false. The [Holy] Roman Empire is in Germany. The German empire consists

² *Zemskoe Delo*.

primarily of Slavs, Italians and Magyars. The elected government changes through inheritance. The relationship of several nationalities is based on mutual loathing for one another. There is nothing organic here; remove Lombardy on the right and add Moldavia-Wallachia on the left: it is all the same. Remove Galicia and add Serbia: and that is not bad; the Staats Kanzley will follow its regular course. The Austrian empire has no future; when it is *abolished*, only then will people really be amazed how such an absurdity could have existed, sewn together from scraps by congresses and strengthened by obscure diplomatic notions. The empire is essential for equilibrium—formerly in order to outweigh the Pope, now so that the Pope should not be outweighed. The bulwark of Europe against Islam, which is saving Turkey from Russia. The imaginary representative of German unity, hated by all of Germany and defending the Rhine “on the Po and on the Adige” with Slavic and Hungarian blood against Italy. This is the dream of someone suffering from a fever!

In complete contrast, Russia is a living personality like England or France. The only difference is that these “old relics,”³ with their riches and their scars, with chevrons on their sleeves and with banners tattered by bullets over the last three centuries, covered in glory, are going off to their rest, while Russia is just stepping onto the square, the parade ground of history. The very name of Russia is beginning to be repeated throughout Europe together with that of America.

Except for her borderlands, Russia is a compact unit akin in blood, language and spirit. Every Russian is aware of himself as part of the state as a whole. He recognizes his kinship with the entire population, which has been brought up in the same peasant way of life, with its communal order and division of land. Because of this, wherever a Russian may live in the vast expanses between the Baltic and the Pacific Ocean, he is vigilant whenever an enemy crosses the Russian border and is ready to go to the aid of Moscow, as he did in 1612 and 1812.⁴

What, however, does he consider to be the border of the country? You, it seems, are very occupied with this question. Truly, I have never spoken of it, although not out of fear of Russian patriots. I am no more afraid of them than of patriots in general, and I am afraid of patriots in general because their self-interested egoism on behalf of the entire race—always ready for unfair gain—and their love for their own too closely approaches hatred for all others. A refined man can love his homeland with his heart, his mind, or by habit; he can serve it and die for it, but a patriot he cannot be. Eighteen centuries ago, Christianity began weeding

³ “*vetkhiia denmi*”.

⁴ 1612 refers to the reaction against Polish intervention and the election of Mikhail Romanov, which ended the Time of Troubles. 1812 refers to the Napoleonic invasion.

out this pagan virtue but achieved nothing, because it directed people toward another, entirely nonexistent homeland—the one in heaven. Socialism will weed it out by removing earthly boundaries. But people are still far away from it [socialism] if you and I are still quibbling about where the boundaries should be drawn.

As regards the principal question, the independence of Poland, it is resolved by language itself. Not one Russian peasant considers Poland to be Russia. All Rus' says: "Into Poland, out of Poland!" But where is the line dividing where Rus' ends and Poland begins? This is more difficult to determine, not because of patriotism, but because we lack the *most important* element for the resolution of the question.

What shall we take as its basis? The annexation of Red Rus'⁵ by Poland, or the annexation of Ukraine by Russia in the middle of the seventeenth century? In between there was an entire century of struggle of the Polish Commonwealth with the Cossacks. In its continuation two tendencies, two opposing streams, appear in southern Rus': the gentry, the lords, who want an aristocratic republic; and the lower class, the [common] people, the Cossacks, who, in complete contrast, feel continuous enmity toward Poland. Khmelnytsky gave himself up to the tsar not out of love for Muscovy, but out of dislike for Poland. Moscow, or, even more, Saint Petersburg, deceived Ukraine and forced it to hate the Russians. How can this question be resolved? A long duration of domination proves nothing. A lost rule proves even less. The right of conquest? The last conqueror will rule until another power drives him out. Conquest is a fact but not a right.

There are no natural borders, no mountain chains, and no big rivers. One still has to look for other bases in the very life of the [common] people, in its way of life. In those areas where the people profess Orthodoxy, speak a language closer to Russian than to Polish, where they have preserved a Russian peasant way of life, the *mir*, the assembly, and common ownership of land—they would probably want to be Russian. In those areas where the people profess Catholicism or the Union,⁶ where they have lost the commune and the common ownership of land, sympathy for Poland is probably stronger, and they will side with her.

⁵ "Chervona," or Red, Rus' is an ancient geographical term referring to Galicia. The term may have its origins in the Turko-Mongol color-directional system. See Ia. Isaievych's article "Chervona Rus'" in *Radianska entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, 4 vols. (Kiev, 1969-72), IV:460.

⁶ This is a reference to the Union of Brest (1596), which created an Eastern-rite Slavonic church in communion with Rome. For the traditional Polish view, see O. Halecki, *History of Poland* (London, 1955), pp. 139-40, which can be compared with the Orthodox Ukrainian view of Doroshenko, *Survey of Ukrainian History*, pp. 156-61.

But tell me, what sort of heirs are we to the Congress of Vienna if we prescribe which zone of land belongs where *without asking the people living on it*? This is how the Paris diplomats were deliberating not long ago regarding what the Rumanians in Moldavia-Wallachia should and should not desire.⁷

Well, and what if after all our argumentation, Ukraine, which remembers the oppression of the Russian soldiers and the institution of serfdom, the conscriptions, the deprivation of rights, the plundering and the knout on the one hand, and has not forgotten what it was like under the Polish Commonwealth with its soldiers, lords and crown officials on the other, desires to be *neither Polish nor Russian*? In my opinion the question is resolved very simply. Ukraine should, in such a case, be recognized as a free and independent country. Among us people who are in exile, who have been the unfortunate witnesses of so many unsuccessful unions and dissolutions, there cannot be and must not be any question as to whom this or the other part of populated land should belong. In Little Russia there dwell people oppressed by slavery, but not so broken by the government and the landowners that they have lost all feeling of national identity. Quite the contrary, their ethnic consciousness is highly developed. What sort of step will it be toward their liberation if, while taking off the Muscovite chains, they are told that they must belong to Poland?

Let us untie their hands, let us loosen their tongues, let their speech be absolutely free, and then let them speak for themselves and step across the knout to us, across the Pope to you, or, if they are wise, extend a hand to each of us in fraternal unity and independence of us both.

This is why I value federalism so highly. The federal parts are connected by a common cause, and no one belongs to anyone else; Geneva does not belong to Bern nor Bern to Geneva. In 1851 the Catholic reaction in the Fribourg canton exasperated the protestant [town of] Murten. The inhabitants of Murten wanted to secede from the canton; this did not take place, but no one even thought of asking whether Murten belongs to the canton or not, whether Murten is unfaithful or not. Federal units can exist even when accompanied by such antagonism as is found between the southern and northern states in America. Centralization, which sacrifices the autonomy of its parts, aims at a uniform police front, and destroys everything individual, distinctive and particular, will always waver between Nicholas and Bonaparte. On the other hand, the complete dissolu-

⁷ In 1856, the Treaty of Paris ending the Crimean War placed Moldavia and Wallachia under the collective guarantee of the European powers and ended a Russian protectorate while retaining Turkish suzerainty. In August 1858, the Convention of Paris discussed the union of the principalities and their future neutrality under a hereditary foreign prince.

tion of national unity into autonomous parts will make out of them a Germany—drawn and quartered, she lies in her dismemberment unable to rise or to move.

The desire to loosen the tightly bound reins of barrack despotism in no way coincides with the desire for full separation of her [Ukraine's] destiny from Russia's. In order to say *whether it is possible* to go with Russia or not, it is necessary to see what will emerge from the general movement into which Russia has been plunged.

Do you really not see how the icy peak that was pressing down upon us is melting? Nicholas noticed that his autocracy had become lifeless, that he had no deeds, but only executions. He invented a war; he was defeated. Two degrees less—he died; ten degrees—and there is no live cause, no life's task at all. In a moment of inspiration and perhaps also desperation, Alexander II found a cause, a fateful, necessary and live cause: *the emancipation of the peasants*. Heavy gates creaking on rusty hinges opened into a new epoch. Here the old policemen, the Orlovs and the Zakrevskys, the lackeys and spies, the Panins and the Muravevs, following what they learned long ago, stand in the way, pushing back, refusing passage.⁸ They give themselves the appearance of strength. If they succeed in hindering us it is our own fault! This is why I am returning again to the point that all of our efforts must be concentrated on one question, rallied around one banner: *in hoc signo vincetis!*

We did not choose the issue, though we could hardly have made a better choice. This again is the reason why we have put aside everything else and have become devoted to this single question: *the emancipation of the peasants together with their land*. One should not judge us for the choice of the question, but for the manner in which we deal with it. Does it conform to the basis for our convictions or not?

⁸ These were well-known families among the Russian service nobility. The reference to Muravev is probably directed at Mikhail N. Muravev (1796-1866), whose reactionary views and subsequent military actions in Lithuania (1863) were to gain him the epithet: "the hangman of Vilno." The reference to Zakrevsky is probably to Arsenii A. Zakrevsky (1783-1865), minister of internal affairs and governor-general of Moscow, who opposed the emancipation of the peasants and predicted that "in Saint Petersburg they will change their minds and all will remain as in the past." Count Viktor Panin (1801-1874) was Alexander's minister of justice and a central figure in the various committees overseeing the emancipation. Prince Aleksei Orlov (1786-1861) was president of the Imperial Council, head of the Third Department, and a convinced defender of serfdom. All these administrators were advanced in age in 1859. See the respective articles on them in *Russkii biograficheskii slovar*, 25 vols. (Saint Petersburg, n.d.).

If Russia, having freed the peasants with their land, really does enter the new phase of life of which we spoke, I do not think that Ukraine would wish to separate from her. Then she would not have those reasons that forced her in the middle of the seventeenth century to throw herself at [the mercy of] the Tatars, at Muscovy for deliverance from the gentry-Catholic yoke of the Polish Commonwealth, and to go over to the Swedes at the time of Peter I.⁹

If Russia, faltering at her first step, should remain under the rod of the landlord, under the baton of the police, without courts and without rights, administered by orderlies and clerks; if this whole movement should prove weak and we, without a murmur, were to return to the time of Nicholas; then not only should Poland or Ukraine not remain with Russia, but they should unite, march on Moscow, and destroy this whole gigantic edifice of slavery.

This is our opinion in its entirety, and no matter what Russian patriots—or yours—say, we will not change it or betray it, for we are convinced in heart and mind of its truth.

For us it is not the foundation but the themes that are changing.

You speak positively of my little article written in 1854 that I mentioned at the beginning of this letter. Circumstances provoked it. Then we thought that Poland would secede from Russia during the Crimean War, and we said to the Russian soldiers stationed in Poland: “Your part would be the worst of all. Your comrades in Turkey are soldiers. In Poland you would be hangmen. You will be forced to blush on account of your bravery . . . we know that you will not march on the Poles of your own accord, but the point is precisely that it is time for you to have your own will It is not easy to subdue tens of thousands of people armed to the teeth.” You can see our opinion clearly from these words. Their repetition shows that our opinion has not changed in the least. But when you tell me to reprint this appeal to the soldiers in *Kolokol*, I do not understand you. Is anyone talking about an uprising in Poland, about the preparations of Russian armies? Why should I start persuading people not to raise their weapons when their weapons are already sheathed?

No. If we were to appeal now to the soldiers, we would not appeal to them using these words. We would not speak to them now about Poland. We would tell them that they should think about the mortal sin of suppressing the peasants; that a soldier who kills a peasant with his bayonet or with a bullet is a parricide; that by aiding the landowner with his arms he defiles his own sister; that with his aid he puts his mother under the blows of the birch; and that if he thinks about it, he will see that without

⁹ This is a reference to the revolt of Bohdan Khmelnytsky against Poland (1648) and of Ivan Mazepa against Peter I (1709).

his blind obedience the institution of serfdom would collapse, pulling down with it all obstacles to liberation.

This is what we would say to the soldier. And if we have not yet said this, it is because the question apparently will be resolved without the use of bayonets or shells. The Russian peasant has suffered enough and has watered the land sufficiently with his sweat and his tears. Why [should he] still [offer] his blood [?]

I have given you our ideas in good faith and have told you frankly about the structure of our activity. You will believe me; your article serves me as a guarantee of this. But there are limited minds and narrow popular hatreds that I would not even attempt to convince. They hate without reason. Take, for example, in order not to speak of our own [people], the articles of the German democrats who pride themselves on their *cosmopolitanism*, and look at their malicious hatred not only for everything Russian, but also for everything Slavic.¹⁰ If this hatred were accompanied by any desire at all that Russia and Poland be free, that they break their chains, I would understand it. But this is not at all the case. Just as medieval people who hated the Jews did not at all wish their improvement, so too any success we have in civil society only doubles the hatred of these limited and closed minds. Fortunately, this time they are dealing not with a scattered and poor tribe, but with a [good] part of humanity.

By the way, this mutual responsibility of the Slavic world, which our enemies have understood with hatred, obliges us to think about it. Are the future destinies of the entire Slavic world in fact the same, or not?

You have already seen that we are resolving the issue by *federalism*.

If Poland desires a different solution, may she manifest the will for it. But while she breaks up the family, let her get to know Rus' better, not the Rus' of the service or of the uniform, but that Rus' that ploughs the land, that is oppressed by the uniform, a Rus' that is thinking and just beginning to express herself. Then she will leave us without international hatred and bitter words. Injury to the people with which she fought for so long and which had such a profound and protracted influence upon her destiny will cast the darkest of shadows upon her.

On 29 November 1853, mounting the rostrum at a Polish meeting in London, I said: "I presented myself to my Polish friends not as one who has renounced his fatherland or as one who wishes that his origins be forgotten. Quite the contrary, I have spoken openly about my love for Russia and about my faith in her future. And so they have accepted me as a *chance representative* of the future Russia, of that Russia that hates the crimes of its government and wants to cleanse itself of the blood of Polish martyrs!"

¹⁰ See the introduction, n. 2, p. 32.

Allow me to conclude my letter with these words, which were drowned out by the applause of your compatriots.

12 January 1859

Iskander¹¹

translated by Thomas M. Prymak

¹¹ Herzen's pen name is an adaption of Scander-beg, a legendary Albanian chieftain, who led his people in a long struggle against the conquering Turks. For this and other general information on *Kolokol*, see Z. P. Bazileva, "*Kolokol*" *Gertsena* (Moscow, 1949).

Myroslav Yurkevich

A FORERUNNER OF NATIONAL COMMUNISM: LEV IURKEVYCH (1885-1918)*

In his "Critical Remarks on the National Question" (1913), Lenin gave the following definition of the tasks of social democracy in Ukraine:

Obviously, all democrats, not to speak of Marxists, will strongly oppose the incredible subjugation of the Ukrainians and demand complete equality for them. But it would be a downright betrayal of socialism and a silly policy, *even* from the viewpoint of the bourgeois "national aims" of the Ukrainians, to *weaken* the existing bond and alliance between the Ukrainian and Great Russian proletariat that now exist within the confines of a single state.¹

Although the thrust of Lenin's remarks was directed against "bourgeois nationalism," his rhetorical opponent on this occasion was not a bourgeois, but a Ukrainian social democrat. "Mr. Lev Iurkevych," wrote Lenin, "who also calls himself a Marxist (poor Marx!) gives an example of this silly policy."²

For Lenin, analyzing the prospects of revolution in an empire in which national movements were weakly developed, the line of demarcation between Marxism and nationalism seemed clear. Whatever weakened proletarian unity in the struggle against tsarism was retrograde, hence Lenin's consistent opposition to

* The present introduction and translation originated in a seminar project supervised by Professor J. L. H. Keep of the University of Toronto. I wish to thank Professor Keep for suggesting numerous improvements to the translation and for commenting on a preliminary version of the introduction. I should also like to thank Dr. Yury Boshyk of the University of Toronto for providing me with copies of Iurkevych's pamphlets, as well as other rare material by and about Iurkevych.

So as not to mislead compilers of reference works and other interested parties, I should state that, despite the identity of surnames, I am not a descendant of Iurkevych.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Kriticheskie zametki po natsionalnomu voprosu" in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow, 1960-65), 24:127. All references to Lenin's works are to this edition.

² Ibid.

autonomy for minority social-democratic parties and his contention that those calling for such autonomy were "objectively," if not actually, serving the interests of the bourgeoisie.³

By the eve of the First World War, Lenin had come to appreciate the potential value of the national movements in undermining the stability of the empire. In order to channel this force, Lenin was prepared to make a tactical alliance with the minorities. He came out strongly in support of "national self-determination," which had been part of the Bolshevik program since 1903. But Lenin's formula contained an escape clause. "National self-determination" as he interpreted it meant the right of the minorities to secede from Russia and form independent states. By recognizing this right, Lenin hoped to persuade the minorities that the Bolsheviks did not intend to keep them in subjection.⁴

The actual implementation of the right to secession was another matter. National sovereignty was essentially a bourgeois goal that could hardly be supported in practice by social democrats and proletarians. Once persuaded of the Bolsheviks' good intentions, the minorities would have no reason to collaborate with "their own" bourgeoisies and would throw their support behind the cause of international proletarian unity.⁵

Cultural distinctions among ethnic groups were of minor importance, argued Lenin, when compared with economic and political factors. He repeatedly stressed the tendency of capitalism to create large states and to obliterate ethno-cultural "barriers" between peoples—a progressive development, in his view, since it promoted international proletarian solidarity.⁶ Lenin spoke of a "culture of democratism and of the international workers' movement" that would replace ethnically based cultures.⁷ In practical terms, this meant that the empire's national minorities should adopt Russian as the most convenient vehicle of communication and that the social-democratic movement should be directed from the centre of the empire, not from its periphery.⁸

³ See, for example, "O manifeste 'Soiuza armianskikh sotsial-demokratov'," 7:102-6.

⁴ "Tezisy po natsionalnomu voprosu," 23:314-22.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 315-6.

⁶ "Kriticheskie zametki po natsionalnomu voprosu," 24:130-36.

⁷ Ibid., p. 120.

⁸ "O natsionalnoi gordosti velikorossov," 26:106-10. For detailed discussions of Lenin's views on the national question, see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, 2d ed. (New York, 1974), pp. 34-49, and Ivan Bakalo, *Natsionalna polityka Lenina* (Munich, 1974).

Most minority social democrats found it impossible to accept this view. Tsarist oppression of the nationalities had been too harsh to be easily forgotten: publications in the Ukrainian language, for example, had been forbidden on government instructions in 1863 and 1876, and the ban had not been lifted until 1905. The Revolutionary Ukrainian Party—the first Ukrainian political party in the Russian Empire—split in January 1905 because of a disagreement on the national question. The majority, which constituted itself as the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party (USDLP), maintained that the ethnic minorities required autonomous social-democratic parties to struggle against both national and social oppression. The minority established the *Spilka* (Union), which functioned as a branch of Russian social democracy in Ukraine.

Lev Iurkevych, who had joined the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party in 1904, became one of the most militant spokesmen for the autonomist view.⁹ The son of a wealthy physician, he sided with the USDLP in the split of 1905 and used a major portion of his inheritance to fund the USDLP journals *Nash holos* (Our Voice), published in Lviv in 1910-11, and *Dzvin* (The Bell), which appeared in Kiev in 1913-14.¹⁰ As a leading figure in the USDLP and a frequent contributor to its journals,¹¹ Iurkevych consistently maintained that the liberation of the Ukrainian working class was associated with the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation.

Iurkevych's insistence on national autonomy placed him in the mainstream of Ukrainian political thought in the Russian Empire, which had long been dedicated to working out a program of federalist reform. The major federalist thinkers, Mykola Kostomarov, Mykhailo Drahomanov, and Mykhailo Hrushevsky, had developed a conception of the Ukrainian *demos* as a people distinct from the Russians. Their goal was political and cultural autonomy for the Ukrainian people, which they expected to attain with the gradual advance of constitutionalism in Russia. As critics of the centralized state, which they regarded as invariably oppressive,

⁹ Dmytro Doroshenko's study, *Z istorii ukrainskoi politychnoi dumky za chasiv svitovoi viiny* (Prague, 1936), draws extensively on Iurkevych's archive and is the major source of biographical information about him. See also Volodymyr Levynsky's pamphlet *Lev Iurkevych* (Lviv, 1927).

¹⁰ Doroshenko, pp. 27-31.

¹¹ Iurkevych often signed his articles with the pseudonym "L. Rybalka." Before the outbreak of the First World War, he also produced two pamphlets, *Natsionalna sprava i robіtnytsstvo* and *Kliasy i suspilstvo*, both published in Kiev in 1913.

they opposed separatists who called for independent Ukrainian statehood.

Along with other Ukrainian social democrats, Iurkevych reformulated the federalist program on a Marxist basis. He drew inspiration from the Austrian socialists, whose program of 1899 called for the transformation of Austria into a democratic federation of nationalities.¹² The Austrians had recognized that "political decentralization corresponding to the national division of the state" was necessary in order to eliminate national oppression, and the Jewish Bund had become the first political party in the Russian Empire to adopt this postulate.¹³ Iurkevych attacked the Russian social democrats for their rigidly centralist thinking, which led them to regard Ukraine as "a territory in which they would have a *monopoly* of influence."¹⁴

Iurkevych was an equally harsh critic of the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia. "National consciousness," he wrote, "appears to be the same for everyone, but a *national outlook* cannot be the same for people of different interests."¹⁵ Iurkevych warned repeatedly that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie would support the national renaissance only to a limited extent: its class interests would lead it to seek an accommodation with the tsarist regime.¹⁶ Only the workers, a genuinely democratic class that oppressed no one, would see the struggle through to the end, demanding national rights for themselves and for all other classes in Ukrainian society.¹⁷

Not all Ukrainian social democrats agreed with Iurkevych's conception of a federalized, democratic Russia on the Austro-Marxist model. Dmytro Dontsov, at that time a member of the USDLP and a contributor to *Dzvin*, proposed the separation of Ukraine from Russia and its federation with Austria.¹⁸ For Iurke-

¹² Lev Iurkevych, "Rosiiski marksisty i ukrainskyi robitnychy rukh," *Dzvin*, 1913, no. 7-8, pp. 91-2. On the Austrian social democrats and their interpretation of the national question, see Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode, eds., *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 30-6.

¹³ Iurkevych, *ibid.*, pp. 85-7, 91.

¹⁴ "Paky i paky (V spravi ukrainskoi robitnychoi gazety)," *Dzvin*, 1914, no. 6, p. 550.

¹⁵ *Natsionalna sprava i robitnytstvo*, pp. 22-3.

¹⁶ "Seredni kliasy i natsionalne vidrozhdenie," *Dzvin*, 1913, no. 2, pp. 107-11.

¹⁷ *Kliasy i suspilstvo*, pp. 40-4.

¹⁸ Dmytro Dontsov, *Suchasne politychne polozhenie natsii i nashi zavdania* (Lviv, 1913).

vych, such a complete break with Russia amounted to bourgeois nationalism.¹⁹ He attacked Dontsov's program for advocating "Ukrainian bourgeois *political passivity* vis-à-vis the Russian state and the political system now existing within it."²⁰ The actual task before Ukrainian social democrats, Iurkevych maintained, was "energetic defence of the national-political and democratic rights of the Ukrainian people within the boundaries of the Russian state."²¹ Iurkevych was instrumental in having Dontsov expelled from the USDLP.²²

Thus, Lenin's characterization of Iurkevych as "quite an undisguised servant of the bourgeoisie" had no basis in fact.²³ Unable to discredit Iurkevych by force of argument, Lenin resorted to subterfuge. Shortly after completing "Critical Remarks on the National Question," he wrote to Inessa Armand, who was then living in Paris, that "we *should* now have *our own* Ukrainian social-democratic group, even a small one."²⁴ As a first step toward creating such a group, Lenin prepared an appeal calling on Ukrainian workers to join forces with the Bolsheviks. He sent the appeal to Armand with the request that she contact the Ukrainian worker Oksen Lola (also in Paris) and have Lola and two or three other Ukrainians translate the appeal and publish it over their signatures. This was to be done

... of course, *against* Iurkevych and, *if possible*, without the knowledge of this vile, wretched, nationalist bourgeois, who, under the banner of Marxism, advocates the *division* of workers by nationality, a *separate* national organization for Ukrainian workers.²⁵

Lola translated the appeal as requested, and it appeared over his signature in the St. Petersburg Bolshevik newspaper *Put' pravdy* (The Way of Truth). Lenin contributed a prefatory note to the trumped-up appeal attacking the *Dzvin* group for "carrying

¹⁹ "Z nahody druhoho vseukrainskoho studentskoho z'izdu," *Dzvin*, 1913, no. 9, pp. 236-41.

²⁰ "Ukrainske politychne molodomishchanstvo," *Dzvin*, 1913, no. 12, p. 493.

²¹ "Paky i paky," p. 542.

²² "Shche kilka sliv u vidpovidi Dontsovu," *Dzvin*, 1914, no. 5, pp. 470-2. It is worth noting that Lenin lumped Iurkevych and Dontsov together as "apologies for Marxists" (24:129).

²³ Lenin, "Sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pravo natsii na samoopredelenie," 27:261.

²⁴ Lenin, 48:272.

²⁵ Lenin, 48:277.

out the work of the nationalist petty bourgeoisie."²⁶ He also wrote to the editors of *Dzvin* expressing his indignation at their "separatist" policy.²⁷ In reply, Iurkevych accused Lenin of exploiting the slogan of "national self-determination" while denying Ukrainian socialists the right to maintain their own organization.²⁸

Following the outbreak of the First World War, both Lenin and Iurkevych settled in Switzerland. In 1915, Iurkevych began to publish the newspaper *Borotba* (Struggle) as the organ of the émigré USDLP. The seven issues that appeared were devoted almost entirely to attacking the nationalist Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, which was funded by the Central Powers.²⁹ A number of the union's activists, feeling that *Borotba's* accusations of political opportunism were unfounded, wrote to Iurkevych protesting that their activity was wholly in the national interest.³⁰ Iurkevych remained adamant. In an open letter to the Kienthal Conference of the Socialist International, he attacked the union once again and condemned the imperialism of both the Central Powers and Russia. He called on the conference to approve resolutions supporting national-liberation struggles and appealing to the Russian proletariat to assist in "the winning of democratic and autonomous rights for the oppressed nations."³¹

It appears that Iurkevych and Lenin discussed the national question several times during their years in Switzerland, but neither man changed his view.³² When the Geneva-based Bolshevik newspaper *Sotsial-demokrat* (Social Democrat) published an anthology containing Lenin's theses on "Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," Iurkevych responded with his most comprehensive indictment of Bolshevik policy, which is here translated as *The Russian Social Democrats and the Na-*

²⁶ Lenin, 25:360. For a detailed account of this episode, see Israel Kleiner, "On Lenin's Attitude Toward the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," *Crossroads* (Jerusalem), no. 5 (Winter 1980), pp. 178-85.

²⁷ See the accompanying translation, n. 29.

²⁸ "Iezuitska polityka," *Dzvin*, 1914, no. 5, pp. 458-65.

²⁹ Adrian Hoshovsky, "U borotbi z SVU i sotsial-patriotamy," *Ukrainskyi kalendar 1966* (Warsaw), pp. 214-22.

³⁰ Doroshenko, op. cit., pp. 57-60.

³¹ *L'Ukraine et la guerre* (Lausanne, 1916), pp. 54-5. See the accompanying translation for Iurkevych's approval of the Kienthal Conference resolutions on the national question.

³² There is an allusion to such face-to-face discussions in the accompanying translation. For Lenin's hostile reaction to one of Iurkevych's visits, see 49:188.

tional Question. Published in Geneva in 1917, the pamphlet was written in Russian and intended primarily for the Bolshevik émigrés. In this work, Iurkevych again attacked Lenin for devising empty formulas to conceal his fundamental hostility to the autonomist demands of the national minorities. He hammered home the point that Russian revolutionaries from Herzen to Lenin had been centralists at heart, too dazzled by the vision of Russia's world-historical importance to respect the minorities as equal partners in the struggle for democracy. Iurkevych appealed to the Russian social democrats at least to refrain from hindering the work of their Ukrainian comrades.

His appeal fell on deaf ears. By the time the pamphlet came off the press, Lenin was back in Russia. Iurkevych attempted to return to Ukraine by a circuitous route late in 1917, but the progressive paralysis from which he had long been suffering forced him into hospital in Moscow, where he died.³³

The autonomous proletarian Ukraine that Iurkevych regarded as a political ideal did not materialize in the Revolution. Many factors worked against its realization: the Ukrainian proletariat was as yet an insignificant social force; the intelligentsia was politically divided; powerful neighboring states were not about to relinquish their control of Ukrainian territory. Within two years of Iurkevych's death, however, the Ukrainian communists Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai were addressing to Lenin the same questions that Iurkevych had asked in his pamphlet of 1917.³⁴ The "national communists" of the 1920s continued in this vein, although they could not draw on the writings of a social democrat anathematized by Lenin. Their efforts to foster political and cultural autonomy for Ukraine—the last attempt to make federalism work—followed the program that had been outlined by Iurkevych.

³³ The exact date of Iurkevych's death, which occurred either in late 1917 or early 1918, has not been determined. See Doroshenko, pp. 88-9.

³⁴ Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, *On the Current Situation in the Ukraine*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Ann Arbor, 1970).

L. Rybalka
[Lev Iurkevych]

THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION¹

The editors of the Geneva *Sotsial-demokrat* [Social Democrat]—the central organ of the Russ[ian] S[ocial]-D[emocratic] Lab[or] Party—have published a *Sbornik* [Anthology] devoted principally to the national question and the defence of the “right of nations to self-determination.”

The Russian social democrats, who formerly treated the national question with complete indifference, have begun to take an interest in it in recent years.

However, their right wing, which turned so sharply toward opportunism before the war and toward patriotism during it, has no concern whatever for the nations oppressed by its dear “fatherland,” which is “defending itself.” Accordingly, we shall not even speak of them.

The revolutionary wing of the Russian social democrats, on the contrary, is very actively engaged in the national question. Primarily involved is its foreign representation, which, exploiting the general confusion, imperiously decrees its views, cursing those who disagree.

Our folk proverb says that “the devil is never really as black as he is painted.” And that is so. Therefore, casting aside superstitious prejudices, we proceed to the exposition of our subject.

The *Sbornik* commences with “Theses”² bearing the resounding title “Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination.” There we read:

The right of nations to self-determination means the exclusive right to independence in the political sense, to free political secession

¹ This translation was prepared from a copy of the original pamphlet in the Andrii Zhuk collection, the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. For a reprint, see L. Rybalka, *Russkie sotsial-demokraty i natsionalnyi vopros* (Munich: Suchasnist, 1969). The Russian text, which appears on pp. 33-58 of this edition, is preceded by a Ukrainian translation.

² For the complete text of the “Theses,” see Lenin, 27:252-66.

from the oppressor nation. Concretely, this demand for political democracy means complete freedom of agitation for secession and the resolution of the question of secession by a referendum of the seceding nation. Accordingly, this demand is not at all equivalent to a demand for secession, fragmentation, or the creation of small states. It signifies only the consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression. The nearer a democratic system to complete freedom of secession, the less frequent and weaker will be strivings toward secession in practice, for the advantages of large states both from the point of view of economic progress and from that of the interests of the masses are indubitable; moreover, they increase steadily with the growth of capitalism

The goal of socialism is not only the elimination of the fragmentation of humanity into small states and of all segregation of nations, not only the drawing together of nations, but also their merging. And precisely in order to attain this goal, we must . . . demand the liberation of nations not in general, nebulous phrases, not in empty declamations, not in the form of "postponing" the question until the achievement of socialism, but in a clearly and precisely formulated political program, taking particular account of the hypocrisy and cowardice of socialists in the oppressor nations.

This quotation defines the basic views of the editors of the RSDLP's central organ on the national question. What is astonishing and glaring, however, is the contradictoriness of these views.

Thus, for example, the recognition of the "right of nations to self-determination," which is understood in the exclusive sense of the right "of secession from the oppressor nation," is followed immediately by the assertion that "the advantages of large states from the point of view of economic progress and from that of the interests of the masses are indubitable."

These two propositions are mutually exclusive. For, if we grant that "with the development of capitalism" large states increasingly serve the interests of the masses and of progress, then our defence of "the right of nations to self-determination," whose realization breaks up "large states," would act as an obstacle to the development of "large states" and to capitalist progress in general. With this in mind and as if to confuse the issue once and for all, the authors³ of the "theses" note that in actual fact "the demand for free secession from the oppressor nation" "is not at all equivalent to a demand for secession, fragmentation, or the creation of small states."

³ As the "Theses" were unsigned, Iurkevych was unaware that they had been written by Lenin alone. See Lenin, 27:630.

It follows from this that the program of the central organ of the RSDLP on the national question, consisting in the *recognition* of the "right of nations to self-determination" and in its simultaneous *denial*—equals zero.

But, if in mathematics zeroes mean *nothing*, the zeroes contained in political programs are often exhibited as large political figures, and the defenders of such zeroes, as has happened, for example, in our case, come forward with the "demand for liberation of nations not in general, nebulous phrases, not in empty declamations, not in the form of 'postponing' the question until the achievement of socialism, but in a clearly and precisely formulated political program, taking particular account of the hypocrisy and cowardice of socialists in the oppressor nations."

However strange this "demand" may seem when proclaimed by people whose program on the national question equals zero, we nevertheless gladly admit the indispensability for socialists of a program on the national question that is "clearly and precisely formulated, taking particular account of the hypocrisy and cowardice of socialists in the oppressor nations."

For it is only by taking this hypocrisy into account that we shall comprehend the "right of nations to self-determination" as it is defended by the Russian social democrats.

The principle of the "right of nations to self-determination" was recognized by them when they were not yet divided and were grouped about the newspaper *Iskra* [The Spark], published in Geneva. Thus, as early as 1903, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the last Polish insurrection of 1863, the Russian and Polish socialist press took up the discussion of the national question in connection with the question of the restoration of an independent Poland. In issue 44 of *Iskra* there appeared, incidentally, a lead article by Lenin entitled "The National Question in Our Program." This article is devoted to the question of the "right of nations to self-determination," and in it, as in the *Sbornik* with which we are concerned, Lenin, while coming out in defence of the "right to self-determination," hastens immediately to add that "the unconditional recognition of the struggle for freedom of self-determination in no way obliges us to support every demand for national self-determination."⁴

Going on to polemicize with the PPS,⁵ Lenin notes the difference between the former insurgent and democratic Poland and the present bourgeois Poland; that *then* (in Marx's time) "the complete victory of democracy in Europe was indeed impossible without the restoration of

⁴ Lenin, "Natsionalnyi vopros v nashei programme," 7:233.

⁵ *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* (Polish Socialist Party).

Poland,” and that *now* “St. Petersburg has become a far more important revolutionary centre than Warsaw; the Russian revolutionary movement already has greater international significance than the Polish.”⁶ Proceeding to quote Mehring’s statement that the restoration of Poland is a “reactionary utopia” and that “at present the restoration of Poland is possible only through a revolution by means of which the modern proletariat will sunder its chains,”⁷ Lenin adds: “We fully subscribe to this conclusion of Mehring’s.”⁸

Proceeding from this, he comes out decisively *against* “the break-up of Russia, toward which the Polish Socialist Party is striving, *as distinct* from our goal of overthrowing autocracy,”⁹ and declares at the end of the article that “we shall always say to the Polish workers: only the fullest union with the Russian proletariat can satisfy the demands of the present, actual political struggle against autocracy; only such a union will provide a guarantee of political and economic emancipation.

*What we have said concerning the Polish question may also be applied to every other national question.”*¹⁰

Thus, Lenin, having declared in 1903 that he recognized the right of secession of nations, came out with utter frankness in the same article against the “break-up of Russia” and, consequently, against the “self-determination” not only of the Poles, but of all the other oppressed nations of Russia, as is entirely clear from his final words, which we have underlined.

It is interesting that the Russian social democrats, pretending to defend the “right of nations to self-determination,” promise with utter seriousness that this right will be recognized by the state that will be achieved by “the union of the Polish and Russian proletariat in the name of the demand for a democratic republic, which will ensure all nations the right of free self-determination” (*Iskra*, no. 33, “In the Last Forty Years”). In the “Theses” of the *Sbornik* it is also stated that “the nearer

⁶ Lenin, 7:238. A quotation from Karl Kautsky, “Finis Poloniae?”, *Die Neue Zeit* 14, part 2, no. 42 (1895-6): 489. Kautsky (1854-1938), a leading German-Austrian socialist and co-founder of the pacifist Independent Social-Democratic Party during the First World War, acknowledged the right of national minorities in the Russian Empire to form their own social-democratic parties. He condemned the Bolshevik revolution as undemocratic and un-Marxian.

⁷ Lenin, 7:238-9. A quotation from Franz Mehring’s introduction to *Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, 1841 bis 1850* (Stuttgart, 1902), vol. 3.

⁸ Lenin, 7:239.

⁹ Lenin, 7:240.

¹⁰ Lenin, 7:242. Iurkevych’s italics.

the democratic system of a state to complete freedom of secession, the less frequent and weaker will be strivings toward secession in practice."

A strange freedom, is it not, which the oppressed nations will renounce the more nearly they approach its attainment! This reminds us of Rodichev's speech in the Duma: "Give the Ukrainians schools so that they themselves may later renounce them."¹¹ But if such mockery of the demands of a people oppressed by Russia is understandable when it comes from a Russian liberal, the Russian social democrats' interpretation of the "right of nations to self-determination" as a right that the oppressed nations will refrain from exercising once they have gained it—an interpretation derived, moreover, from internationalism and socialism—can arouse amazement and indignation.

No less astonishing is the Russian social democrats' promise to ensure the democratic republic's "guarantee" of the right of free secession. For if a democratic system is actually established in Russia, then, taking as an example the development of the West European states and also considering the reactionary and blatantly imperialist character of the policies of the Russian bourgeoisie, one can say with certainty that it will not only not oppose the weakening of tsarist centralism but will strengthen it, turning it from an exclusively bureaucratic system into a social system for the oppression of the nations of the Russian Empire.

It is quite ridiculous to speak of the possibility of the "guarantee" by those in power in a capitalist state of the "right of nations to self-determination." Every state, even the most democratic, and especially now, in the age of imperialism, not only will never agree to allow the oppressed nations to separate, but will always strive to make new territorial acquisitions, to oppress even more nations. Capitalist governments have always regarded the "right of nations to self-determination" as a betrayal of the fatherland and punish the guilty with the death penalty.

We would be right to consider the Russian social democrats' promise to "guarantee" the "right of secession" in a Russian republic a criminal and conscious deception of the democratic forces of the oppressed peoples if we did not recall, in their extenuation, their idealization of a democratic Russia, of the Russian "toiling masses," and of political revolution, which they often identify with social revolution.

Lenin, for example, does not doubt that his party will manage to seize power in the present war, and that then "we would," he promises,

offer peace to *all* belligerents on condition of the liberation of colonies and *all* dependent, oppressed and underprivileged peoples. Neither Germany nor England and France, under their present

¹¹ Fedor I. Rodichev (1856-1933), leading Constitutional Democrat and member of the Russian Provisional Government in 1917.

governments, would accept this condition. Then we would have to prepare and wage a revolutionary war, that is, not only carry out all of our minimum program completely with the most decisive measures (!), but also systematically rouse to revolt all the peoples now oppressed by the Russians, all the colonies and dependent countries of Asia (India, China, Persia, and so on), and—in the first place—we would rouse to revolt the socialist proletariat of Europe against its governments and in defiance of its social chauvinists. There can be no doubt whatever that the victory of the proletariat in Russia would present uncommonly auspicious conditions for the development of revolution in Asia and Europe (*Sotsial-demokrat*, no. 17, 13 October 1915).¹²

To supplement this revolutionary nonsense, we shall cite another Russian socialist newspaper, *Vpered* [Forward] (no. 2), representing the left wing of the Bolsheviks, which is convinced that if Russia should democratize herself during the war, “she would cease to be a spectre to the Balkan (!) and Austrian (!) Slavs (!); on the contrary, she would be such a powerful *magnet* for them that Austrian militarism would immediately be shaken. By the very fact of her democratism Russia would disarm her enemies.”

This blind faith in the democratic and socialist virtues of Russia, from our point of view, is not at all an expression, as is generally believed, of the exceptional revolutionariness and internationalist impeccability of Russian socialism. On the contrary, if we take into account the development of Russian liberal ideas of the last century in their relation to the national question, we shall see that the national program of the revolutionary Russian social democrats is nothing but a reiteration of the Russian liberal patriotic program formulated in the age of the emancipation of the peasants.

The most prominent exponent and, one might say, the creator of that program was, as is well known, Herzen, the “ruler of men’s minds” during the 1860s. At that time the Polish question was extremely acute in view of the Polish uprising, which coincided with the Russian liberation movement of the 1860s.

All attempts at effecting an agreement between the Russian liberals and the Polish insurgents did not lead to any positive result, and with the onset of reaction during the reign of Alexander II, Russian society, becoming rapidly permeated with patriotic sentiments, turned away from Poland, which tsarism had taken in its iron fist. Among the ideas that served to justify its brutal abuse of the Polish nation were those of Slavophilism, which changed from a federalist program into a program

¹² Lenin, “Neskolko tezisov,” 27:50-1.

of Russian patriotism, and under its banner tsarism "liberated" the "little Balkan brothers" in 1877.

It is significant that Herzen's national federalist program, which already contained all the elements of insatiable Russian nationalism, was constructed on the principle of . . . "the right of nations to self-determination."

Replying to a Polish writer in an open letter published in number 34 of *Kolokol*, ed. M. V. Nechkina et al. (Moscow, 1962-4), 2:273-6. At Herzen wrote:

Poland, like Italy or Hungary, has the *full, inalienable* right to exist as a state *independent* of Russia. Whether we want a free Poland to break away from a free Russia is another question. No, *we do not want this*, and can one desire such a thing at a time when exclusive nationalities and international enmities constitute one of the main obstacles restraining free social development? . . .¹³

We believe that Poland and Russia can go hand in hand down a single path to a new, free social life. It is our opinion that Poland and Russia are in an entirely different situation from that of Lombardy and Austria. Different paths lie before Lombardy and Austria. The downfall of Austria is the necessary condition for the life of the peoples welded together by her into a unit . . .

In complete contrast, Russia is a living personality like England or France. The only difference is that these "old relics," with their riches and their scars, with chevrons on their sleeves and with banners tattered by bullets over the last three centuries, covered in glory, are going off to their rest, while Russia is just stepping onto the square, the parade ground of history. The very name of Russia is beginning to be repeated throughout Europe together with that of America.

Except for her borderlands, Russia is a compact unit akin in blood, language, and spirit. Every Russian is aware of himself as part of the state as a whole. He recognizes his kinship with the entire population, which has been brought up in the same peasant way of life, with its communal order and division of land. Because of this, wherever a Russian may live in the vast expanses between the Baltic and the Pacific Ocean, he is vigilant whenever an enemy crosses

¹³ The original text reads "*chelovecheskoe*" (human), not "social" development. Herzen's open letter is reproduced in the facsimile edition of *Kolokol*, ed. M. V. Nechkina et al. (Moscow, 1962-4), 2:273-6. At several points, Iurkevych's quotations deviate very slightly from Herzen's text. Suspension points have been added to mark Iurkevych's omissions of passages of the text.

the Russian border and is ready to go to the aid of Moscow, as he did in 1612 and 1812.

Going on to discuss the question of the borders between Poland and Russia and following the words: "But tell me, what sort of heirs are we to the Congress of Vienna if we prescribe which zone of land belongs where *without asking the people living on it?*", Herzen writes:

... Well, and what if after all our argumentation, Ukraine, which remembers the oppression of the Russian soldiers and the institution of serfdom, the conscriptions, the deprivation of rights, the plundering and the knout on the one hand, and has not forgotten what it was like under the Polish Commonwealth with its soldiers, lords, and crown officials on the other, desires to be *neither Polish nor Russian?* In my opinion the question is resolved very simply. Ukraine should be recognized as free and independent.... In Little Russia there dwell people, people oppressed by slavery, but not so broken by the government and the landowners that they have lost all feeling of national identity. Quite the contrary, their ethnic consciousness is highly developed. What sort of step will it be toward their liberation if, while taking off the Muscovite chains, they are told that they must *belong* to Poland?

Let us untie their hands, let us loosen their tongues, let their speech be absolutely free, and then let them speak for themselves and step across the knout to us, across the Pope to you, or, *if they are wise*, extend a hand to each of us in fraternal unity and independence of us both....

In order to say *whether it is possible to go with Russia or not*, it is *necessary* to see what will emerge from the general movement into which Russia has been plunged....

If Russia, faltering at her first step [the emancipation of the peasants with land — L.R.], should remain under the rod of the landlord, under the baton of the police, without courts and without rights, administered by orderlies and clerks; if this whole movement should prove weak and we, without a murmur, were to return to the time of Nicholas; then not only should Poland or Ukraine not remain with Russia, but they should unite, march on Moscow, and destroy this whole gigantic edifice of slavery.

This is our opinion in its entirety, and no matter what Russian patriots—or yours—say, we will not change it or betray it, for we are convinced in heart and mind of its truth.

We have purposely not begrudged the space for this long question in order to show the quite extraordinary resemblance between Herzen's view on the national question and the current program of the "right of

nations to self-determination" of the Russian social democrats, who call themselves internationalists.

In some respects Herzen is even more resolute and consistent than Lenin, but they are both national twins, and their views on the national question are generally identical.

They both recognize that nations have "the full, inalienable right to exist as states independent of Russia," but if you ask them whether they actually want the secession of the nations oppressed by Russia, they will answer you cordially and with one voice: "*No, we do not want it!*" They are opponents of the "break-up of Russia," and, recognizing the "right of self-determination" only for the sake of appearances, they are actually fervent defenders of her unity. Herzen, because he proceeds from the assumption that "exclusive nationalities and international enmities constitute one of the main obstacles restraining free human development," and Lenin, because "the advantages of large states both from the point of view of economic progress and from that of the interests of the masses are indubitable."

Both these public men—the liberal and the socialist—are also united by their obeisance before Russia's greatness, and both of them regard her with equal enthusiasm as the Messiah who will save humanity from social injustice. Herzen bases his hopes in this regard on the Russian "commune" and Lenin on the "Russian proletariat," and they are both convinced that it is not Europe, "an old relic" and "going off to her rest," but Russia that will be the first to achieve socialism, while Lenin even imagines that during the present war the Russian socialist proletariat, seizing power in its own hands and declaring war on Western Europe... "will rouse to revolt the socialist proletariat of Europe against its governments and in defiance of its social chauvinists."

Ostensibly, they both also take a highly extreme position on the national question. Herzen is prepared to turn to the oppressed nations, if Russia does not realize the "social ideal," with an appeal "to march on Moscow and destroy this gigantic edifice of slavery," while Lenin promises that his party, after seizing power during the present war, "will rouse to revolt all the peoples now oppressed by the Russians."

This unanimity on the national question between the father of Russian liberalism and the leader of contemporary Russian socialism is, of course, highly significant.

Herzen's Slavophile federalist "internationalism," to say nothing of its reactionary offshoot in the form of the contemporary neo-Slav movement, has turned in the current Russian liberal movement into a political program of Russian aggressive imperialism, openly hostile to the national-liberation movements of the oppressed peoples of Russia.

Herzen was the theoretical creator of the idea of a great Russia, the creator of Russian bourgeois patriotism. But his epoch was the epoch

of the idealistic, youthful stage of development of Russian liberalism, and accordingly his Russian patriotism assumed revolutionary form.

It was precisely in this revolutionary form that the Russian social democrats adopted the program of the Russian liberals on the national question, and if they have replaced its old liberal revolutionary character with a newer, proletarian one, the content of the program has nevertheless remained for the most part unchanged.

What is the "right of nations to self-determination"? The bourgeoisie of the oppressor nation makes use of this "right" to arouse patriotic feelings of devotion to "large states" in its own and foreign oppressed nations. Like Herzen and Lenin, who promise to "guarantee" the "right to self-determination" in a free and democratic Russia, the bourgeoisie and its governments also usually promise liberation to oppressed nations *after* something, for example, *after* a war.

Russian public opinion was highly sympathetic to the tsar's promise of "self-determination" for the Polish people *after* the war. However, its attitude to the fate of other oppressed peoples was somewhat different. Highly characteristic in this regard is the position that the Russian right-wing and liberal press assumed on the question of the governing authorities' conduct in those parts of Galicia and Bukovina that have now been conquered.

After the initial conquest of Austrian Ukraine, the Russian troops and officials, both secular and ecclesiastical, distinguished themselves, as is well known, by such barbarous conduct toward the Ukrainian population that at the time of the second invasion by Russian armies the Ukrainian populace attempted, as was noted in the Russian press, to abandon their dwellings. The Russian press could not fail to pay attention to this, and the government was showered with reproaches from all sides for arousing the Galician population against itself and strengthening Austrophile sympathies within it.

Nevertheless, both the right-wing and liberal Russian press indicts the government not for its violence against the Ukrainian-Austrian population, but only because the government has already, in time of war, begun to oppress Austrian Ukraine. *Kolokol* [The Bell]¹⁴ wrote openly that the solution to the problem of "Galician Ukrainophilism" "*will come in its own time*, when the conquest of this primordially Russian region is definitely and unalterably assured to the Russian Empire," and in the meantime it advises "not to interfere in the internal affairs of Galicia." *Novoe vremia* [The New Era]¹⁵ expressed itself in the same spirit, declaring

¹⁴ Right-wing daily published in Petrograd, not to be confused with Herzen's émigré newspaper of the same title.

¹⁵ Major liberal daily published in Petrograd.

that the solution of the "civic problem" in Galicia "is still premature." *Russkie vedomosti* [The Russian News]¹⁶ indicts the government in its turn on the grounds that, "without waiting for the war to end," it wanted to accomplish "tasks of internal policy" in the occupied land. *Den* [Day]¹⁷ also notes that "the civic national religious reconstruction of the region should be left until after the end of the war." *Rech* [Speech]¹⁸ took much the same position; moreover, like all the Russian press that wrote about Austrian Ukraine, demanding respect on the part of the government for the national and religious particularities of the occupied land, it did not say a word about the extreme oppression to which the Ukrainian movement in Russia has been subjected since the beginning of the war.

Most characteristic, however, was the declaration on Austrian Ukraine made by Prince E. Trubetskoi¹⁹ in *Russkoe slovo* [The Russian Word] (no. 171 for 1906).²⁰ "If we," he wrote, "set ourselves the goal of *merging* the Galicians with the native Russian population, we should from the very beginning instill in them the conviction that to be Russian means for them not to renounce their religious beliefs and national particularities, but to preserve them."

These words testify to Lenin's solidarity on the national question not only with Herzen, but also with Prince Trubetskoi, as both Prince Trubetskoi and Lenin promise the oppressed nations—the former—"preservation of their national particularities"—and Lenin—"the right to self-determination," but both for the purpose of *merging* these nations.

In general, the promise of the "right" to liberation on the part of an oppressor always amounts to "hypocrisy." After all, this right is decidedly contrary to his interests, and therefore, if he promises it, he does so only to deceive the oppressed party and thereby continue his domination.

The slogan of the "right of nations to self-determination" may be considered as demagogic as the slogan of the "right to work," which has long served the bourgeoisie as a means of deceiving the workers.

"In struggle you shall gain your rights," and if we imagine with Herzen that Ukraine, remembering her great rebellion against Poland and victory over her, rises against Russia and wages war on her, of what

¹⁶ Leading liberal daily published in Moscow.

¹⁷ Menshevik daily published in Petrograd.

¹⁸ Daily newspaper of the Constitutional Democratic Party published in Petrograd.

¹⁹ Prince Evgenii Trubetskoi (1863-1920), professor of philosophy at the universities of Kiev and Moscow, founding member of the Constitutional Democratic Party.

²⁰ Liberal daily published in Moscow.

“right” of Ukraine could one speak at such a moment? * There is no doubt that the Russian government and bourgeoisie would use all the means at their disposal and even enlist the aid of allied states to defeat Ukraine, to crush her, and to place her in subjection anew.

But how will the Russian proletariat act in such a case? Even if it is educated in the spirit of Lenin’s “right to self-determination,” and even if we assume that in the event of a Ukrainian insurrection Lenin comes out in favor of the “defeat of Russia,” the Russian proletariat will most likely *not* obey him and will go to war against Ukraine.

It will remember, after all, that for ten whole years Lenin has been coming out most energetically against “the break-up of Russia”; that he has always been of the opinion that “the advantages of large states both from the point of view of economic progress and from that of the interests of the masses are indubitable; moreover, they increase steadily with the growth of capitalism,” and that it is necessary to enter into “the fullest union [of proletarians of the oppressed nations] with the Russian proletariat,” for “only such a union will provide a guarantee of complete political and economic emancipation.”

Besides, the Russian worker has learned from Lenin that contemporary wars are distinguished by their exclusively imperialist character. Taking this into account, the Russian workers will easily understand that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie, which will be at the head of the insurgent Ukrainian people, should it prove victorious, will not limit itself, obviously, to the liberation of Ukrainian territory, but will attempt also to “liberate,” for example, Belorussia, of whose incorporation the partisans of an independent Ukraine are already dreaming. Nor will the Ukrainian bourgeoisie deny itself the annexation of a large slice of Russian territory.

The danger of a Ukrainian victory is bound to impel the Russian proletariat to come out against Ukraine’s “self-determination,” and as its justification it will say that “the right of nations to self-determina-

* A propos of this let us note that the *Sbornik* proposes in its “Theses” “the resolution of the question of secession by a referendum of the seceding nation.” No view could be more mistaken. A nation that has seceded unilaterally has no need for a referendum. Only a conqueror or a ruling power in general can have recourse to a referendum, and under such conditions a referendum can only be a manifestation of constraint. For example, how fine a referendum organized by the Germans would look now in Poland. It is also being rumored that Black Hundred reactionaries are insisting on the necessity of a referendum in Ukraine in order to decide the question of its national schools. It cannot be doubted that under present police conditions, when even the Ukrainian printed word is forbidden, such a referendum would yield a result favorable to the tsarist government. [Turkevych’s note.]

tion is not at all equivalent to a demand for secession, fragmentation, or the creation of small states." If the Ukrainian workers, believing in the "right to self-determination," join the rebellion, the Russian proletariat will call them traitors to the cause of "complete political and economic emancipation" and will combat them in the interests of "emancipation."

Accordingly, both the Russian proletariat and the Ukrainian, if they proceed from the "right of nations to self-determination" at the moment of their peoples' struggle, the Russian for "unity" and the Ukrainian for "secession," will inevitably come to the conclusion that "the defence of their fatherlands" is a necessity. One who upholds a particular right cannot fail to defend that which the implementation of this right will bring him. If, for example, after long struggle we obtain the right of free speech, then at any attempt to take it away from us we shall defend ourselves. Unless demands, once achieved, are defended, there is no sense in fighting for them.

The achievement of the "right to self-determination" obliges us to "defend the fatherland." Hence it appears to us illogical that the supporters of the "right to self-determination" should refuse to defend contemporary states. States organized anew will not really differ in any way from already existing states. The Russian social democrats, in discussing the "right to self-determination," have never broached the question whether the new boundaries should be historical or ethnic. If, for example, Poland were to be restored in her historical boundaries, it would be necessary to include within her the Lithuanians, the Belorussians, and half the Ukrainians. But if we should wish to accept the principle of ethnic boundaries, then we would not achieve any positive results either, because under capitalism, with its wars and annexations, boundaries are continually changing. Therefore there do not exist and cannot exist at the present time any states that are whole in the national sense, and in each of them the nation that is greatest in numbers rules.

But all these considerations do not, strictly speaking, pertain to the "right to self-determination" enunciated by the revolutionary Russian social democrats, as their "right to self-determination" represents nothing other than veritable "hypocrisy."

The Russian Social Democrats' obeisance before "large states" and before the centralism of these states destroys within them the capacity to consider the national question from a genuinely internationalist point of view.

Lenin, for example, resolves the problem of the relationship between "large" and "small" nations in exactly the same way as it is resolved in practice by the governments of the "large states." In this case, moreover—as always—he passes off his views as the last word in Marxist perfection and speaks in Marx's name with the same conviction as clerics speak in the name of the Lord God.

As long ago as 1896, Kautsky, in his introduction to Marx's *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, noted with perfect justice that Marx had made a mistake in "denying the (Austrian) Slavic peoples, first and foremost the Czechs, all possibility of national existence." Marx's mistake consisted, in Kautsky's opinion, in Marx's failure to take into account the fact that

in 1848 the national movement of the Bohemians was a class struggle at whose head stood a *single* class, the petty bourgeoisie. Thanks to this the entire nation could appear temporarily as the enemy of revolution, and the national movement was characterized by unity and wholeness. At the present time the Czech nation is torn asunder by the same profound class contradictions as every other contemporary nation, and it is therefore impossible that it should again come out as a whole against the revolutionary movement and betray it The Austrian Slavs, as a nationality, will never again play the same role as they did in 1848.

Condemning the Austrian Slavs to national extinction, Marx turned all his sympathies toward Poland, considering that the restoration of its independence would ensure the complete victory of European democracy. But the situation has changed. Lenin now comes out against the slogan of an independent Poland because "St. Petersburg has become a far more important revolutionary centre than Warsaw." Regardless of this, Lenin still makes use of Marx's position after 1848 to justify his view on the necessity of discriminating between "revolutionary" and "reactionary" peoples and "subordinating the interests of democracy in one country to the interests of democracy in *several or all* countries."²¹

To prove the justice of such a view, Lenin gives the following example:

Let us imagine that between two large monarchies there is a small one whose kinglet is "related" by kinship or other ties to the monarchs of both neighboring countries. Let us imagine further that the proclamation of a republic in the small country, the banishment of *its* monarch, would mean in practice war between the two neighboring large countries for the restoration of one monarch or the other in the small country. There is no doubt that international social democracy as a whole, including the truly internationalist section of social democracy in the small country, *would be against the substitution of a republic for the monarchy* in this case.

²¹ Lenin, 30:43. This quotation and all further quotations from Lenin (except those identified in notes 27-9) are taken from the article "Itogi diskussii o samoopredelenii," 30:17-58.

This is a striking example. First of all, the assumption of the possibility of war between two large states over the banishment of a "kinglet" in a "small country" is as naive as, for example, the explanation of the present world war by the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne by a Serb. The banishment of the "kinglet" could serve only as a pretext for the large states to settle imperialist accounts between themselves, and therefore, it would seem, "international social democracy as a whole" should come out not against the republican aspirations of the "small country," but against war between the large states; moreover, one of its antiwar slogans ought to be the slogan of the *defence* of the republic of the "small country" and the aspiration of creating a republican order in the belligerent large states.

But it must not be forgotten that Lenin holds "small nations" in utter contempt, calls them "one of the sources of parasitism," and usually identifies the concept "small" with the concept "oppressed." He also finds that "the internationalist education of the working class ought not to be *concretely identical* in large, oppressor nations and small, oppressed nations."²² For: "The path to a single goal—to complete equality of rights, to the closest drawing together and further *merging of all* nations passes here, of course, along concretely different roads."

"The centre of gravity," writes Lenin, "of the internationalist education of workers in oppressor nations must inevitably consist in the advocacy and defence by them of the freedom of secession of oppressed nations." And having stated with his characteristic gentlemanliness that "we are entitled and obliged to treat every social democrat of an oppressor nation who does *not* conduct such propaganda as an imperialist, as a scoundrel," Lenin immediately adds that "we are obliged to educate the workers in 'indifference' to national distinctions. This is indisputable."*

It would seem that the fostering of this "indifference" amounts in fact to the education of "scoundrels," but Lenin explains that:

A member of an oppressor nation should be "indifferent" to the question whether small nations belong to *his* state or to a *neighboring*

²² Lenin, 30:43-4. Iurkevych here condenses a paragraph of Lenin's text, supplying the words "ought not to be."

* In the *Sbornik* there is a note on the "All-City S[ocial]-D[emocratic] Conference in Kharkiv" that took place in November 1915. In the cited resolutions of this conference, notwithstanding the fact that Kharkiv is a Ukrainian city, there is not a word of mention of the national oppression of Ukraine and of her "right to self-determination." It would seem that the moment for such a declaration was most appropriate. The question arises, therefore, whether Lenin regards the Kharkiv S[ocial]-D[emocratic] Conference as a meeting of "scoundrels," and if not, why not? [Iurkevych's note.]

one or to themselves, according to their sympathies: without such "indifference" he is not a social democrat. In order to be an internationalist social democrat, it is necessary to think *not* only of one's own nation but to place *above it* the interests of all nations, their universal liberty and equality of rights.

On the other hand, the social democrat of a small nation should place the centre of gravity of his agitation on the second word of our formula: the "voluntary *unification*" of nations. He may, without violating his responsibilities as an internationalist, favor both the political independence of his nation and its incorporation into a neighboring state. But in all instances he should struggle *against* petty national narrowness, isolation, and exclusiveness, for the consideration of the whole and the universal, for the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general.

Thus socialists of oppressor nations should "indifferently" advocate and defend the "right of nations to self-determination," while socialists of oppressed nations should, on the other hand, defend "in all instances" the "unification of nations" and "the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general."

Both parties, socialists of the oppressed and the oppressor nations, are obliged, if they do not want to be "scoundrels," to aspire toward "the closest drawing together and further *merging of all* nations."

There is no doubt that this "further merging" is an expression not of internationalism, but of the contemporary system of centralism of "large states" and the "further" assimilation and oppression of the nations subjected to them.

Faithful to this system, Lenin also transfers it to the socialist order and declares that "the goal of socialism is not only the elimination of the fragmentation of humanity into small states and of all exclusiveness of nations, not only the drawing together of nations, but also their merging." As a convinced centralist, he shies away from the generally recognized fact that the capitalist order, while oppressing nations, simultaneously regenerates and organizes them. The rebirth of oppressed nations runs parallel with the democratization of culture, and hence it is impossible not to agree with Bauer²³ that nations will fully develop only under socialism, when the broad masses take part in cultural life, which will inescapably assume a national character, accelerating social progress by means of its peaceful diversity.

²³ Otto Bauer (1882-1938), leading Austrian social democrat, author of *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1907), repeatedly attacked by Lenin for his championing of autonomy for the national minorities of the Dual Monarchy.

In any case, it is clear that acknowledgement of the inevitability of "further merging of nations" can in no way be reconciled with the "thesis" of the right to self-determination, and we cannot therefore fail to relegate this "thesis" to the collection of other national-"liberation" slogans of contemporary belligerent imperialism. The last Zimmerwald Conference sincerely and honestly declared that it considers the proletariat obliged "to repel all efforts made under the standard of liberation of oppressed peoples to create seemingly independent but in fact unviable states."²⁴

The Zimmerwald internationalist movement came out, as is well known, with an *autonomist* program on the national question, stating in a resolution at its second conference that "as long as socialism has not brought about liberty and equality of rights for all nations (compare with Lenin's "further merging"!), the unalterable responsibility of the proletariat should be energetic resistance *by means of class struggle against all oppression* of weaker nations and a demand for the defence of national minorities and autonomy on the basis of full democracy."²⁵

Class struggle against all national oppression—this is the only principle on which a truly internationalist socialist program on the national question can be constructed.

The difference between the Zimmerwald "theses" on the national question and the "theses" of the central organ of the RSDLP consists precisely in the fact that the latter, while recognizing the "right of nations to self-determination," actually supports a policy of hostility to the liberation struggle of nations, counterposing to the Zimmerwald "liberty and equality of rights for all nations" its own "further merging."

Supporting the struggle for national liberation, the Zimmerwalders display a concern deserving of every recognition for "national minorities" and demand democratic autonomy for oppressed nations.

The "central organ," on the other hand, not only does not advance the demand for autonomy, but is even scornful of it, because, according to Lenin's expression, "autonomy as a reform is distinct in principle from freedom of secession as a revolutionary measure."

All that Lenin defends is always, of course, very revolutionary. But if we take the example of Sweden and Norway, of which Lenin makes so much, these two nations exercised "self-determination" peacefully and

²⁴ The original texts of this resolution and the one cited later in this work are reprinted in *Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung: Protokolle und Korrespondenz*, ed. Horst Lademacher (The Hague and Paris, 1967), 1:410.

²⁵ Ibid. Original text reads: "to offer energetic resistance by means of class struggle against all national oppression, to oppose all violation of weaker nations." Iurkevych's italics.

by governmental means. On the other hand, the struggle for Irish autonomy expressed itself in a prolonged and stubborn revolutionary struggle.

In his defence of the "right to self-determination," Lenin is obliged, in order to emerge as victor, to mix up concepts. In this case he identifies the forms of liberation of nations with the means of achieving their liberation.

The achievement of autonomy, as well as of state sovereignty, may be the result, in one case, of revolutionary struggle; in another, of a legal governmental or social act. Besides, the different classes of an oppressed nation, interpreting one and the same national-liberation slogan in different ways, fight for it differently. The bourgeoisie, in its striving for state sovereignty, as in its striving for autonomy, invariably pursues a policy of compromise with the government of the dominant state, for which its patriotic feelings are incomparably stronger than are its sympathies for the democratic goals of its people.

As for the proletariat and the democrats of the oppressed nation, their national-liberation strivings will be expressed at the decisive moments by *barricade* warfare with an autonomist democratic program, and by *trench* warfare with a program of secession.

We shall make no secret of the fact that we, for our part, prefer barricade warfare, that is, political revolution, to trench warfare, that is, war. The difference between the autonomist movement and the separatist movement consists precisely in the fact that the first leads democrats of *all* nations oppressed by a "large state" onto the path of struggle for political liberation, for only in a free political order is it possible to achieve democratic autonomy, while the second—the separatist, which is the concern of a *single* oppressed nation struggling not against the order that oppresses it but against the state that oppresses it—cannot fail, in the present strained atmosphere of antagonism between "large states," to turn into an imperialist war combination.

It is also necessary to take into account that the capitalist states' strivings for conquest serve as a kind of continuation of the system of oppression of the nations within these states. The Muscovite state, for example, transformed itself into the modern Russian Empire only when it subjugated Poland and Ukraine, which stood above it in the cultural sphere but were disorganized by internecine wars, and subjected both to barbaric tsarist bureaucratic centralism. The greatness of the "Russian" Empire, which has always sent the Russian opposition movement into such transports of enthusiasm, is built on the dominion of the Russian people over a whole series of annexed peoples.

The oppression of nations within a state, like the oppression of a colonial population, is conducive to the development of imperialist greed in the government of a "large state," which, in order to realize its war plans, makes use not only of its own people, but of the vast masses of

oppressed peoples that, in Russia, as in Austria, comprise the majority of the population. From the nations that it oppresses the centre extracts great resources, which enrich the state treasury and allow the government to maintain the army and bureaucracy that protect its dominance.

Hence a democratic, autonomist decentralization of "large states," by allowing the democrats of oppressed peoples also to play their part in political life, cannot fail to weaken the reactionary character and omnipotence of the central power. Hence also the national-liberation movements of the oppressed nations, particularly if the proletariat takes an active revolutionary part in them, combining its national liberation with its general class liberation, undoubtedly serve the cause of social progress.

On the question of old annexations, the central organ of the RSDLP holds to the view that "protest against annexations is nothing other than the acknowledgement of the right to self-determination,"²⁶ that is, that if we come out against new annexations, we should by the same token come out against old ones and, accordingly, for the right to self-determination. Lenin maintained in view of this that I, "in coming out against the right to self-determination, *thereby* defend the old annexations of tsarism (Finland et al.),"²⁷ and in this connection called me "quite an undisguised servant of the bourgeoisie."²⁸

As if to prove his "revolutionary" ebullience, Lenin greatly likes to abuse his opponent with a strong word. This manner of his arouses disgust, and it is often necessary to make a certain effort in order to force oneself to continue a discussion with him.

As proof that those who protest against annexations should recognize the right to self-determination, Lenin makes the following comparison:

Let us assume that I walk out onto the street of any European city and declare publicly(!), then repeat in the newspapers(!) a "protest" at not being allowed to buy someone as a slave. There is no doubt that I would properly be regarded as a slaveholder, a supporter of the principle or system, if you like, of slavery. That my sympathies toward slavery are expressed in negative and not positive form ("for slavery") will deceive no one. A political "protest" is *fully* equivalent to a political program; this is so evident that it is somehow awkward even to feel obliged to explain it.

We greatly doubt whether the public of "any European city" could "regard" Lenin as a slaveholder. It would much sooner take him to be

²⁶ Lenin, 30:25. Cf. Lenin, 27:261-2.

²⁷ Not a direct quotation, but a reference to the accusation made in Lenin, 27:261 and to the argument developed in the "Theses" (see n. 2).

²⁸ Lenin, 27:261.

a man psychologically afflicted with a mania for domination. The newspaper editors of "any European city" would probably throw his "protest" away in puzzlement into their editorial wastebaskets. After all, this "comparison" is as nonsensical as the affirmation that "a political 'protest' (Lenin's quotation marks) is *fully* equivalent to a political program."

The second Zimmerwald Conference declared with perfect justice that "the proletariat combats annexations not because it recognizes the world map as it was before the war as corresponding to the interests of the people and which, therefore, should not be changed! Socialism itself aspires to the elimination of all national oppression by means of the economic and political unification of peoples, which is unrealizable with the existence of capitalist boundaries."

We protest against new annexations because they serve as a new form of coercion of nations and as a new constraint on their liberation movements. As far as old annexations are concerned, it is not we who are their true defenders, but Lenin, because it is he, and not we, who stands for the "further merging of nations" in "large" and centralized states, and his "right to self-determination," as he himself declares, will be renounced by the oppressed nations after its "guarantee."

We, on the contrary, insist upon the necessity of struggle against the consequences of old annexations, against the oppression of annexed nations, and upon the conquest of democratic and autonomous rights for them as the only possible guarantee of their free national existence and development under a capitalist order. The shifting of boundaries is the task of imperialism; our task is the struggle for the decentralization and democratization of "large states." Moreover, the proletariat of the oppressor nation, at least that section whose attitude is truly internationalist, is obliged to help us in our struggle by its pressure on the central government.

We are against the Petrograd government's and the Petrograd central committee's centralizing in their hands, first, all political power over the Russian Empire, and second, all organized power over Russian social democracy.

We support the federalist principle both in the constitution of the Russian Empire and in the organization of Russian social democracy.

When Ukrainian social democracy, which took definitive shape in programmatic and organizational respects at its constituent conference in 1905, declared itself in favor of unification with Russian social democracy on the basis of autonomy, the Russian social democrats, in the course of prolonged negotiations with us that were renewed several times, refused unification in the most decisive fashion, offering us "*fusion*," which we, of course, rejected and to which we will never agree.

In order to envisage most concretely what is meant by "the right of nations to self-determination," it will suffice to quote Lenin's letter to one of our editorial offices, which we print with the author's permission:

"I must say," he wrote to us, "that I am profoundly outraged by the advocacy of the *segregation* of Ukrainian workers into a separate s[ocial]-d[emocratic] organization."²⁹

Throughout the whole nineteenth century and our own, Ukraine has been in the position of a Russian colony; moreover, repression of the Ukrainian movement by the tsarist government has always been merciless. The Ukrainian printed word was banned for thirty years before the revolution and has now been banned once again since the beginning of the present war, while the Russian army, upon the occupation of Galicia and Bukovina, has destroyed all the cultural achievements of the Ukrainian people in the relatively free political conditions of Austria.

Ukrainian social democracy has recognized the struggle for the liberation of its people as its responsibility. It has opposed to Ukrainian bourgeois politics, which consist in the exclusive effort to "make peace with the government" at the price of a few tiny concessions, a political program of democratic autonomy and a tactic of revolutionary class struggle, together with the proletariat of all the nations of Russia, against the tsarist order and for political and national freedom. Separate, but linked autonomously with Russian social democracy, the Ukrainian organization is indispensable for the realization of the distinct political demand of autonomy for Ukraine.

But Russian social democracy has received our movement with "profound outrage" from the first days of its appearance. As our movement grew, and regardless of the fact that our party took on a perfectly definite social-democratic character in 1905 and has held to a consistent revolutionary tactic, the antagonism between us and the Russian social democrats working in Ukraine not only has failed to weaken, but has grown continually stronger.

We have been treated as "chauvinists" and "separatists," regardless of the fact that the Russian social democrats, following in the footsteps of governmental assimilation and utilizing its results, organized the proletariat in Ukrainian cities as a Russian proletariat and thus estranged it culturally from the rural proletariat, whereby, of course, they violated the unity of the workers' movement in Ukraine and retarded its development.

In the whole course of their activity they have never come out on Ukrainian soil against national oppression and have utilized the

²⁹ Lenin, 48:283. Iurkevych cites the postscript appended by Lenin to Grigorii Zinoviev's undated letter to Volodymyr Levynsky, editor of *Dzvin*. According to the editors of *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Lenin wrote his postscript on 26 April 1914 in Cracow. The full text of the letter is cited in Dmytro Doroshenko, *Z istorii ukrainskoi politychnoi dumky za chasiv svitovoi viiny* (Prague, 1936), pp. 31-2.

results of this oppression as a means of extending their influence and their organizations across all of Ukraine's large territory; this, of course, significantly strengthened their movement.

We can have no claims upon the Russian comrades who work among the Russian proletariat on Russian territory or among the proletarians who have emigrated to Ukrainian territory, but we are speaking of those Russian social democrats who work among our proletariat and, while recognizing our "right to self-determination," nevertheless refuse us the right to struggle for our national liberation.

If they are sincere in saying that they wish to protest against old annexations, as a result of which Russia harshly oppresses Ukraine, then let them at least refrain from hindering the Ukrainian proletariat in its struggle for its own national liberation.

translated by Myroslav Yurkevich

GUIDE TO RESEARCH

THE G. R. B. PANCHUK COLLECTION

Introduction

The Gordon Richard Bohdan Panchuk Collection is an important personal archive of materials pertaining to Ukrainian-Canadian affairs, both during and immediately after World War Two. It is particularly rich in documentation about refugee relief organizations, such as the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau (CURB), and about the role Ukrainians in Canada played in ameliorating the plight of their compatriots in Western Europe after the war.

With the recent relocation of the core of Mr. Panchuk's collection—ninety-three transfer cases—from his Montreal home to the Archives of Ontario (AO) in Toronto,¹ the way has now been cleared for the *eventual* accessibility of most of this material to the public. This will occur once a definitive finding aid has been readied under the auspices of the current guardian of the collection, the Multicultural History Society of Ontario (MHSO), and approved by Mr. and Mrs. Panchuk.

A tentative finding aid, prepared by Zenowij Zwarycz and Lubomyr Luciuk, was made and five copies distributed, with one each going to Mr. Panchuk, Mr. Zwarycz, Mr. Luciuk, and Dr. M. R. Lupul, director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Edmonton. The original and a copy were left with the MHSO.

This guide describes the contents of the transfer cases:

<i>Series</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>No. of Transfer Cases</i>
A.	Ukrainian Canadian Servicemens' Association	9
B.	Ukrainian Canadian Veterans' Association	12
C.	Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau	4
D.	Ukrainian Canadian Relief Mission & Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund	2
E.	Ukrainian Canadian Committee	2
F.	Ukrainian (Relief) Organizations in Europe	2
G.	Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain	2
H.	Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain	1
I.	" <i>Dyviziiia Halychyna</i> "	1
J.	Personal Papers of G. R. B. Panchuk	24
K.	Miscellaneous Papers	30
L.	Photo-Blocks (Newspapers)	4

¹ On 19 December 1980, Mr. Panchuk signed an agreement with the Multicultural History Society of Ontario confirming his intention of depositing his papers with the Archives of Ontario.

A large number of unlabelled photographs and films (16 mm.) were also located. The photographs were left with Mr. Panchuk, on the understanding that he would describe them for eventual deposit with the MHSO as an integral part of this collection. The films, many of them brittle with age, require restoration before they can be included in the collection. This restoration is now being undertaken by Mr. and Mrs. Yuriy Luhovy, of Montreal, in co-operation with the MHSO and Mr. Luciuk. The films, depicting such scenes as Ukrainian refugees in the Displaced Persons camps of Western Europe and the *Dyviziia Halychyna* in Rimini and the U.K., are simply unique. Their preservation as a part of this collection is extremely fortunate.

Ongoing Efforts

Now that the collection is safely stored under MHSO supervision, other related projects are being undertaken. Of primary importance is the preparation of the detailed finding aid to this collection, a task conservatively estimated as requiring upwards of a year's work. Until such a guide is readied, the entire collection must remain closed.

A transcript of oral-history interviews by Mr. Luciuk with Mr. Panchuk in 1980 and 1981 is now being typed for use as a first draft of a book about Mr. Panchuk's role during the Second World War and immediate postwar years. This book will be published by the MHSO.

Other G. R. B. Panchuk Materials

A considerable correspondence between Mr. Panchuk and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee exists. Much of it can be located at the Public Archives of Canada (PAC) in Ottawa. A file dated 1947 and containing a number of interesting letters was restored by the PAC and will be retained in Ottawa. As well, the collections of the late Dr. Kaye, and of the Ukrainian Canadian Servicemens' and Veterans' Associations, parts of which are at the PAC, also contain occasional documentation relating to Mr. Panchuk and his activities. These collections are all, to varying degrees, restricted. Researchers wishing to make use of them should address a written inquiry to the PAC before travelling to Ottawa.

An unknown amount of material pertaining to this period and to Mr. Panchuk remains in the files stored in the Ukrainian Canadian Committee building in Winnipeg. Likewise, the Ukrainian Cultural Centre Oseredok has a number of CURB, Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund and other related documents.

Conclusions

Of course, there are many other Ukrainians across Canada who retain private archives in which a variety of possibly critical documents are kept.

The location and transfer of such papers into professionally managed public archives should be recognized as a priority for the Ukrainian-Canadian academic community.

The transfer of Mr. Panchuk's collection guarantees the availability of these materials for future students. Once a thorough survey of the collection's contents has been prepared and publicized, the potential of this collection will become apparent. It is to Mr. and Mrs. Panchuk's credit that despite personal inconveniences, they kept this collection intact and then recognized the need for the timely transfer of the collection to an archive located in the midst of an emerging centre of Ukrainian-Canadian research.

Lubomyr Luciuk,
University of Alberta
and
Zenowij Zwarycz, Toronto

REVIEWS

THE McMASTER CONFERENCE ON "UKRAINE AND RUSSIA IN THEIR HISTORICAL ENCOUNTER"

This conference, which took place on 8-9 October 1981 in Hamilton, Ontario, is the third conference on a Ukrainian topic organized by Professor Peter Potichnyj. The proceedings of the first two McMaster conferences—"Contemporary Ukraine" (1974) and "Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present" (1977) have been published and are highly regarded as original contributions to the field of Ukrainian studies. It is hoped that the proceedings of this conference will also appear in print.

Professor Potichnyj stressed in his opening remarks that the conference was "a scholarly, not political, gathering." Perhaps this was the intention underlying the two-tier system of participation, with invited academics seated around the conference table enjoying the right to speak, and the "lay audience," twice the size of the former group and known for its eagerness to contribute at the earlier conferences, merely listening and occasionally applauding. Nevertheless, a political as well as scholarly gathering it was. Nowhere was this more evident than in the first and last sessions. During the first session, on Medieval and Early Modern History, one could not fail to appreciate the degree to which political concerns of the day influence our study of Kievan Rus' (discussed by Professor Jaroslaw Pelenski, Iowa), the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654 (Professor Edward L. Keenan, Harvard) and Ukrainian-Russian relations after 1654 (Professor Joachim Torke, Berlin). Indeed, Professor Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard) began his comments on the papers presented by observing that today's Russians cannot imagine their past without reflecting their present great-power status, and that Ukrainians compensate for their present statelessness by referring to the past imperial glory of Rus'.

The last session—a round-table discussion on Problems of Ukrainian-Russian Dialogue—was a political debate pure and simple. It is dangerous to generalize about any of the sessions, but I would venture to say that in this one the lines were fairly clearly drawn: the Ukrainians demanded that the Russians "free themselves of the complexes of the past" and recognize Ukraine's right to self-determination; the Russians protested defensively that they did recognize this right, but that the larger issue concerned a united Russian-Ukrainian front against the Kremlin. This also was the sentiment of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's written submission to the conference, read aloud by Professor Gleb Zekulin in the Political Relations session immediately preceding the Round Table finale. The elderly General Petro Hryhorenko, who sat patiently throughout the entire conference (and was not provided with an interpreter by the conference

organizers) was the last to speak. Like his mixed Ukrainian-Russian ancestry, Hryhorenko's comments seemed to straddle both sides of the debate. Speaking with great emotion about the tragic fate of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and its struggle for national rights, as well as about the need for a united oppositional struggle in the USSR, the recently exiled general was one of the few speakers to confront the *contemporary* reality of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Professor Potichnyj's hopes were realized, however, in the conference sessions on Modern History, Economy and Demography, Cultural Relations, the Religious Question, and Political Relations. Of the wide assortment of papers presented, I was particularly intrigued by "A Century of Moscow-Ukraine Economic Relations: An Interpretation" by Professor Ivan Koropecyk (Temple), "Ukrainian-Russian Literary Relations in the 19th Century" by Professor George Grabowicz (Harvard), "Ukrainian-Russian Dialogue: The Religious Dimension" by Rt. Rev. Alexander Schmemman (St. Vladimir Orthodox Seminary, New York), and Professor John A. Armstrong's after-dinner speech on "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Nationalism."

In reviewing these papers, one is struck by the persistence of the political dimension of intellectual labor in the social sciences and the humanities. Perhaps political partisanship and intellectual objectivity are not necessarily antagonistic. Let us take, for example, Professor Grabowicz's presentation at the conference. He offered a critique of current Soviet scholarship, which "places" writers who worked in the Russian language in the nineteenth century (completely or partially) within an exclusively Russian literature. The difficulty in establishing boundaries between Russian and Ukrainian literature flows from the fact that many Ukrainian writers participated in the Russian literary schools and vice versa. The linguistic basis alone cannot be acceptable as the line of demarcation, because in certain periods Ukrainians had no choice but to write and publish in Russian; some utilized both languages, others wrote on Ukrainian themes in the Russian language, and so on. What constitutes Ukrainian and Russian literature involves also questions of the reader audience, the reality of bilingualism, the association of languages with particular classes and political centres, and literature in the service of imperialism or of national liberation. Apart from the fact that the problem of establishing a literary paradigm here involves the political reality of the nineteenth-century empire, Grabowicz is required to respond to contemporary Soviet literary criticism, more precisely, its "official line." And *its* political partisanship cannot be denied.

Given the effort put into this conference by the organizers and the speakers alike, it is a pity that more people from the academic community did not attend. The Russians were underrepresented numerically, a fact that explains the rather one-sided dialogue with the Ukrainians. Many Jews

were unable to attend because the conference began on Yom Kippur. The Ukrainian community at large expressed its usual keen interest in these conferences, attending in large numbers and reporting and debating its proceedings in the press. In the light of such support, is it not desirable to avoid the two-tier nature of participation, in which the audience cannot even ask questions? We may be scholars, but we should not limit the discussion on such occasions to ourselves.

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SYLVESTR IARYCHEVSKY, *TVORY*, two volumes. Edited with an introduction and notes by Mahdalyna Laslo-Kutsiuk. Bucharest: Kriterion, 1977-78. 301 and 509 pp. 560 and 730 copies. Lei 15 and 19.50.

Magdalena Laszlo-Kutiuk, whose present efforts have rescued a noteworthy writer of the "Franko School" from near oblivion, has been the pillar of Ukrainian studies at Bucharest University for over two decades.¹ She made her debut in 1960 with an article on Olha Kobylanska,² who, like Iarychevsky, was connected with Bukovyna, both northern and southern (Romanian). This was followed by two articles in *Radianske literaturoznavstvo*, one on Shevchenko in late nineteenth-century Romanian publications (1961, no. 2),³ the other a comparative study of Shevchenko's *Kateryna* and Baratynsky's *Eda* (1975, no. 8). Another Kiev periodical, *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1962, no. 2, printed her article on late nineteenth-century Ukrainian-Romanian relations. The organ of Romanian Slavists, *Romanoslavica* (Bucharest), carried a number of her contributions over the years; inter alia, on B. P. Hasdeu's writings about Ukrainian folklore and on Berynda's *Lexicon* (1964), on Skovoroda's works in the manuscript collections of Romanian libraries (1965), on Romanian-Ukrainian collaboration during the Romanian Independence War (viz., chiefly on Drahomanov), and on Iurii Shcherbak's *Barier nesumisnosti* (1980).⁴

¹ Ivan Reboshapka (Ioan Rebusapca) is also very active there, writing mostly on Ukrainian folklore and compiling textbooks for Ukrainian schools (cf. the review of one of his works in this journal, fall 1980).

² "Problema emanciparii femeii în opera lui O. Kobylanska," *Analele Universitații București* 9 (1960), no. 18, pp. 67-79.

³ Another article on Shevchenko in Romania by her appeared in the same year in a Romanian academic periodical.

⁴ Laszlo-Kutiuk also draws our attention to Shcherbak in her *Shukannia formy* (1980) (see *Suchasnist*, 1981, no. 10, p. 11). It is to be hoped that her high rating of him may contribute to saving this remarkable writer, too, from possible undeserved oblivion. It is noteworthy that his

Since 1973, she has also published several books on Ukrainian literature,⁵ the latest two of which⁶ have been reviewed by Larissa Zaleska Onyshkevych in this journal (spring 1981) and in *Suchasnist* (1981, no. 10).

To return to the subject of this review: Sylvester Iarychevsky (1871-1918) spent the last nine years of his life in Sereth (now Siret), his wife's native town, in southern Bukovina, now in Romania, and the six years before that in northern Bukovina (at that time, all Bukovina belonged to Galicia, a province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy); this establishes the Romanian connection. He was born in Rohatyn, a town in Western Ukraine (then Galicia), into the family of a tailor, but his great-grandfather was a Cossack who came there from the Dnieper area. As Iarychevsky later reminisced:

Сяду, бувало, в саду,
й дідо — старезний козак —
розповідає мені
про силачів-гайдамак.

("Згадка", 1892, 1:43)

When still at school in Berezhany, at the age of fifteen Iarychevsky started writing poetry. Some of it was published later, and some remained in manuscript. It is now included in this edition, unlike eighteen short stories and novelettes (*povisti*) of that period, none of which are extant. In 1891 he appeared in print for the first time with the poem "Dolia" (not reproduced in this edition).⁷ Entering Lviv University in that year, he met Ivan Franko, whom he worshipped; joining the Peasant Radical Party on Franko's advice, he was a delegate to its October 1891 congress. In

early work, "Z khroniky mista Iaropolia," appeared only in *Vitchyzna* (1968, no. 7, pp. 16-68), and not, as customarily expected, subsequently in book form; nor have any of the promised further parts of the "Chronicle" appeared to date. A reason for this may well have been the unconventional and fascinating form of the "Chronicle."

⁵ *Z knyhy zhyttia: Antolohiia ukrainskoho klasychnoho opovidannia* (1973); *Relațiile literare româno-ucrainene în secolul al XIX-lea și la începutul secolului al XX-lea* (1974); *Pytannia ukrainskoi poetyky* (1974); *Ukrainskaadianska literatura* (1975; 2d ed. 1976); *Ukrainska poeziia XX stolittia: Antolohiia* (1976) (all publ. in Bucharest).

⁶ *Velyka tradytsiia: Ukrainska klasychna literatura v porivnialnomu vysvitlenni* (1979); *Shukannia formy: Narysy z ukrainskoi literatury XX stolittia* (1980).

⁷ The date that actually appears in the introduction (1:7) is 1892, but this, as the subsequent context seems to indicate, must be a misprint. B. Derkach, in the endnotes to *Ukrainska dozhovtneva baika* (Kiev, 1966), p. 335, also gives 1891 as the date of Iarychevsky's first appearance in print, but without further details.

Lviv he wrote, apart from poetry, also poems in prose, which were published, and three *povisti* and a verse drama, of which only the titles have been preserved. After two years of military service, he transferred to Vienna, where he studied at the university (1896-1901) while supporting himself through hard physical work, e.g., as a docker, as well as translating; he was also very active in Ukrainian student and worker organizations and evening classes; the text of one of his talks delivered before a worker audience, "Labor and Capital," based on a work by the prominent German Social Democrat F. Lassalle, is included in this edition. He also contributed prose, verse and articles to periodicals, notably the newspaper *Bukovyna*. Following the advice of its editor, Osyp Makovei, Iarychevsky wrote a number of stories and poems based on the ordinary people's lives in the Austrian capital, which stand out among Ukrainian writing on urban themes.⁸

After graduating, Iarychevsky took up teaching, at the same time continuing his activity among the people—organizing reading rooms, choirs, dramatic societies, and so on. This caused conflicts with the authorities, so that he had to move from one provincial West Ukrainian town to another, never staying long in any one school and having spells of unemployment. At the same time, he went on writing, and between 1903 and 1914 published in book form several collections of prose and poetry, as well as dramatic works. A contemporary critic, V. Kalynovych, thus wrote of Iarychevsky's 1904 collection of verse, *Pestri zvuky*, voicing no doubt also the reaction of most of the reading public:

Sylvester Iarychevsky's name has long been known to Ukrainians. His poems and feuilletons have often appeared in Ukrainian journals and papers. Reading them, many people must have been pleasantly surprised. Here was an author who had something to say to the people and knew how to say it. He delved deeply into his people's soul and drew from it his songs, which reached the hearts of the people. His poetic art is purely of the people. He never stands aside from that by which his people lives; on the contrary, he fights by its side for its freedom. A great yearning for the sun rings in his poetry. He firmly believes that the people will rise and reach the greatest heights of humanity. At the same time, his poetry is free from all reflection, his feelings flow freely and naturally, straight from the heart, and the form that he can give them is equally simple and sincere. Cheap sentimentalism is foreign to him. Also, it would be useless to try and look in him for signs of Decadence, which

⁸ Laszlo-Kutiuk dealt with the Vienna period in Iarychevsky's work in "Wien im literarischen Schaffen von Sylvester Jaryčevskij (1871-1918)," *Wiener slavistisches Jahrbuch* 22 (1976):24-36.

threatens to poison the lyric poetry of our time. Everything in his works breathes freshness and naturalness . . . (1:5-6)

Horemir (1906), the allegorical and somewhat abstract and schematic "poetic fairy-tale" in dramatic form, on the theme of tyranny, the passivity of the people, and a conspiracy against the tyrant that fails (2:296-314), evoked quite a different response from Iarychevsky's idol, Franko, whose review⁹ was immoderately and unfairly cruel, concluding with the words:

О Hore mir! Hore mir! О Гармодіє і Арістотітоне, чи ви чуєте, як на вашій могилі хрюкають свині!

Whatever the reasons for this unexpected outburst (Franko's unbalanced state of mind at the time was among those mooted), Laszlo-Kutiuk is convinced—and it is difficult to judge whether she is right—that Franko's damning review influenced out of all proportion posterity's view of Iarychevsky's dramatic works and *Horemir* in particular. However, it was in the last period of his life, in Sereth, that he was able to settle down as a teacher in the local *gymnasium* and the director of the Ukrainian school-boys' *bursa* (dormitory residence). He achieved recognition both as a teacher and an enlightener of the people, as well as a writer. A number of his poems even became favorite songs among students.¹⁰

During World War One he was released from military service and returned to Sereth "at the height of the hostilities," where, according to Laszlo-Kutiuk, "while holding the office of the burgomaster, he applied all his efforts to protecting the local population." A Soviet scholar, M. Ivasiuk of Chernivtsi University, on the other hand, while noting that Iarychevsky did not write "a single line" in the spirit of Austrian patriotism, asserts that "on the contrary, the writer soon found common language with the Command of the Russian troops in Bukovina and carried out the functions of the Burgomaster of Sereth."¹¹ This finding of "a common language" with an imperialist, anti-Ukrainian military command hardly squares with what Iarychevsky thought of the oppressors of Ukraine in "Vstavai, Ukraino!" (1903) and elsewhere:

Здається, сини вже України мертві,
а преці встають все завзяті нові.
Козак-невмирака не впаде, не вмере,
і ляцькая злоба його не зітре,
ні підлість московська, ні Сибір, ні кнут . . . (1:86)

⁹ *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, 1907, no. 4, pp. 179-81.

¹⁰ According to Ie. Iarosh's review of vol. 1 in *Zhovten*, 1978, no. 12, p. 146.

¹¹ M. Ivasiuk, "Spivets borotby i spodivan," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 19 January 1971.

and Ivasiuk's interpretation may be due to the now prevalent Soviet eagerness to treat all Russian military exploits as creating conditions for the ensuing "friendship of the peoples of the USSR."

Much of Iarychevsky's writing of his last years remained unpublished because of the war, and some were lost. After his death nothing seems to have been published apart from isolated items in some Soviet anthologies: once in 1931, and four times between 1957 and 1966.¹² Ivasiuk contributed further to a revival of interest in Iarychevsky when he wrote a thesis on him, followed by a number of articles.¹³ But it is only in the present two volumes that the major part of his extant works, some hitherto unpublished, is given again to the reader (though in a lamentably small edition).

Iarychevsky's poetry is strikingly diverse in form. From poem to poem, he skilfully varies the metre and rhyming schemes, and the length of stanzas and lines; in some quatrains, verses 2 and 4 are repeated as 1 and 3 of the next quatrain, and so on (1:83-4, 123, 131-2, 145-6); "Ver sacrum, novum" (1:116-7) has lines of varying length arranged in the shape of vases and bowls. His civic and patriotic poetry is somewhat abstract, especially in his early period:

Я чую в собі йскру святу:
хотів би я весь мир обіймити,
а за бездомную тоту
Вкраїну й жизнь свою зложити! (1890, 1:39)

Обновися, двигнись, Україно моя!
В Твоїй груді надія най сонцем сія,
[...]
У борбі най кріпить Тебе правда єдина —
великая ціль: Irredenta Вкраїна! (1899, 1:68-9)

He is at his strongest when evoking the hopelessness and despair of the underprivileged in the city or in the country (e.g., the suicide of a mother with her children in "Velykomiska idyliia," 1:76-7) or satirizing, in a style reminiscent of Thomas Hood, the idle rich against the contrasting background of the misery of the poor ("Amatorka sela," 1:135). His later lyric poetry is marked by sincerity and depth of feeling, and he is excellent in his ballads, often based on folk tales (e.g., "Brat-Bis," 1:189-

¹² Iarychevsky may well have been proscribed in the Soviet Union between the mid-1930s and mid-1950s: according to the reminiscences of Roman Kotsyk (*Vyzvolnyi shliakh* [London], 1963, no. 1, pp. 97-8, who was a former pupil of Iarychevsky's in 1905-6, some time in the 1930s Iarychevsky was described in *Chervonyi shliakh* (Kharkiv) as a "trubadur burzhuaaznoho fashyzmu."

¹³ In *Zhovten*, 1971, no. 1, and in *Ukrainske literaturoznavstvo* (Lviv), 1970, no. 10; 1975, no. 24; and 1976, no. 26. See also n. 11 above.

91); also in an earlier prose version, "Rohaty bratchyk," 2:59-63; "Anhel-ubiinyk," 1:180-2, meting out retribution for renouncing one's nation), and in entertaining and humorous narrative poems.

Ivasiuk (1970) deals at length with Iarychevsky's anti-clericalism. But his ecumenical, universal religious idealism must not be ignored:

Обніміться, мільйони! — кличе могутнім звуком симфонія, і на зворотних її крилах плывуть-налітають, немов тихі мари, якісь постаті величні, божеські . . .

Конфуцій, Будда, Христос . . .

Вони ж кликали: обніміться, мільйони!

("Дев'ята симфонія", а poem in prose, 1903, 1:272)

Iarychevsky's Christ, "the great Son of great Jehovah," the King of slaves and paupers" who "became the vanquisher of all kings," is very much like today's Christ the Liberator in Latin America, and Iarychevsky derives an expectation of his people's resurrection from Christ's:

Христос воскрес! . . .

Народе мій, учасниче недолі!

В ярмі, в неволі,

{ . . . }

Замучений та невмиручий краю,

Чекаю

Твого воскресіння!

("Чаю воскресіння", 1909, 1:144)

None of Iarychevsky's longer prose works have survived. His short stories, occupying half of vol. two, are of considerable interest with their unvarnished realism, being often either autobiographical or slices of life around him; some are stark and shattering, such as "Pustka" (1896, 2:86-91), anticipating Stefanyk in the subject matter and mode of treatment.

Iarychevsky's best dramatic works appear here in print for the first time: the delightful comedy "Lovy na lovtziv," the "social drama" "Boia-huzy," in which class prejudice is the cause of the death of the heroine, a working-class girl; and "Pochatok kintsia," which is only the first part, covering the end of 1647 and the beginning of 1648, of a projected dramatic tetralogy on the Khmelnytsky era. It is well researched and historically sound; e.g., the fact of the alliance with the Crimean Tatars is not sidestepped. Yet his Khmelnytsky is somewhat idealized, saying as he does in his last speech:

і стане Україна панувати

на власний лад і ряд, бо не піддана,

свобідна — і без хлопа і без пана! (2:389)

Iarychevsky closely follows Shevchenko in condemning Khmelnytsky's alliance with, or genuflection before, the Tsar of Muscovy in the short story "Velykodnia mriia" (1903, 2:96):

Ти, ти — батьку Хмельницький, а ти перед ким клонишся, падеш на коліна? Перед мальованою лялькою? [...] Батьку, батьку — велика в тебе сила, недосяглий твій розум і пекольний — твій блуд! ...

and quotes Shevchenko's invective against Khmelnytsky from "Rozryta mohyla." Such would no doubt have been the line of treatment in the rest of the tetralogy had it been written.

This valuable edition of an underservedly neglected writer is greatly enhanced by Laszlo-Kutiuk's erudite, perceptive and enlightening introduction (1:5-34) and notes (1:285-9, 2:499-507); it is, unfortunately, marred by a good sprinkling of misprints—probably difficult to eliminate with printers hardly used to Ukrainian. Two major printing errors have been noted: the obvious one in the middle of 2:466, and a missing line in Kobzar's second speech in 2:393.

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НАД ДРУГИМ ТОМОМ ХВИЛЬОВОГО

(споба ліричної рецензії)

МИКОЛА ХВИЛЬОВИЙ, ТВОРИ В П'ЯТЬОХ ТОМАХ. ТОМ ДРУГИЙ. Упор. і заг. ред. Григорія Костюка, передмова Мирослава Шкандрія. Нью-Йорк, Балтімор і Торонто: Об'єднання укр. письменників "Слово" і укр. видавництво "Смолоскип", 1980. 409 стор.

З далеких шкільних років залишився спогад... Заходить в класу нова вчителька — молоденька дівчина, тільки з інституту, ІНО, як тоді говорили. Її не зовсім звичайне для тих часів взуття — добрячі чобітки на високих підборах — одразу притягають допитливу учнівську увагу. І як на диво, читає вона нам оповідання "Кіт у чоботях". Усміхнена дівчина і химерна історія якимось зливаються в нашій уяві, і за новою вчителькою, шкільним звичаєм, одразу закріплюється прізвище — "Котик у чобітках".

Були потім і "Хрестоматія" Плевака, і незмінні «Айстри», і звучні "Соняшні клярнети" ... Дівчина діло своє знала і любила. На цокіт чобіток ми чекали.

А потім все раптом зникло — і дівчина, і Плевако, і "Айстри" ... Як марево. Як і не було.

Чи думалось, чи гадалось, що майже через півстоліття знову триматиму я в руках того "Кота в чоботях" і вільно листатиму книжки його

автора? Як друге народження. Хто зрозуміє це почуття, даруватиме, що не зміг я (українським звичаєм) без лірики. Та якось воно й нелегко писати з академічним спокоєм про Хвильового.

Видання творів письменника має особливе своє значення. Відомо, що після всіх реабілітацій, лібералізацій та всіякого роду "відлиг" ті твори залишаються в Україні під міцним замком. Добре відомо також, у чийй кишені ключ од того замка. Та зовсім невідомо, коли його відкриють. Виглядає швидше на те — і це найприкріше сьогодні, — що саме творам Хвильового судилося, мабуть, залишатися у себе на батьківщині за ґратами міцно й довго.

Значення наполегливої і копіткої роботи, яку ведуть зараз видавці п'ятитомника, важко переоцінити.

Другий том відкривається оповіданням "Я (романтика)" — одною з найсильніших речей автора.

Сказати, що "хвильовізм" якоюсь мірою закрив для нас письменника Хвильового, — значить повторити істину, яка вже стала загальним місцем. Та доводиться її повторювати. Щось подібне відбувається і з Винниченком. Його давня політична діяльність тяжіє Дамокловим мечем і закриває шлях його творам. Подивіться, тимчасом, щоденник — Винниченко відчував себе передусім і головним чином письменником.

Все йде, все минає — мистецтво залишається жити.

Оповідання "Я" — ще один тому доказ.

Перечитав його зараз іншими, може, очима. Одшумів той далекий час, зітерлися конкретні його ознаки, а твір хвилює, бо зберігає одвічну актуальність загальнолюдської проблематики, якою володіють твори такого художнього викінчення. Утверджуються елементарні, фундаментальні людські цінності—родина (мати), віра (Марія), природні муки сумління (супроти чергової "великої ідеї" і сумнівного до неї обов'язку). Хто зневажає оті одвічні реалії життя в ім'я "невідомої, загірньої (ці епітети закінчують твір) утопії, — вбиває в собі людину. Є ще в цьому ж томі оповідання "Мати": політичний розбрат обертає братів на нелюдів, готових вбити одне одного і рідну свою матір. Ніяка догма, ніякий «ідеал» не можуть виправдати антилюдського вчинку. Всі "покращувачі" світу не варті отих нетлінних, даних природою, Богом, цінностей, які роблять з нас людей. І як потрібні вони, ті цінності, в сьогоднішньому холодному нашому світі! Ось про що думалось над сторінками оповідання Хвильового. Про гуманістичний патос справжньої літератури.

І потім — ця психологічна роздвоєність, "розкол власного Я" — чи не те саме, що позначаємо в нашому сучаснику модерно-наукоподібними слівцями "амбівалентність", "відчуженість"? Замислилось більше над посвятою оповідання — "Цвітові яблуні", витонченому художньому дослідженню болісної роздвоєності. У Коцюбинського — конфлікт людини і митця, у Хвильового — конфлікт людських почуттів з прийнятим на себе обов'язком. Образ серця і каменя (згадаємо "камінність" в драмі Лесі

Українки). Обидві колізії — старі як саме життя, сьогодні такі ж актуальні, як і в ті часи.

Іншими словами: я наголошую на широкомистецькому характері твору, що надає йому довге життя поза конкретно-історичними реаліями, які відійшли в минуле і про які часом аж надто багато продовжують писати. Властивість речі справді художньої.

У томі надруковані голосні свого часу “Вальдшнепи”. Не будемо входити в їх оцінку. Можна погодитись з Г. Костюком про тип “заангажованого” роману, та жанр не вибачає художньої недосконалості. Я згодний з Є. Маланюком: з точки зору літературно-мистецької — роман слабкий. Увагу, в зв’язку з новою появою “Вальдшнепів”, звернути хочу на інше: рідку непохитну послідовність в обструкції його в Україні, попри всі зміни вітрів. Понад півстоліття тому (54 роки!) з’явилась відома розгромна стаття повновладного в ті часи А. Хвилі про роман — “Від ухилу — у прірву”. Офіційна академічна “Історія української літератури” в 1970 році називає Хвильового, в зв’язку з романом, тим же “ухильником” (т. 6, стор. 237). І сьогодні Л. Новиченко в останній своїй книзі, датованій 1980-м роком («Поетичний світ Максима Рильського»), вживає те ж визначення автора “Вальдшнепів” — “націонал-ухильник” (стор. 189). Піввіку минуло — не змінилося нічого. На що надіятися українському читачеві далі? Якщо порівняти з іншими літературами, з літературним розвитком взагалі, — факт, в своєму роді, унікальний.

Під першою публікацією роману в журналі “Вапліте” стоїть таке, здавалося б, звичайне речення: “Продовження в наступному номері”. Та у нас, виявляється, воно може бути й незвичайним (все “не як у людей”): продовження не має і — не буде. І це сприймається як символ особливої трагічної долі сучасної нашої літератури.

Не все, звичайно, рівне в творах, надрукованих у томі (“Повість про санаторійну зону”, наприклад, видалась надто розтягнутою). В цілому ж, коли порівняти їх з творами I-го тому, можна наочно побачити провідний характер творчості Хвильового для літератури тих десятиліть. Як на барометрі, позначився тут її відхід від стилю орнаментально-ліричного, зміцнення в ній епічного начала. Залишалась “розкиданість”, *рубаність”, що були, зрештою, знаменням часу в багатьох літературах, зникали буйний наплив ліризму і пишна метафорика. Все те значною мірою розгублено сучасною прозою, де замість експериментів і пошуків панує в цілому пісний “добрячий реалізм”.

Тепер — дещо і неліричне.

Вже піднімалось питання про виправлення текстів згідно з сучасним правописом. Воно є достатньо принциповим, і варто до нього повернутися.

Відповідно до прийнятого тут правопису 1929 р. редактори неухильно міняють написання слів: замість клас — кляса, кінематограф — кінематографія, екстаз — екстаза, клумба — клюмба, ієрогліфи — гієрогліфи,

потягу — потяга, саквояжу — саквояжа, ловелас — льовелас, Флобер, Лонгфело — Фльобер, Льонгфелло, папіровник — паперовник, німкіня — німкеня і. т. д. . . Немало змін.

Не про правописні суперечки тут мова, а про виправлення у творі художньому, про порушення тканини твору як вона була зроблена на той час. Текст твору має зберігатись з усією атмосферою своєї епохи, в тому числі і мовною. Це свого роду документ часу. Ми вправі мати повністю автентичний текст, і це видається мені елементарною науковою вимогою. Ми не раз говорили про це з колегами, і один з них зауважив: що як англійці почали б правити мову Шекспіра під сучасний правопис? Чи ми — мову Стефаника? Що робитимуть дослідники-мовознавці?

Така позиція тягне за собою всілякого роду зміни. Коли брати до уваги останні прижиттєві видання творів, якими, звичайно, користувались редактори, то у “Вальдшнепах” **спізнюватись** (початок VII-го розд.) міняється на **спізнюватися** (стор. 335), і тим порушується ритм фрази. В тих же “Вальдшнепах” **звукозбіг** замінено на **звук**. В “Повісті про санаторійну зону” кілька разів **сентиментальний** замінено на **сентиментальний** в мові персонажів (стор. 59). В оповіданні «Бандити» виправлення ще суттєвіші: замість **гомонять** — **говорять** (стор. 242)., а у “Микити Гордійовича” знято епітет **блідий** (стор. 251). У “Вальдшнепах” “Дмитрій взяв папіроси” зі **стулу** (з стільця), виправлено — зі **стола** (стор. 292).

В примітках я знайшов перерахування всіх видань творів, але не побачив звичного речення: “Друкується за . . .”. Потрібна річ. Прижиттєвий тритомник, як пише редактор, є основою плянування цього видання, і це, очевидно, слушно. Та з якого конкретно тексту друкується той чи інший твір — невідомо. Тим більше, що за наших тут умов видавці не мали все до своїх послуг. Я вже думав, наприклад, що для оповідання “Бандити” міг бути використаний і текст під назвою “В очереті”.

В переліку видань “Вальдшнепів” (стор. 406) австрійська публікація 1946 р. названа другою і німецька 1952 — третьою. Не зазначено, тимчасом, львівське видання 1937 р. (“Українська книгоспілка”, редакція і вступна стаття Б. Т. Романенчука).

Не знайшов я також якогось певного принципу в поясненні слів, виразів, речень. **Раднарком** пояснений, **ком’ячейка** (стор. 187,319) — ні. Ціщєрон, Діцген, д’Анунціо — пояснені, Гофман, Вайлд (стор. 227), Шпільгаген (стор. 268) — ні. *Gaudeamus igitur* — є в примітках, *Morituri te salutant* (стор. 228, 229) — немає.

Загалом примітки справляють враження певної довільності, часом випадковості. Фльоберу чи д’Анунціо може бути даний один-два рядки, Війону—десять. Може, менш відомий широкому читачеві? А чи більш відомий Обанель, який має лише піврядка? Характерним є, наприклад, суб’єктивне пояснення вживання русизму **мисленно** (стор. 404): не було тоді ще “такого доброго українського відповідника, як **подумки**”. Даруйте, але виглядає таке пояснення достатньо наївно. Помилки у франкомовних реченнях від-

значені у спеціально доданому листку, звичайного ж списку друкарських помилок немає (боку зам. **бору** (стор. 34), **Булгарія** (стор. 403). Латинські чи французькі вирази пояснюються, а цілий ряд явних русизмів — ні (**папіроси** (стор. 292, 253), **ізобретателі** (стор. 76), **поощрення** (стор. 304), **невежди** (стор. 142), **брачне життя** (стор. 274), **бред** (стор. 367), **отряд** (стор. 363), **сосіскі** (стор. 358). І це у виданні, розрахованому на західного читача. Слово **половий** (статевий) пояснене лише на стор. 196, зустрічається ж воно раніше (стор. 66, 144, 189).

Скорочення **керсправ** (стор. 404) в Україні не вживається (калька з російського), натомість загальноновживаним є **управділами** (наслідування російської абрєвіатури). Коли вже бути точним, Горький жив не в Соренто (стор. 408), а на Капрі (в Україні це широко відомо через поїздки Коцюбинського і російських діячів і письменників). Що таке **архикнязь** (стор. 402)? Великий князь? Курфюрст? Чи знову штучно утворена калька? І потім — літературна норма фіксує **архі** (архієписком, архіпастир і т. п.).

Знаю, наскільки копіткою є така редакторська праця, та, попри всі наші тут труднощі, вона має бути зроблена якнайретельніше.

А головне — треба б виробити певні принципи пояснень, приміток, редакторських зауважень, бажано — чіткі й строгі, і ними, тими принципами, відповідно керуватись.

Слід вітати, що томи видаються з відповідними передмовами. П-му томові передує стаття М. Шкандрія про стиль ранньої прози Хвильового — одна з рідких робіт такого докладного характеру про художньо-стилістичні особливості творів письменника. Спостереження автора над формою слухні й цікаві, шкода тільки, що лишаються вони часом самодостатніми і позбавляють, в цих випадках, можливості оцінки тих чи інших засобів. Адже оцінювати їх можемо в кожному конкретному випадку відповідно до всієї художньо-образної системи твору. Сказати, наприклад, що композиція нечітка (стор. 25), — це, посуті, ще нічого не сказати. Не існує якогось загального правила, за яким композиція має бути обов'язково стрункою (Пушкін: Кожний поет творить за законами, ним самим для себе створеними; Драч: Художнику немає скutih норм, він норма сам, він сам в своєму стилі). Важливим є інше: відповідність композиції всьому ладові твору. Може в тому чи іншому випадку потрібна була якраз композиція розхитана. Чи саме лише визначення "вдалі метафори" (стор. 13), саме по собі, мало що говорить. Знову ж таки потрібний зв'язок з твором, певною ситуацією, певним контекстом. Автор статті констатує вживання іншомовних слів, введення неологізмів (стор. 12). Для чого? З якою метою? Коротше кажучи: засоби не завжди "грають", автор не завжди проникає у їх відповідність з своєрідною внутрішньою системою твору. А втім, — завдання може, з найтрудніших. В "оголенні засобу" я бачу не просто гумористичний ефект (стор. 16-17), а глибинний зв'язок з усією системою поглядів Хвильового на українську літературу і українського читача, з його закликами. Над цим варто подумати.

І останнє. Том добре виданий, з виразною обкладинкою — чорні літери на небесно-блакитному полі, прорізаному ламаною червоною блискавкою-стрілою (мистецьке оформлення Ореста Поліщука).

Чекаємо на дальші томи.

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WALTER McKENZIE PINTNER AND DON KARL ROWNEY, EDS., *RUSSIAN OFFICIALDOM: THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980. xvii, 396 pp.

It is a paradox of the Russian Revolution that a stifling tsarist bureaucracy helped to bring it about only to have the revolution give rise to an even more stifling Soviet bureaucracy. Given the central importance of the bureaucracy in Russian imperial and Soviet history, this attempt to deal with the "bureaucratization of Russian society" is a welcome and worthwhile undertaking. The volume contains essays by eleven American scholars who attempted to analyze the personnel, structure, procedures, mobility, resources, evolution and effectiveness of the tsarist and Soviet bureaucracies. By and large, they have done their job very well. Utilizing impressive quantities of statistical data, much of it culled from Soviet archives, they studied "literally thousands of official careers across some thirty decades." Not since the late S. M. Troitsky came out with his meticulous monographs dealing with the eighteenth-century bureaucracy has such detailed work been done on this subject.

Some of the specific topics treated in this composite work are the seventeenth-century *prikazy*, the boyar elite, career patterns of eighteenth-century noblemen, the organization and administration of the Don Cossacks (unfortunately, potentially rewarding comparisons with the Ukrainian Hetmanate were not attempted by the author), the differences between provincial and central bureaucracies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the nineteenth century, the composition of the Soviet bureaucracy in the early stages of its formation, and the selection of members to the Central Committee of the CPSU. In order to maintain a sense of continuity between these studies, the editors added brief introductions and conclusions to each of the essays.

A number of these essays, especially those by Pintner, Crummey, Meehan-Waters and Orlovsky, provided interesting insights into the particular institutions or historical contexts with which they dealt. As far as general conclusions are concerned, those that emerge from this work as a whole are (a) the Russian imperial bureaucracy preserved a considerable continuity throughout its existence, and (b) its principles

and practices were, to a large extent, taken over by the emerging Soviet bureaucracy. These general conclusions are not especially original, and the lack of fresh, new revelations concerning this topic is a major weakness of this work.

For those interested in Ukrainian history, this study is useful in that it provides the reader with detailed information about the bureaucratic institutions that ruled Ukraine for over three centuries. But, with the exception of Daniels's examination of the leadership selection for the Central Committee from 1917 to 1927, an essay in which some interesting details are provided about candidates from Ukraine, there is no discussion about the impact that the tsarist and Soviet bureaucracies might have had on the non-Russian peoples.

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CHRISTIAN RAKOVSKY: SELECTED WRITINGS ON OPPOSITION IN THE USSR 1923-30. Edited and with an introduction by Gus Fagan. London and New York: Allison and Busby, 1980. 189 pp.

Christian Rakovsky played a leading role in the Russian Bolsheviks' rise to state power. He was the Bolshevik "president" of Ukraine in 1919-23, the Soviet ambassador to Great Britain in 1923-25, and ambassador to France in 1925-27. Upon his return to the USSR at the end of 1927, he was expelled from the Party Central Committee as well as from the Party for "oppositional activities." Between 1928 and 1930 Rakovsky was the heart of the internal Left Opposition, while Trotsky led the opposition from exile. By mid-1930 the internal exiles had been silenced by Stalin's regime. Nothing was heard from Rakovsky until 1934, when an article in *Izvestiia* announced his recantation. In early 1938, with other former Bolshevik leaders, he confessed to being a "spy" and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. It is not known exactly how and when he died; it is thought that he was shot on Stalin's orders at the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1941. His wife was also imprisoned and was last seen in a Moscow prison in 1938-39.

The main value of this collection of writings by Rakovsky is that it brings to the surface chapters of Soviet history that have been submerged owing to the victory of the Stalinist faction. The first document in the collection is Rakovsky's autobiography, which was printed with those of many other leading Bolsheviks in the excellent Granat Russian encyclopedia. The second and third documents deal with the creation of the USSR in 1923. They show that at this time Rakovsky supported the idea that the USSR should be a union of politically equal republics rather than

administrative areas of the Russian republic and its Communist Party. The second document is his speech at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, where he fought and lost to Stalin's resolution on the national question. The third document is Rakovsky's theoretical approach to the national question and how this question was to be resolved in the former Russian Empire. In it he denies that the October Revolution solved the national questions. This document makes instructive reading for those who think otherwise.

The fourth and fifth documents were written and published in the West while Rakovsky was an ambassador there. The fourth is a eulogy of Lenin after his death, in which Rakovsky helps to create the myth of the perfect revolutionary leader—"the most beloved and most popular man in the whole Union of Soviet Republics," whom events "never took by surprise." Rakovsky's statements about the Bolshevik Party in the same document also bear more relation to myth than to reality: "The party disputes about democracy, which are now taking place, are a result of its growth, and under no circumstances of its weakness." This was not very prophetic, as the disputes would lead to the dictatorship of the Stalinist faction and to Rakovsky's downfall and eventual death.

The fifth document, "The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia," is by far the most lucid and best translated article in the collection. It was originally published in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1926. Rakovsky neatly summarizes the nature of the new Soviet government and candidly explains the workings of Soviet foreign policy. There is a bit of liberal demagoguery in the article when Rakovsky writes that the republics of the USSR could freely leave the federal union "without securing the consent of other members of the Union." Rakovsky was a great diplomat and knew how to win over his Western audience. He knew from his own personal experience as "president" of Soviet Ukraine that the Russian Soviet republic did not even allow equal state rights for the other republics in the USSR.

The remaining eight documents deal with Rakovsky as a Left Oppositionist. They are compelling reading, with many prophetic statements and analyses of Soviet society. But one cannot but be struck by Rakovsky's idealization of the Bolshevik Party during the revolutionary period as a democratic political party supported by the workers and poor peasants against the rich and the opportunist political parties, that is, all the other political parties. He contrasts to this the Bolshevik Party ten years later, which he says would be unrecognizable to the Bolsheviks of 1917. The new Bolshevik Party, he says, was based on appointments from the top and peopled by political opportunists and those looking for material privileges. He refers to another oppositionist as saying that the availability of motor cars and harems for communist officials "played a very important role in the formation of the ideology of our bureaucracy of soviets and the party."

Rakovsky sees as the main cause of the rapid degeneration of the Bolshevik Party and soviets "the gradual elimination of the elective principle and its replacement by the principle of *nominations*" (Rakovsky's emphasis). One cannot disagree with this, except to say that this started with the October Revolution and not with the death of Lenin, as Rakovsky suggests. For if ever an example of the principle of nomination during the revolutionary period has to be found, it is of Rakovsky himself. He was appointed by Lenin to head the Soviet government in Ukraine. He got his position because of the military might of the Russian Red Army and Cheka and not because of any elections in the soviets of Ukraine.

A former colleague of Rakovsky's, Balabanoff, described how she was appointed the Ukrainian Commissar of Foreign Affairs and the nature of Rakovsky's government:

Early in February 1919, Lenin sent for me and asked me to go to Kiev to assist Rakovsky who was then acting as the president of the People's Commissars for Ukraine—a position analogous to that of Lenin in Russia proper. In theory, the Bolsheviks had set up an independent republic in the Ukraine. In actuality that section of it in which Soviet rule had been established was completely dominated by the Moscow regime.

Balabanoff was not some raging Ukrainian nationalist but the first general secretary of the Third International. She described the founding conference of the International in March 1919 as a fraudulent affair created by Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and others. "Most of the thirty-five delegates and fifteen guests were hand-picked by the Russian Central Committee . . ." from prisoners-of-war or foreign radicals who happened to be in Moscow at the time. Japanese Communists were represented by a "Dutch-American engineer . . . who had spent a few months in Japan, England by a Russian émigré . . ." Rakovsky, with no mandate, represented the Balkans while still "president" of Ukraine. After the conference, Lenin personally decided that Balabanoff was to become the general secretary of the Third International.¹

Gus Fagan's introduction sweeps comprehensively through Rakovsky's varied and complex political life. He traces Rakovsky's political experiences from Bulgaria to Romania, then to Western Europe, then back to Eastern Europe, and then again to Western Europe and so forth. By far the most complex and controversial part of Rakovsky's life was his involvement in the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions. The introduction collects and presents most of the relevant facts about this revolutionary period. But

¹ Angelica Balabanoff, *My Life as a Rebel* (Bloomington and London, 1973).

it misses a few facts about Rakovsky, especially the important period from January to March 1918. Rakovsky's autobiography states that he was sent to the Romanian border area and Odessa by the Russian Bolshevik government to deal with Romanian problems. In Odessa he became a member of RUMCHEROD. The editor mistakenly defines RUMCHEROD as the "the Central Executive Council of Romanian Soviets" (p. 75), whereas RUMCHEROD was the Russian acronym for the Soviets of the Romanian Military Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the Odessa Oblast. Furthermore, at this time Rakovsky was the chairman of the "Supreme Autonomous Collegium for the Struggle against Counter-Revolution in Romania and Ukraine." Was this the Cheka? Also missing is an analysis of Rakovsky's role as the Soviet Russian ambassador to the German-backed Skoropadsky government in Ukraine from April 1918 to November 1918.

Although the introduction presents Rakovsky's involvement in Ukraine from January 1919 to 1923 at great length, it fails to draw conclusions on the evidence presented. We are told Rakovsky was nominated by Lenin to head the Ukrainian Soviet government, but it is not explained how the head of the Russian Soviet government could appoint the head of another Soviet government, supposedly equal and independent. Neither are we told what this says about the political nature of the relationship between Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine. Contemporary accounts made clear that the population in Ukraine was split on the Russia-or-Ukraine question, and so was the Bolshevik Party in Ukraine. Already by early 1918, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, led by Shakhrai and others, wanted Soviet Ukraine to be politically equal to Soviet Russia, while the other major Bolshevik faction in Ukraine, backed by the majority of the Russian Bolsheviks, wanted Ukraine to be part of Russia. Rakovsky and Lenin took the side of the latter, and as a result were severely criticized in a publication by two Ukrainian Bolsheviks on the eve of Rakovsky's becoming "president" of Ukraine.²

But although Rakovsky had arrived in early 1918 as viceroy of the Russian Communist Party, by 1923 he had become an advocate of state equality between Soviet Russia and Ukraine. Lenin had also begun to move in that direction, but only in his last months. By then it proved too late to change the political dominance of the Russian republic over Ukraine. The only change made by Stalin, who called it a compromise, was to rename the Russian Communist Party and its government agencies "all-union" organs.³ This simply helped to camouflage the colonial relationship.

² Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, *On the Current Situation in the Soviet Ukraine*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Ann Arbor, 1970).

³ Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle* (New York, 1970).

This first collection of Rakovsky's writings in English will expand the horizons of those who want to understand how the USSR was founded and what is its political nature as analyzed by one of the most brilliant early Soviet leaders. But another collection of Rakovsky's writings is needed to present his role in the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions.

Finally, a moan directed at the publishers of Rakovsky's documents. Why is the book so poorly edited and why does it have so many mistakes, e.g., Bolshevik-leninists (sic)? Why are the documents not dated, why are they so sparsely annotated, and why was the first page of the introduction so unproportionally laid out?

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MYTHOLOGY AND SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY

KENNETH C. FARMER, *UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-STALIN ERA: MYTH, SYMBOL AND IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY*. "Studies in Contemporary History," vol. 4. The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980. x, 241 pp.

The subject of Professor Farmer's study is modern Ukrainian nationalism—that is, the "new nationalism" of Soviet-trained Ukrainian elites as distinguished from the romantic nationalism of the past. At times, Farmer also defines his subject as "the fourth wave of nationalist opposition," which developed in the 1960s and early 1970s. (The first, second, and third waves are represented by the Ukrainian national movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-20, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] in Western Ukraine, respectively.) Chronologically, his research encompasses the period from the post-Stalin liberalization of the mid-1950s to the fall of Shelest in 1972. The purpose of this study, according to the author, is "to examine Ukrainian nationalism in the period 1957-1972 from the standpoint of the unintended effects as well as deliberate manipulation of myths and symbols of the nation and of internationalism. We are in fact pursuing a dual purpose: a substantive one of examining the phenomenon of modern Ukrainian nationalism, and a theoretical one of contributing to our knowledge of the role of myths and symbols in political conflict—in particular, in the context of a society in which political communications are severely restricted" (p. 19).

In short, the author has set out to write a history of Ukrainian nationalism during the above-mentioned period, utilizing the conceptual framework or model of "symbolic politics" to provide a keener understanding of both the subject and the theory.

Let us begin with theory. It should be stated from the outset that

this reviewer is not particularly fond of theoretical constructs devised by social scientists in the field of Soviet studies. Such models are often formulated for the avowed purpose of injecting "meaning" or "insight" into seemingly complex or incomprehensible political processes and, ultimately, in order to shroud specific views and interpretations with an aura of "scientific objectivity." The problem, of course, is that there are as many models as there are social scientists willing to expound them. They come and go not unlike the whims of fashion designers. Whom is one to believe? In the end, one is often left disappointed, with little else than the excess baggage of jargon-cluttered phraseology and a renewed confidence in the powers of common sense.

Farmer appears to be saying that if we are to have a better understanding of Ukrainian nationalism we must first understand something called "symbolic politics." I must admit that I have failed to fully grasp the significance of this model for the subject at hand. Perhaps I have not read enough about "communications systems," particularly those of the "arrested," "constrained," and "directed" varieties (pp. 23-24); about "semantic space of a symbol," especially if it is "wide or open" (p. 29); and about "metaphoric transfer" for symbol cooptation (p. 32). These are some of the theoretical issues treated in the first chapter ("Introduction: Approach and Conceptualization," pp. 1-35), which is meant to show the relevance of myths and symbols for Soviet nationalities policy. The theoretical construct that emerges is that the two conflicting ideas that define nationalities policy—nationalism (or "national moral patrimony") and proletarian internationalism cum Russian primacy—are in fact mythic structures, and that the adherents of these myths attempt to shape and transform them for their own purposes by the utilization of symbols.

Does this model genuinely reflect the nature of Soviet politics in the realm of nationalities policy? Is the Russian *Herrschaft* in the Soviet Union really a myth? And is attachment to the native culture and language a myth as well? Perhaps one might be so bold as to suggest that these are concrete realities, and that such phenomena as the concept of *sovetskii narod* (the Soviet people), Soviet legislation to broaden the role and status of the Russian language, dissent, *samizdat*, long prison terms for national elites, and the existence of special psychiatric hospitals, far from being mere symbols or examples of "symbolic action," are also realities.

Fortunately, the "symbolic politics" model has only a limited impact on Farmer's study of Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Stalin era. The bulk of the monograph is devoted to tangible problems: the formulation of the theoretical precepts governing Soviet nationalities policy from Marx to Brezhnev; the development of a Ukrainian cultural revival following Stalin's death and the Twentieth CPSU Congress; the position of the

Ukrainian language as reflected in the 1959 and 1970 censuses and Soviet language policy; and the growth of the Ukrainian dissident movement.

The chapter treating the evolution of Soviet theory on the national question is a survey of familiar ground. This should not be taken as a criticism of the author. The point is that there is not very much new or original that can be said about *rastsvet* (flourishing), *sblizhenie* (drawing together), *sliianie* (merger or fusion), and *sovetskii narod*, at least not for the period 1957-72. Farmer traces the changes in emphasis that have occurred in Soviet theory, beginning with Khrushchev's initial restraints on the excesses of assimilationist policy, followed by a renewed hardening of the line in 1958-61, and the abandonment of *sliianie* after Khrushchev's ouster and its replacement during the Brezhnev period by the formula of simultaneous *rastsvet* and *sblizhenie* and the concept of *sovetskii narod*. In this connection, it should be pointed out that more care in translation could have precluded certain faulty conclusions. Quoting the 1969 editorial article in *Kommunist* (p. 61), for example, the author renders *sovetskii narod* as "Soviet nation" and interprets the phrase "*kazhdaia sovetskaia natsiia i narodnost'*" (every Soviet nation and nationality) as a "reference to the Soviet Union as a 'nation'" (p. 62). In the first case, the problem is simply one of mistranslation; in the second, the editorial does indeed speak of a Soviet nation, but certainly not in an ideological sense. Finally, towards the end of this quotation Farmer simply inserted the term "Soviet" where it did not occur in the original. This is rather unfortunate insofar as the word that follows is "nations." Taking this into account, the article is not as "remarkable" as the author would have us believe.

Much more interesting is the analysis of the impact of de-Stalinization on Ukrainian cultural and intellectual life. Farmer devotes considerable space to a discussion of the renaissance of Ukrainian literature during the so-called Thaw, emphasizing the attempt on the part of Ukrainian writers and poets to inject a new humanistic and national spirit into their works. Similar processes were at work in Ukrainian art, cinema, and music; attempts were also made to recover those aspects of Ukrainian history that were lost after the Soviet rewriting of the past. The Ukrainian cultural revival, which came to be represented by the *shestidesiatnyky*, provides a good example, says the author, of the "reactive" feature of Ukrainian nationalism at this stage of its development. Its defining characteristics were not the messianism and exclusivism that typified the OUN in the interwar period, but rather the desire to preserve the nation's uniqueness within a hostile environment. Oles Honchar's 1968 novel, *Sobor*, is a case in point.

Farmer recognizes the importance of language for national identity and consequently devotes a separate chapter to language politics in Ukraine. After analyzing the data from the 1959 and 1970 censuses, he

concludes that the Ukrainian language is not as imminently threatened as would appear from the writings of Ukrainian dissidents. At the same time, he points out that Soviet nationalities policy clearly places limitations on the development of the native language while favoring an increasingly more prominent role for Russian as the language of "internationality discourse" in the USSR. This is supported by the data on the use of Ukrainian and Russian in the republic's educational system as well as by statistics on book publication. Other areas of concern have been the general lack of adequate dictionaries, the underdeveloped state of Ukrainian scientific terminology, and the broader question of language purity as opposed to "mutual enrichment." I would only add that the most recent data on the number of pupils attending Ukrainian-language schools in Ukraine are not for the 1955-56 school year as indicated by the author; such data have been available for the 1967-68 school year since at least 1976. Likewise, quite recent statistics have also been published on specific regions, such as Zakarpattia.

The final chapter of Farmer's study, entitled "Symbolic Action: Nationalist Opposition and Regime Response," examines the Ukrainian dissident movement largely on the basis of the *samizdat* material that it has produced during the last twenty years. This too is rather familiar material, although the author is to be credited for compiling and organizing it in a fashion that is readily accessible to the reader. Farmer goes into some detail in describing the views of Ivan Dziuba and Valentyn Moroz, underlining the distinctions between the former's "legalistic" arguments in support of national self-determination and the latter's romantically colored ethnic nationalism. Farmer also attempts an analysis of the socio-economic and geographical structure of the Ukrainian dissidents, but, as he himself cautions, the fragmentary data base should signal the reader to be wary of hard-and-fast conclusions. The chapter ends with an analysis of the various ways in which the regime has responded to the challenge posed by the Ukrainian dissident movement.

From the technical standpoint, the book could have been edited more carefully in order to avoid misspellings and incorrect transliteration. The reader will often find Ukrainian words and names rendered either fully or partly in Russian form (*shestydesiatnyki*, *malikh*, *Nadezhda Svitlychna*, *iurysti*, *nam*, *Osyp Diakov-Hornovoi*, *velikomuchenits'ke*, *oblichchia*).

In conclusion, although *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era* is not without faults, the author should be congratulated for providing a competent survey of the most important developments affecting the Ukrainian cultural-national revival of the 1960s and the emergence of Ukrainian dissent.

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ІВАН ВАНАТ, НАРИСИ НОВІТНЬОЇ ІСТОРІЇ УКРАЇНЦІВ СХІДНОЇ СЛОВАЧЧИНИ. КНИГА ПЕРША (1918 — 1938). Словацьке педагогічне видавництво в Братіславі — Відділ української літератури в Пряшеві, 1979. Тираж 1.000 прим. Стор. 418.

Хоч рецензована праця є першою книжковою публікацією пряшівського дослідника, вона знайшла прихильний відгук на сторінках центральних наукових журналів Чехословаччини, Радянського Союзу, Польщі, Югославії та Угорщини. В західних країнах вона залишилася поза увагою дослідників, тому вважаємо доцільним, хоч і з запізненням, познайомити з нею українознавчу громадськість на еміграції, оскільки вона є вагомим внеском не лише в чехословацьку, але перш за все українську історіографію.

Монографія майже повністю побудована на архівному першоджерельному матеріалі: на архівах пражського міністерства закордонних справ, архіві президентської канцелярії, обласного архіву в Кошицях, районних та інших архівах. Отже праця приносить нові, досі невідомі матеріали, а в цьому полягає її найбільша сила і переконливість. На відміну від інших, зокрема старших дослідників, автор стоїть на твердій українській національній позиції, що дозволило йому вповні об'єктивно приступити до обраної теми.

У вступі він освітлює термінологічну плутанину досліджуваного регіону, пояснюючи такі його найменування, як "Угорська Русь", "Карпатська Русь", "Прикарпатська Русь", "Угорська Україна", "Карпатська Україна", "Руська Країна" ("Руська Крайна"), "Підкарпатська Русь", "Русинія", "Закарпатська Україна", "Пряшівська Русь", "Словацька Русь", "Словацька Україна", "Пряшівщина", "Закарпаття". Навряд чи знайдеться в Європі етнічна група зі стількома синонімними назвами. Причому кожна з вище наведених назв має своєрідне ідейне чи політичне забарвлення.

Зміст монографії поділено на чотири частини з цілим рядом тематичних підрозділів.

У першій частині автор розглядає історіографію досліджуваної теми, посилаючись на праці чехословацьких, українських та інших дослідників, головним чином з 1920—30 років. Тут же він робить аналіз економічного та соціального становища закарпатських українців до Першої світової війни та подає огляд національно-визвольного руху на Закарпатті під час війни.

Далі він детально зупиняється на питанні приєднання Закарпаття до Чехословаччини у 1918-19 рр., підкреслюючи важливу роль у цій справі закарпатоукраїнських переселенців у США, які вже в 1918 р. вели на цю тему переговори з майбутнім чехословацьким президентом Масариком. Важливу роль в цьому питанні відіграли т. зв. "Руські народні ради" у Пряшеві, Старій Любовні, Мукачеві та Хусті. Автор наводить кілька фактів про заходи галицьких лемків, що намагалися вирватися з-під панування

Польщі і разом з закарпатськими та пряшівськими племінниками приєднатися до Чехословаччини. Питання приєднання Закарпаття до Чехословаччини було остаточно легалізоване Паризькою мирною конференцією, яка однак такі важливі питання, як справа державно-правового упорядкування Закарпатської України та її західного кордону дала на вирішення чехословацькому урядові. І. Ванат відкриває перед читачем закулісну боротьбу навколо цього питання, незацікавленість уряду у його справедливому вирішенні, вказує на політичну наївність закарпатоукраїнських діячів, які задовольнялися пустими обіцянками чехословацького уряду.

В другій частині автор розглядає становище у 1920-х рр. українців Східної Словаччини, які в силу невирішення західного кордону Закарпатської України опинилися в адміністративних кордонах Словаччини, де були піддані посиленій словакізації. Якщо угорська статистика 1910 р. наводить на Словаччині 152.353 українців (русинів), то за чехословацькою статистикою 1921 р. це число зменшилося майже на половину (на 85.628 людей). Автор вказує на численні махінації, згідно з якими уряд дійшов до такої цифри.

Чехословацькі політичні діячі, як і майже вся чехословацька преса, початку 1920-х років заперечувала існування українців (русинів) на території Словаччини, вважаючи їх "словаками греко-католицької релігії". Єдиний виняток автор знайшов в чеській газеті "Трибуна", на сторінках якої "невідомий автор, прихований під криптонімом "Ло" гостро засудив журналістичну антиукраїнську кампанію" (с. 129). Пару років тому мені вдалося встановити, що цим "невідомим автором" був несправедливо забутий і досі недооцінений чеський військовий, політичний та культурний діяч Флоріан Заплетал, який в тому часі був військовим дорадником губернатора Закарпатської України Ю. Жатковича та спеціальним кореспондентом празького щоденника "Трибуна". (Криптонім "Ло" — початок імені його майбутньої дружини Лоти).

На підставі конкретних архівних та статистичних даних автор доводить, що економічне та соціальне становище українців Пряшівщини було найгіршим у Чехословаччині. Тут, крім кількох лісопилень не було жодної промисловости, а невеликі ремісничі артілі, як правило, не мали довгого тривання. Майже все українське населення займалося мало продуктивним сільським господарством. Чимало уваги автор приділяє заробітчанській еміграції українців в США та Канаду, релігійному питанню, зокрема боротьбі за скасування залишків фєвдального невільництва — "роковини" та "коблини". Окремий підрозділ (с. 189-210) присвячено політичним партіям на досліджуваній території та їхньому ставленню до національного питання. Автор критично розглядає діяльність Руської народної партії, Карпаторуської трудової партії, Автономного земледільського союзу, Християнсько-народної партії Підкарпатської Руси, Соціал-демократичної партії підкарпатської та інших політичних угруповань. Об'єктивно він оцінює і роль Комуністичної партії Чехословаччини, констатує, що "у цілому

організований комуністичний рух в цьому краї у порівнянні зі Закарпатською Україною відставав, про що свідчать результати парламентських виборів" (с. 207).

Третя частина присвячена періоду економічної та політичної кризи серед українського населення Східної Словаччини (1930-вересень 1938). В порівнянні з 1920-ми роками тут не було майже жадних змін. Згідно зі статистикою 1930 р., 89,64 проц. українського населення займалося сільським господарством і лише 3,32 проц. працювало у промисловості. Недостача робочих місць, селянське перенаселення та постійні неврожаї вели до посиленої еміграції за кордон. За статистичними даними 1929 р. 75,6 проц. переселенців Чехословаччини походили із східної, тобто в основному української території республіки. У періоді економічної кризи 1930-х років, внаслідок безробіття в західних країнах, кількість переселенців зменшилася і соціальний стан українського населення Чехословаччини значно погіршав. Вело це до масового голодування і незадоволення населення, кульмінацією якого було чертіжнянсько-габурське селянське заворушення 1935 р.

В умовах економічної кризи та депресії серед українців Східної Словаччини значно пожвавився політичний рух. В 1930-х роках з новою силою виринула на поверхню боротьба за надання Закарпатській Україні автономії, яка мала значний відгук і на Пряшівщині. Про ролі заокеанської еміграції в цьому русі автор пише: "Не малий вплив на автономістський рух на Закарпатті мали й земляцькі об'єднання в США, які багатьма нитками були зв'язані із старим краєм. Численна закарпатоукраїнська еміграція в США і Канаді в міжвоєнний період становила силу, яка значною мірою впливала на економічне і культурне життя старого краю. В земляцьких об'єднань шукали фінансової і моральної підтримки різні культурні, конфесійні товариства та політичні угруповання Закарпатської України і Східної Словаччини" (с. 283). Як приклад таких зв'язків І. Ванат пише про діяльність О. Геровського, М. Горняка, І. Облетіли та інших.

Остання частина книжки присвячена культурно-політичним обставинам серед українців Пряшівщини у міжвоєнному періоді, а саме шкільному питанню, мовному питанню та культурно-освітній праці серед населення.

Автор на підставі архівних, статистичних та публіцистичних джерел переконливо доводить послідовну спробу державної влади словакізувати українське населення та штучно затримувати його культурну відсталість, використовуючи для цього політичне москвофільство, яке вело нещадну боротьбу проти вживання української літературної мови, вважаючи її "сомнительным жаргоном". В боротьбі проти українофільства підтримували москвофілів і представники т. зв. "русинського" напрямку, репрезентовані перш за все греко-католицькою церквою.

Автор переконливо пише про численні спроби ізолювати українців Пряшівщини від українців Закарпатської України. Наприклад, згідно зі статутом затвердженим урядом, найчисленніша культурно-освітня органі-

зація Пряшівщини, Общество ім. О. Духновича, могла розвивати свою діяльність на території всієї Чехословаччини “крім Підкарпатської Русі” (с. 328).

Єдина пряшівська культурно-освітня організація, що програмово стояла на українських позиціях була “Просвіта” з друкованим органом “Слово народа”, що виходив у Пряшеві на початку 1930-х років. Активними членами її пряшівської філії були: І. Невицька, Д. Зубрицький, Е. Андрейкович, Г. Качмар, Й. Дюлай та Е. Бігарій. Автор справедливо підкреслює, що “культурна концепція народовців згуртованих навколо газети “Слово народа” була більш демократична, ніж концепція чи безконцепційність пряшівського правління товариства ім. О. Духновича” (с. 333).

В 1930-х роках починає діяти у Кошицях українське (руське) радіомовлення, поживається літературний рух, образотворче мистецтво, народня художня самодіяльність тощо. Однак все це були лише зародки національного відродження українців Східної Словаччини, яке настало лише після Другої світової війни.

Книжка поповнена словацьким та англійським резюме, списком використаної літератури, іменним та географічним покажчиком. Дуже цінним додатком до монографії є вперше публіковані фотокопії оригінальних документів (перш за все про приєднання Закарпаття до Чехословаччини із 1919-20 рр.), серед яких є “Меморандуми Американської руської народної оборони Т. Г. Масарику”, Заява Горлицької руської народної ради про визнання правомочності Пряшівської РНР на галицькій Лемківщині, Заява Народної ради Галицької Лемківщини про об'єднання з Пряшівською РНР, Звернення галицьких лемків до Кошицького військового командування про приєднання Галицької Лемківщини до Чехословаччини, Лист Американської національної ради угорських русинів міністру зовнішніх справ ЧСР Е. Бенешу про приєднання Закарпаття до Чехословаччини, Протокол із засідання з'їзду американських русинів, на якому було підтримано ідею приєднання Закарпаття до Чехословаччини тощо.

Треба лише подивляти наукову ерудицію І. Ваната, який хоч не є професіональним науковцем (працює методиком краевого педагогічного інституту у Пряшеві), зібрав і науково обробив багатющий матеріал, випередивши таким чином “професіональних” вчених, що над даною проблематикою роками працюють в університетах чи академіях наук і досі не спромоглися на хоч би загальну оцінку даного періоду.

Правда, книжка не позбавлена і певних недоліків та прогалин, більш-менш технічного характеру. Наприклад, автор майже всі цитати з чужих джерел, перш за все чеських і словацьких офіційних архівних документів, цитує у перекладі на українську літературну мову, ніде не зазначивши, що йдеться про переклад. На українську мову він перекладає і цитати з карпаторуської преси, писані т. зв. “язичієм”. Оскільки в переважній більшості йдеться про перше цитування цих джерел, рядовому читачеві недоступних, слід було залишити їх в оригіналі, чим би зміцнилася їхня автентичність.

Певні прогалини є і в цитованих бібліографічних джерелах: в ряді випадків відсутні сторінки, томи, роки видання тощо.

Дуже недостатньо використані закордонні наукові праці на цю тему. Поза увагою автора залишилися не лише численні журнальні статті, але й такі поважні монографії, як "The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus'" П. Марочі, "Sprawa ukraińska w polityce zagranicznej Czechosłowacji w latach 1918-1932" К. Левандовського та ряд інших.

На стор. 342 автор розшифровує скорочення ініціалів 15 архівів, використаних в праці. Біля першого фотодокументу (с. 367-373) наведено "Архів М. М.". Пояснення цих ініціалів у праці нема. Щоб читач не подумав, що йдеться про якийсь засекречений архів, зазначу, що це "Архів Миколи Мушинки". З цього ж "архіву" взято і документи № 9 публікований на стор. 390-402, без жадного посилання на джерело.

Ці недоліки й прогалини однак не знижують наукового рівня рецензованої праці. Сподіваємося, що незадовго появиться її другий том, присвячений періоду 1938-1948 рр.

Микола Мушинка.
Пряшів

UKRAINSKI POSELENNIA: DOVIDNYK. Edited by Atanas M. Miliaynych, Volodymyr N. Bandera, Ihor M. Huryn, and Vsevolod V. Isaiv. New York: the Ukrainian Center for Social Research, Inc., 1980. *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, vol. 200. 351 pp.

Do we know how many Ukrainians live in which countries of the world? Do they consider themselves to be Ukrainian, speak the Ukrainian language, attend Ukrainian churches, support Ukrainian organizations, or publish Ukrainian newspapers? Until recently, answers to such basic questions were not easy to find, and references at our disposal provided sporadic coverage, incomparable statistics, and outdated information. Now indispensable help has arrived in the form of a reference book on the Ukrainian communities throughout the world. Sponsored jointly by the Ukrainian Center for Social Research and the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and assisted by the World Congress of Free Ukrainians with a grant for its publication, this book contains the efforts of many authors, moulded into a meaningful whole by its editorial committee.

The editors adopted a standard format that would ease the search for information and facilitate comparisons between countries. This book contains thirty-two chapters, each representing, in most cases, a country in which Ukrainian settlements are described. Every chapter begins with a gazetteer that identifies the country (name, geographic location, area and population), and its political structure, economy, and population (religious affiliation, ethnic composition, official languages, and major cities). The

second section—the Ukrainian settlements—describes their location, the climate where they are located, and the number, occupation and participation of Ukrainians in the life of that country. The third section—the nurturing of Ukrainian culture—may include such topics as the history of the settlements, religious life and churches, the use of the Ukrainian language at home and in social communication, Ukrainian schooling, the Ukrainian press and other mass media, Ukrainian literature, art and science, museums and archives, the vitality of Ukrainian folklore, social and political life, and the forms and degrees of interaction with Ukrainians in other countries. Each chapter is usually followed by a bibliography. An index of countries at the end of the book helps to locate the needed facts.

Clearly, the emphasis of this reference book is on the Ukrainian diaspora. Ukrainians living in the USSR, while comprising some ninety-six per cent of all the Ukrainians in the world, are accorded “for comparative purposes” only two chapters (39 pp.): (1) the Ukraine (sic), and (2) the Ukrainians in the USSR outside the Ukraine (sic). In both cases the authors/editors mean by Ukraine the Ukrainian SSR. Another four chapters—(3) Poland, (4) Romania, (5) Hungary, and (6) Czechoslovakia (in Ukrainian alphabetical order)—represent the adjoining countries that contain indigenous Ukrainian populations (33 pp.). The remaining chapters are grouped according to continents: fifteen in Europe (110 pp.), two in North America (73 pp.), six in South America (45 pp.), and two in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand, 15 pp.). The last single chapter is a brief catchall that mentions Ukrainians in other countries of Europe and Asia (Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Iran, and China, 3 pp.). Even the appended list of Ukrainian bookstores is émigré oriented. Names and addresses are provided only for bookstores in the West (the United States, Canada, and one each in Australia, England and West Germany), but communist bookstores, whether in the communist countries or abroad, are omitted.

In his foreword, Professor Isajiw provides a good overview of the reference book and points out its utility for planning Ukrainian life in the diaspora. He discusses, in a scholarly fashion, the problems of collecting, interpreting and comparing the data on various countries. Unfortunately, Isajiw's summary of the Ukrainians in the world is neither comprehensive nor consistent with the material presented in the chapters that follow. A table of Ukrainians living in the countries described in the reference book is wanting. Had he prepared such a table, Isajiw would not have understated the number of Ukrainians in Eastern Europe (“418,000,” including Yugoslavia) by 61,000 or more. According to the contributing authors there were, in Poland, 300,000 (best estimate), in Romania, 70,000 (official), in Hungary, 3,000 (official), in Czechoslovakia, 55,000 (official), and in Yugoslavia, 51,000 (official)—a total

of 479,000 Ukrainians. More generous estimates for Romania (130,000) and Czechoslovakia (300,000) would increase the total to 774,000. Isajiw chose not to mention another five to six million Russified Ukrainians in the USSR. By contrast, his estimate of Ukrainians in the West (2,340,000) exceeded the numbers given in the chapters (even with the higher estimate of 1,250,000 Ukrainians in the USA) by some 20,000.

The uniform structure of the chapters that follow, though useful for easy retrieval of facts, imparts a sense of futility where little information on the Ukrainians is provided. It makes little sense to feature a chapter on a country with a full-page gazetteer of information obtainable from any almanac and then proceed with a modest paragraph on several hundred Ukrainians living there. Moreover, even in the longer chapters the facts about this or that country's economy or climate are not always integrated effectively enough to explain Ukrainian immigration and settlement patterns.

Most chapters are thorough and well written, but there are some weaknesses that should be eliminated if and when a new edition is prepared. In the first chapter, the manifestations of Ukrainian vitality, such as schooling and publications, also should be expressed in quotients of per-thousand Ukrainians, which would enable meaningful comparisons with the diaspora. In the second chapter, the Russification of Ukrainians outside their republic was ably demonstrated, but downplayed in calculating the total number of Ukrainians. Why should Ukrainians who declared themselves Russian (some five to six million) be excluded, but intermarried or third-generation Americans or Canadians of Ukrainian origin be included? Estimates for the number of Ukrainians in Poland (chapter three), if not based on the Polish census, should be documented (p. 56). The presence of aboriginal Ukrainians in Hungary might be indicated using historical data from S. Tomashivsky, *Etnohrafichna karta Uhorskoj Rusy* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1910). Estimates of Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (chapter six) should be carefully documented. References to the two widely differing estimates of Ukrainians (650,000, p. 80, and 300,000, p. 82), both attributed to Ku-biiiovych, should be listed in the bibliography. Since the estimates were probably computed over two different territorial bases and for different time periods, verification without references is impossible.

The impressive account of Ukrainians in the Vatican and its vicinity (chapter thirteen) lacks an assessment of their numbers and a list of documentary sources. Chapter fifteen deals strictly with West Germany, yet East Germany is included, inappropriately, in its introductory gazetteer. The long chapter on Canada contains tedious lists of organizations, publishers, and periodical publications that lack the needed commentary, yet nothing is said about Ukrainian radio or television programs, or the outstanding choirs, dancers, or performers in major cities. Paraguay

lacks an estimate of the number of Ukrainians, a description of their institutions, and a bibliography. A careful search of publications would have filled some gaps. According to the Soviet ethno-demographer S. I. Bruk (*Chislennost i rasselenie narodov mira* [Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1962], p. 347), some 10,000 Ukrainians arrived in Paraguay from Poland in 1939. On this basis Bruk assessed the Ukrainian population of Paraguay at 10,000 for 1978 in his *Naselenie mira: Etno-demograficheskii spravochnik* (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 780. Chapter twenty-nine, on smaller Ukrainian groupings in countries of Latin America, is weak and inconsistent with the format of the book. It contains two brief and outdated reports on countries (Uruguay and Venezuela) already described, and two exercises in futility on Chile and Peru because of fragmentary information. Again, bibliography is lacking.

A reference book of this magnitude needs careful editing. Meaningless statements, such as the first paragraph on p. 42, should be avoided. Indeed, if that sentence is correct, the percentages are wrong. The correct author in ref. 17, p. 51, is D. W. Treadgold, not Dr. M. Milko. Proper names of organizations should be corrected (e.g., SUM, pp. 102, 120, 176; TUSM, p. 241). Which is the correct proper name: "Karpatoruska Pravoslavna Hreko Kat. Tserkva" (p. 266, table 4), or "Rosiiska Pravoslavna Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva v Amerytsi" (p. 269, l. 5) ?

Maps should be both informative and aesthetically pleasing. In this reference book each of the six parts are introduced by an administrative map showing countries included in that part. Each chapter is adorned, alongside its heading, with a tiny logo-style outline of the country involved. Unfortunately, the administrative maps are cluttered, in most cases, with unnecessary detail. On the map of the Soviet Union (p. 12), the annexations since 1940 and industrial areas need not be shown, but administrative boundaries and the distribution of the Ukrainian population (not shown) are crucial. The map of Eastern Europe (p. 54) need not be complicated by postwar boundary changes, but it should show all of Poland and East Germany (cut off), and areas of Ukrainian indigenous population (not shown). Instead of clutter, the map of Western Europe (p. 90) could have presented graphically the present distribution of Ukrainians. The poorly reproduced and crowded map of North America (p. 202) is dominated by a heavy, doctored boundary that donates the western half of southern Ontario to the United States. The simple, readable map of South America (p. 278) fails to locate the towns or provinces where the Ukrainians live. Australia is represented by the clearest map of all. Unfortunately, the scaled dots for cities in Australia (p. 326) may be mistaken for the distribution of Ukrainians, which Tesla represented so well on his map of Canada (p. 211).

Despite some shortcomings, the reference book provides a wealth of information. Perhaps with proper funding and broad cooperation, data may

be collected to close some gaps and update the information base. The Ukrainian Center for Social Research should be commended for its work and encouraged to produce a revised English-language edition.

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LUBOMYR Y. LUCIUK, *UKRAINIANS IN THE MAKING: THEIR KINGSTON STORY*. Kingston, Ont.: Limestone Press, 1980. x, 156 pp.

How did the three successive waves of Ukrainian immigration to Canada perceive and relate to each other? Luciuk attempts to provide an answer using Ukrainians in Kingston as his model. Despite some shortcomings, it is a fruitful endeavor resulting in a competent, if somewhat pedestrian monograph, which should stimulate further research.

According to Luciuk, the first wave of Ukrainian immigrants (1891-1914), at least in Kingston, did not publicly act as Ukrainians. He states: "These first immigrants... had no distinct consciousness of belonging to any 'corporate' or 'national' groupings" (p. 23). For them, "abstract concepts like 'Ukraina' exerted little influence..." (p. 24). Apolitical, unorganized, these "immigrants desired to disregard or mask their own backgrounds" (p. 25) while emulating the Canadian way of life. To illustrate his argument, Luciuk notes that about seventy-five per cent of those Ukrainians who settled in Kingston before World War One Canadianized their names.

The second wave of Ukrainian migrants (1922-1929), according to Luciuk, were substantially different from the first. Unlike their predecessors, they possessed a "rudimentary awareness of a corporate national identity as Ukrainians" (p. 20). For them, "to be Ukrainian meant to have taken an activist position in Ukraine" (p. 50). In Canada, they embodied a particular sort of Ukrainian—a "politicized" Ukrainian. This produced a rift between the two enclaves. Luciuk states: "the two groups of immigrants met and judged each other, measuring worth by standards uniquely their own, largely alien to each other and certainly completely so in relation to Canadian society as a whole" (p. 64). The second wave viewed their brethren as "dark people, uneducated, undisciplined" (p. 63) and slighted them for "not living as Ukrainians" (p. 64). Defining their ethnicity "within an organizational framework," the interwar group found their predecessors lacking in patriotism, myopic in their vision, and totally uncooperative in being "enlightened" by those who had experienced the "Ukrainian Revolution."

Luciuk argues that the third wave of Ukrainian immigration compounded the cleavages already evident among Ukrainian Canadians.

Shaped by the experience of World War Two and the Displaced Persons' Camps, this group developed their own institutions, which supplanted other Ukrainian ethnic organizations. While the pre-World War One immigrants continued their obstinate "un-Ukrainianism" by rejecting the notion of ethnic organizations, the inter-war enclave fought with the "D.P.s." The second accused the newcomers of not appreciating conditions in Canada and of not being willing to submit to Ukrainian organizations already in place; the latter argued that the second immigration was "stuck in the past" and thus was incapable of representing a Ukrainian cause that they no longer understood (p. 108). For example, post-World War Two immigrants believed that the existing Ukrainian organizations in Canada were insufficiently militant toward "communism" (Ukrainian-Canadian communists had energetically attempted to block the admission of Ukrainian refugees into Canada) and therefore unable to serve as vehicles for the continuation of the Ukrainian national-liberation struggle (p. 108).

Luciuk concludes that pre-emigration experiences and the ongoing evolution of Ukrainian fortunes in Eastern Europe had different meanings to each wave of Ukrainian immigrants. This was complicated by the "new world" milieu that influenced their ideas and behavior. Consequently, the Ukrainian-Canadian community has been riddled with bitter strife and factionalism. The result is that no one group or organization can represent Ukrainians collectively to the host society.

Bolstered by lengthy slices from interviews, Luciuk's thesis appears convincing until one realizes the narrow limits of his evidence. For instance, it may be true that seventy-five percent of those Ukrainians who settled in Kingston in the pre-World War One era "Anglicized" their names, but it is also true that there were no more than a dozen Ukrainians residing in Kingston before World War One (p. 17). This fact makes the reviewer wary of the implicit and explicit generalizations for Ukrainians throughout Canada that the author formulates from the Kingston example. Certainly, a study of Ukrainians in Kingston has intrinsic value, but not as a reliable guide from which to deduce the Weltanschauung of Ukrainians nationally. The example is too small.

Although the second wave of immigrants was more conscious (that is, they did not doubt that they were Ukrainians), it can again be argued that the Kingston cases are too truncated to allow for such clear-cut distinctions between the first and second wave as delineated by the author. No doubt, the inter-war period witnessed the arrival of educated, nationalistic intellectuals who established and assumed leading positions in Ukrainian-Canadian organizations. And, no doubt, they propagated their own brand of "narodna sprava," criticizing and shunning those who did not. But what proportion were they of the total that came in the inter-war period? Given our scant knowledge of this group, it could very well

be that the educated, nationalistic, urban, intellectual component was a minority, and that the vast majority had much more in common with their pre-World War One brethren in their desire to begin anew and become Canadians as rapidly as possible. (If, indeed, one accepts Luciuk's characterization of the first-wave immigrants.)

Without unduly belaboring the point, the same can be said of the post-World War Two migrants. The degree of animosity and clear ideological distinctions can only be assessed after a systematic study of the "D.P.s." As with the inter-war immigrants, such a study has yet to be written.

In conclusion, the author may well be correct in his assessment of the three immigration waves and their relationship to each other. Certainly, it appears the case in Kingston. The above comments simply represent a plea for caution, not a rejection of Luciuk's thesis. Many more micro-studies of the kind Luciuk has completed are needed before a definitive macro-portrait can emerge. For his contribution of grist to the mill of Ukrainian-Canadian studies, Luciuk is to be congratulated.

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EUCHARISTERION: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO OMELJAN PRITSAK ON HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY BY HIS COLLEAGUES AND STUDENTS. Ed. I. Ševčenko and F. Sysyn. 2 vols. in 1. Cambridge, Mass.: *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4 (1979-80). 972 pp.

Omeljan Pritsak (b. 1919) is the internationally known orientalist who heads the Ukrainian Research Institute and Chair of Ukrainian History at Harvard University. His contributions to Ukrainian studies are many and have been marked by the attention to detail and to the spirit of international cooperation characteristic of the professional orientalist. The present volumes reflect these traits. Besides the usual biographical summary and bibliography, the *Festschrift* contains essays that may be divided into three main categories. The first category is Oriental studies with no direct connection to Ucrainica. This type of scholarship takes up most of the first volume and a good part of the second. But as it is of marginal interest to the readers of the present journal, purely Oriental studies will not be discussed in this review. The second category, Oriental and other studies related to Ucrainica, is of greater interest. The third category, purely Ukrainian studies, will, of course, receive the most attention here.

In general, the essays on Ukrainian history, especially of the Cossack period, are the strongest part of the book. This reflects Professor Pritsak's own interests and his cultivation of this area at Harvard. The result has been a new generation of Ukrainian historians with expertise in a classic

core area of Ukrainian history and a claim to a scholarly lineage going back through Pritsak's teacher Ivan Krypiakievych (1886-1967) to Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) and even further. Thus, it is sometimes said, at Harvard the Hrushevsky school of history lives on.¹

The work of the new Harvard generation does not stand in isolation. The studies of the Cossack period are complemented by contributions on the older and modern periods, by discussions of the resources for Ukrainian studies, and by a few contributions dealing with language and literature.

There are three resource-type studies. The first is a discussion of Lviv manuscript collections by Patricia Grimstead. The Lviv collections seem to have largely survived the Second World War and are an important and underused resource. The Ossolineum library in Wroclaw is also discussed. The second is Edward Kasinec's description of the Ivan Ohienko (Metropolitan Ilarion) Collection in Winnipeg. The last study is Paul Magocsi's account of the rich resources awaiting the Ukrainian scholar in Vienna. A visit to this city is especially valuable for the specialist interested in Galicia.

The historical studies begin with Bohdan Strumins'kyj's attempt to find out whether the ancient Antes were eastern Slavs. On the basis of linguistic evidence he concludes that, Hrushevsky to the contrary, they were really North Pontic Goths. Peter Golden discusses the "Wild Polovtsi" and the politics of the Turkic steppe tribes. Jaroslaw Pelenski discusses the descriptions of the sack of Kiev (1482) in the Muscovite chronicles. Since the Muscovite ruler was partly responsible for the pillage of this holy city, a serious polarization exists in the chronicles: some authors see it as a crime against fellow Christians; others see it as the just deserts of a foreign town. The ideological problems of the emerging theory of the "Kievan inheritance" is Pelenski's real subject.

The contributions on the Cossack period begin with another page in Frank Sysyn's biography of the leader of the Orthodox Ukrainian nobility, Adam Kysil (1580-1653), who was a proponent of accommodation between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the rebellious Cossacks. Zbigniew Wójcik discusses the chaotic period of civil strife that followed Khmelnytsky's death. His main interest is the Polish-Russian rivalry in Ukraine. Orest Subtelny describes the futile attempts at forging a lasting alliance of Mazepa's followers-in-exile with the Crimean Tatars. The latter were seriously threatened by Muscovy after the battle of Poltava (1709)

¹ See Omeljan Pritsak, "Harvardskyi tsentr ukrainskykh studii i shkola Hrushevskoho," in his *Chomu katedry ukrainoznavstva v Harvardi?* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 91-107, and the critical remarks of Oleksander Dombrowsky, "Do pytannia ukrainskoi istorichnoi shkoly v diiaspori," *Ukrainskyi istoryk* 4 (1974): 74-84.

but could not resist plundering Ukrainian lands. Zenon Kohut continues his study of gentry autonomists in eighteenth-century Ukraine, and Myroslav Labunka makes a contribution to the ecclesiastical history of this period.

Modern Ukrainian history is represented by three studies. Ivan L. Rudnytsky examines the theories and influence of the Polish-Ukrainian ethno-historian, Franciszek Duchiniński (1817-93). Duchinski was the foremost popularizer of the theory that the Muscovites are racially not really Slavs at all, but rather Finns and Turanians. The Ukrainians, however, are ethnic Slavs, like the Poles, and are therefore European. Though Duchinski's name is forgotten today, Rudnytsky contends that elements from his thought can be found in the writings of the ideologues of Ukrainian "integral" nationalism. Russian nationalism and Peter Struve's attitude toward the Ukrainian movement is the subject of Richard Pipes's contribution. He points out that while Struve recognized Polish and Finnish national aspirations, Ukraine was his "blind spot" and the cause of his break with the liberal (Kadet) party on the eve of the First World War. Moving on to the twentieth century: Bohdan Bociurkiw discusses the spirit of democracy and the resultant Ukrainization movements within the highly formal Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the 1920s. Finally, Jaroslaw Padoch describes the life work of the Ukrainian-Czech archeologist, Ivan Borkovsky, who was an expert on the Prague Royal Palace and Slavic antiquity. All of these studies are real "meat and potatoes" Ukrainian history.

They are not without garnishing. The Pritsak volumes contain rather a lot of material of significant, if less direct, bearing upon mainstream Ukrainian history. This type of study begins with Moshe Altbauer's discussion of Karaim linguistics. The Karaim are a Turkic-speaking ethnic group of Jewish religion who are believed to be the descendants of the ancient Khazars, who ruled the Ukrainian steppe at the dawn of Kievan history. A few thousand Karaim have survived to live in modern Ukraine.² Louis Bazin also deals with a Turko-Ukrainian subject. He

² According to official Soviet statistics, which may understate the number, in 1959 there were 3,301 Karaim in the Ukrainian republic, and by 1964, 6,000 in the entire Soviet Union. (See *Radianska entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, 4 vols. [Kiev, 1969-72], 2:310). In general, Soviet accounts of the Karaim tend to stress their Turkic origins and to treat them as a peculiar ethnic group. By contrast, Jewish scholarship, which has a deep concern about the genealogical questions raised by the notion of "the Chosen People," tends to minimize the role of the Turkic Khazars in Jewish history. In a popular work intended to offset this tendency, Arthur Koestler maintained that the Khazars migrated westward to form the cradle of European Jewry. His *Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire*

analyzes the origin of the term "Ataman" (a high rank in the Cossack army) and discusses its relationship to the Turkish word "Ata", meaning father. Alexandre Bennigsen and Mihnea Berindei make a contribution to sixteenth-century steppe politics, while Patricia Herlihy deals with Greek merchants in nineteenth-century Odessa. Yaroslav Dashkevych points out that the Armenians did rather well in Ukraine during and after the Khmelnytsky revolution. Their Jewish competition was gone. Crimean history receives two treatments. In the first, Alan Fisher describes the decline of the Crimean Khanate in the sixteenth century. He suggests that Cossack raids were a major factor in the weakening of this once powerful state. In the second treatment, the Turkish historian Halil Inalcik describes the rivalry between the Khan and the tribal aristocracy and how this led to the capture of Astrakhan by the Muscovites. This was an event that forever altered the politics of the East-European steppe.

Finally, there are a few literary, ethnological, and linguistic studies. George Grabowicz compares Shevchenko's Russian and Ukrainian poetry. He thinks the former more distant and controlled, the latter, more immediate. Michał Łesiów discusses personal names in popular Ukrainian riddles. George Shevelov deals with Ukrainian-Belorussian linguistic contacts. Victor Swoboda reveals a Ukrainian contribution to Yiddish vocabulary, and A. DeVincenz discusses the etymology of the family name Petliura.

All in all, the two volumes of the Pritsak *Festschrift* are quite a mixed bag. They certainly testify to the dual nature of Pritsak's interests—Oriental and Ukrainian studies. It is a lucky fact that these two disciplines cross paths so frequently; if they did not, the little old lady from the Ukrainian National Home in Winnipeg, who has donated her hard earned-savings to help establish a Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard, would certainly wonder what an article by Barbara Flemming on "Three Turkish Chroniclers in Ottoman Cairo" was doing in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.

Thomas M. Prymak
University of Toronto

and *Its Heritage* (New York, 1976) produced a storm of controversy when it was first published. The founder of the Ukrainian school of Oriental studies, Ahatanhel Krymsky (1871-1942), devoted the last years of his life to a monumental history of the Khazars, which seems to have dealt with these problems. The two-volume manuscript lies unpublished in the archives of the Ukrainian academy of sciences in Kiev. Krymsky's pupil, Omeljan Pritsak, has in his possession at least part of the manuscript and will probably include some of this material in his long-awaited *Origins of Rus'*. See the brief remarks of N. Polonska-Vasylenko, "Naukova spadshchyna Akademika A. Iu. Krymskoho (u spravi rukopysu 'Istoriia Khazar')," *Ukrainskyi istoryk* 3-4 (1973):142-5.

ПАВЛО РОМАНЮК, НЕПОРОЧНІСТЬ МОВЧАННЯ. Бухарест: Критеріон, 1978. 113 ст.

Це вже друга збірка молодого поета з Мараморощини. Романюк народився 1952 р. в селі Вишня Рона. Закінчив філологічний факультет Бухарестського університету й тепер учителює в середній школі. Перша його збірка віршів появилась в 1976 році під заголовком "Замок перелітних птахів".

Своєю наївністю сприймання світу вірші Романюка спершу нагадують Голобородька. Обох поетів в'яже дитяча безпосередність вистову та вільна форма вірша. Та коли Голобородько справляє враження майже дитячої спонтанности і невимушености то Романюк більш надуманий і зумисний.

Він відкриває свою другу збірку довгим (як на нього) віршем "Автобіографія", в якому власне і видніють деякі риси його надуманости:

Мені вісім тисяч чотириста п'ятдесят і п'ять років,
одинадцять тисяч сто дванадцять неділь.
Кажу: вісім тисяч чотириста п'ятдесят і п'ять і
одинадцять тисяч сто двадцять неділь тому,
бо мене мати навчила день вважати роком.
Це тільки один із кроків в арифметиці мого життя —
наука про лічбу...

Хоча це замилювання лічбою знаходить вираз у ще деяких віршах збірки, і хоча Романюк звертається до теми буття, народження, існування — не тільки людини але й речей та слів ("Айви починають свій ріст, свій всесвіт (від літери А.) (Яблуко народжується від я... ітд.), більшість віршів у збірці — це ліричні спостереження дуже чулого поетового "я", яке часто-густо вражене болем, чи пак, смутком власного зростання.

Хоча композиція всіх віршів не рівна і не завжди витримана логіка асоціацій, Романюк вміло користується модерним поетичним скорописом, використовуючи при тому метафоричні порівняння, метонімію, синестезію та персоніфікацію. Ось кілька прикладів:

Промінились грані весни
в пронизаній душі солдата...
Він йшов смерекою по
пошинеленій бруківці... (ст. 48)

То ж я встромив
заповіт любові
у груди Мавки моїх літ! (ст. 57)

Таких прикладів можна б навести дуже багато. Та мабуть вистачить процитувати один короткий вірш, в якому відзеркалюються притаманні для Романюка ніжність сповита в ностальгію, легка й не надто скомплікована інструментація, та цікава й свіжа метафора:

БАТЬКУ СПОГАДІВ

Батьку спогадів,
коли крилом
вміє лебідь
твої щоки,
як клен вдовіє,
прощаючись з літом,
прибуду на твій
згорблений віками
пори́г,
попрошу в заповіт
твій перстень,
дзвіницю слів,
сопілку туги,
і казку недоказану. (ст. 79)

Романюк цікавий поет за яким варта слідкувати. Що від нього можемо ще сподіватися дальшого розвитку бачимо вже з вірша, що не ввійшов до цієї збірки а появився рік пізніше в збірнику **Обрії І** (Бухарест, 1979, ст. 59-60):

ВТЕЧА З ТРОЇ

Пропила ніч очіпки
в опівнічнім шинку,
на ринку,
де обріями
вітри торгують.
Лишилася вдовою сорочка,
накривши
вечорниці заснуті;
в октавах
калинового шепоту
пропила ніч очіпки,
мов козак люльку,
а ворон
розгніздив свої очі
у соках ліщини...
Вже вози
лебедem ячать
по чумацькій дорозі,
вже
перстні сну

рути напились,
а ти плачеш,
народжуючись
непорочною сопількою.

В тих же **Обрях** є і коротка стаття Магдалини Ласло-Куцюк, "Березовість поета", ст. 189-92, присвячена поезії Романюка, де критик виділяє часте вживання образу дерева, олюдненням якого Романюк старається віддати свої і людські переживання. Стаття кінчається легкою критикою недотягнень Романюкової композиції й порадою "більш сміливо запровадити композиційні принципи фольклору" щоб писати вірші" в яких відчувається нахил народної пісні до епічності." З цим ми вповні згідні і дивлячись на повище наведений вірш бачимо, що Романюк саме і прямує в тому напрямі. Надіємося, що вневдовзі появиться ще одна збірка й бажаємо йому успіхів.

Данило Гусар Струк
Торонтський університет

ЛЮБОМИР ВИНАР, ЄВГЕН ОНАЦЬКИЙ — ЧЕСНІСТЬ З НАЦІЄЮ (1894-1979) Нью-Йорк — Мюнхен — Торонто: Українське Історичне Товариство, 1981. 31 стор.

У цій відбитці з журналу **Український історик** (1980, ч. 1-4), Любомир Винар подає коротку біографію й огляд творчості Євгена Онацького — чільного діяча націоналістичного руху, журналіста, лексикографа, дослідника історії та етнографії України. Незвичайно широкий діапазон зацікавлень Онацького утруднює оцінку його діяльності. Розглядаючи свій есей як причинок до дальших досліджень, Винар не намагається відокремити головне від другорядного в творчості Онацького. Це приводить автора до деяких перебільшень: нариси в книжці **Портрети в профіль**, наприклад, належать до патріотичної публіцистики, а не до наукової біографії. Можна сумніватися й у "фундаментальності" деяких наукових публікацій Онацького, хоч своїм розміром вони безперечно роблять імпозантне враження.

Тенденція представляти твори Онацького в найкращому світлі зрозуміла, оскільки ця праця має на меті вшанувати його пам'ять. Треба підкреслити, що авторові вдалося змалювати діяльність Онацького в усій її багатогранності, і що дбайливо опрацьована бібліографія стане дослідникам у пригоді.

В додатках до есею поміщено коротку (на жаль, дуже конспективну) автобіографію Онацького, написану незадовго до смерті. Тут також надруковано шість листів Онацького до Винара з інформаціями про українську дипломатичну діяльність у 1920-их роках. У листах іде мова про недрукований щоденник Онацького за 1931-38 рр., коли він жив в Італії як пред-

ставник ОУН. Виданням щоденника зайнялося торонтське видавництво "Новий Шлях", яке минулого року опублікувало другий том п. н. **У вічному місті: записки українського журналіста, роки 1931-32** (перший том, за 1930 р., появилася ще 1954 р. у видавництві М. Денисюка). Онацький був не з тих націоналістів, що закликали гострити "зуби і пазурі нації": треба думати, що повне видання щоденника змодифікує дотеперішню історіографію ОУН. У міжчасі слід вітати працю Винара, яка допоможе дослідникам зорієнтуватися в друкованій спадщині Онацького.

Мирослав Юркевич
Мічиганський університет

LETTERS

Dear Editor:

The Multicultural History Society of Ontario has recently acquired microfilm copies of three Ukrainian journals. These are rare publications, and the material contained in them is of interest to scholars and researchers of Ukrainian studies. Hence, a short description of the holdings is provided for publication by way of information.

Sincerely yours,
Iroida L. Wynnyckyj
Researcher
The Multicultural History Society of Ontario

ANNOTATED LIST OF RARE UKRAINIAN JOURNALS AT THE MULTICULTURAL HISTORY SOCIETY OF ONTARIO

NAROD

Lviv. Monthly: in Ukrainian
Vol. 1-6 (12 issues per volume), 1890-1895.
Subtitle: Orhan Rusko-ukrainskoi radykalnoi partii.
Edited by Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Pavlyk.

The journal is devoted to economic and political thought. The period of publication coincides with the beginnings of mass emigration of Ukrainians, and emigration to Brazil and North America is particularly well documented.

The microfilm copy was made from the original publication in the private archive of Dr. G. Gerych of Ottawa, Ontario.

Journal

STUDENCKYI VISTNYK

Prague. Monthly: in Ukrainian and French
1923, no. 1—1931, nos. 8-10.

Edited by Ihor Fediv, Pavlo Horesh and others.

Official organ of the Central Union of Ukrainian Students (Tsentralnyi soiuz ukrainskoho studentstva); reports on Ukrainian and international students' activities. Particularly noteworthy are the writings on the state of Ukrainian education in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, as well as information about the beginnings of organized Ukrainian student activities in Canada. The journal provided some space for literary works. Among the contributors were: D. Andriievsky, D. Antonovych, O. Babii, L. Biletsky, D. Dontsov, I. Fediv, K. Kononenko, L. Lutsiv, E. Malaniuk, K. Nyzhankivsky, S. Smal-Stotsky, Ia. Shkrumeliak, Iu. Lypa, L. Mosendz, M. Mukhyn and others.

The microfilm copy was made from the original publication in the private archive of Dr. Marko Antonovych of Montreal, Quebec.

DAZHBOH

Lviv. Biweekly: in Ukrainian

No. 1 (28. 2. 1935)—No. 9 (30. 7. 1935)

Edited by Bohdan Kravtsiv.

OBRII

Lviv. Weekly: in Ukrainian

No. 1 (6 2. 1936)—No. 31-32 (7. 1. 1937).

No. 7 missing.

Edited by Bohdan Kravtsiv.

NAPEREDODNI

Lviv. Biweekly: in Ukrainian

No. 1 (15. 10. 1937)—No. 8 (12) (30. 11 - 30. 12. 1938).

Edited by Bohdan Kravtsiv.

Dazhboh, *Obrii* and *Naperedodni* are, in fact, one publication that, owing to political circumstances, appeared under three different titles. It mirrors the nationalist feelings of the time, as expressed in literature, art and scholarship. A regular feature of the publication is the information supplied by correspondents from such cities as Prague, Rome, Vienna, Warsaw, Zagreb and Harbin, Manchuria. Material on Canada deals with Ukrainian-Canadian literary and cultural activities.

The microfilm copy was made from the original publication in the private archive of Mr. Antin Iwachniuk of Proton Station, Ontario.

Dear Editor:

Unfortunately, two rather critical misquotations mar Marko Bojcun's otherwise thoughtful review of my book, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism*, in your fall 1981 issue:

1) Bojcun: "Why, indeed, did the Ukrainian social democrats and social revolutionaries fail to establish an independent state during the Revolution and Civil War? Motyl *merely repeats* the nationalists' charge: 'democracy, socialism and lack of will' in other words, the SDs' and SRs' ideology and flaws of character, were to blame" (italics added).

The Turn to the Right (p. 2): "In diagnosing the fiasco of 1917-1920, the Nationalists came to the conclusion that democracy, socialism, and lack of will were to blame."

Bojcun should have understood that *describing* an analysis is hardly the same as *sharing* it.

2) Bojcun: "It was not the 'Ukrainian emigration [that] became the centre of the nationalist movement in the postwar decade' (p. 20), but *Galicia*, where the émigrés encountered a Ukrainian minority whose national identity had been forming over decades of struggle with the Polish ruling class."

The Turn to the Right: "Although . . . Ukrainian émigrés also played an important political role in the national movement during the war, the collapse of first the ZUNR and then of the UNR resulted in so large a flood of émigrés, that the Ukrainian emigration became the center of the *national* movement in the post-war decade." (italics added).

National is not nationalist is not *Nationalist*—as page one of the book makes clear.

Alexander J. Motyl
Sunnyside, New York

BOOKS RECEIVED

- ANDHIEVSKA, Emma. *Roman pro liudske pryznachennia*. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1982. 454 pp.
- ARMSTRONG, John A. *Ukrainian Nationalism*. Reprint of 2d ed. Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1980. xiv, 361 pp.
- BULBA-BOROVETS, Taras. *Armiia bez derzhavy: Slava i trahediia ukrainskoho povstanskoho rukhu. Spohady*. Winnipeg: Society of Volyn, 1981. 327 pp.
- BYKOVSKY, Lev. *Solomon A. Goldelman: A Portrait of a Politician and Educator (1885-1974). A Chapter in Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*. Ed. and with an intro. by Lubomyr R. Wynar. New York, Toronto & Munich: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1980. 98 pp.
- ELLIOTT, Mark R. *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation*. Urbana, Chicago & London: University of Illinois Press, 1982. xiv, 287 pp.
- GRABOWICZ, George G. *Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981. 101 pp. Dist. Harvard University Press.
- HAHN, Werner G. *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-53*. Ithaca & New York: Cornell University Press, 1982.
- HIRNIAK, Iosyp. *Spomyny*. Ed. Bohdan Boychuk. New York: Suchasnist, 1982. 487 pp.
- HORAK, Stephen M., ed. *Guide to the Study of the Soviet Nationalities: Non-Russian Peoples of the USSR*. Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, 1982. 265 pp.
- IAROSLAVSKA, Dariia. *Prapor: Novelety*. Philadelphia: Kyiv, 1981. 191 pp.
- KOSYK, Wolodymyr. *La Politique de la France a l'égard de l'Ukraine, Mars 1917—Fevrier 1918*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, "Serie Internationale," no. 13, 1981. 304 pp.
- Lesia Ukrainka 1871-1971: Zbirnyk prats na 100-richchia poetky*. Ed. B. Romanenchuk. Philadelphia: Svitovyi komitet dlia vidznachennia 100-richchia narodzhennia Lesi Ukrainky, 1971-80. 400 pp.
- LYMARENKO, Danylo. *Monholska imperiia*. Philadelphia: Zinaida Lymarenko, 1978. 70 pp.

- NAHAYLO, Bohdan & C. J. PETERS. *The Ukrainians and Georgians*. London: Minority Rights Group Report, no. 50, 1981. 20 pp.
- ONATSKY, Ievhen. *Chestnist z natsiieiu (1894-1979)*. New York, Toronto & Munich: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1981. 31 pp.
- PRITSACK, Omeljan. *The Origin of Rus'*, volume 1: *Old Scandinavian Sources Other than the Sagas*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1981. xxx, 926 pp. Dist. Harvard University Press.
- PROCKO, Bohdan P. *Ukrainian Catholics in America: A History*. Washington: University Press of America, 1982. xiv, 170 pp.
- PROKOP, Myroslav. *Ukraina i ukrainska polityka Moskvu*. Part 1: *Period pidhotovy do Druhoi svitovoi viiny*. 2d printing. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1981. 176 pp.
- RIEBER, Alfred J. *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. xxvi, 464 pp.
- Robitnychi straiiky v Polshchi (1980)*. Ed. and with a foreword and afterword by Myroslav Prokop. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1981. 197 pp.
- ROCKETT, Rocky L. *Ethnic Nationalities in the Soviet Union: Sociological Perspectives on a Historical Problem*. New York: Praeger, 1981. xiii, 171 pp.
- SKRYNNIKOV, Ruslan G. *Boris Godunov*. Ed. & trans. by Hugh F. Graham. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1982. xix, 175 pp.
- SOKOLYSZYN, Aleksander & Vladimir WERTSMAN, eds. *Ukrainians in Canada and the United States: A Guide to Information Sources*. Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1981. xiv, 236 pp.
- TESLA, Ivan & Evhen TIUTKO. *Istorychnyi atlas Ukrainy*. Montreal, New York & Munich: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1980. 190 pp.
- Ukrainski politviazni v SRSR: Adresnyi pokazhchyk za stanom na hruden 1981 roku*. Comp. Marta Harasowska. Toronto and Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1981. 204 pp.
- Volodymyr Hnatiuk. Vybrani staty pro narodnu tvorchist na 110-richchia narodzhennia 1871-1981*. Ed. and with an intro. by B. Romanenchuk. New York: Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka 201 (1981). 288 pp.
- VYSHNIA, Ostap. *Hard Times: A Collection of Satire and Humour*. Trans. Yuri Tkach. Doncaster, Australia: Bayda Books, 1981. 181 pp.

PUBLICATIONS

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Social Sciences

1. Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, 1980. 365 pp.

Cloth \$14.95

Paper \$9.95

2. Jurij Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination*, 1980. 488 pp.

Cloth \$19.95

Paper \$12.95

3. *Volodymyr Vynnychenko: Shchodennyk* (Diary). Edited, annotated and with an introduction by Hryhory Kostiuk, 1980. 500 pp. *In Ukrainian.*

Cloth only \$30.00

4. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, 1981. 269 pp.

Cloth \$14.95

Paper \$9.95

Please order from the *University of Toronto Press*, 5201 Dufferin Street, Downsview, Ontario, Canada, M3H 5T8. Cheques should be payable to University of Toronto Press.

Ukrainian Literature

1. Mykola Zerov, *Leksii z istorii ukrainskoi literatury* (Lectures on the History of Ukrainian Literature), 1977. 271 pp. *In Ukrainian.*

Cloth \$9.95

Paper \$3.95

2. *Vaplitianskyi zbirnyk* (The VAPLITE Collection). Edited and with an introduction by George S. N. Luckyj, 1977. 260 pp. *In Ukrainian.*

Cloth \$10.95

Paper \$4.95

3. *Antolohiia ukrainskoi liryky, chastyna 1 — do 1919 r.* (An Anthology of Ukrainian Lyric Poetry, Part 1 — To 1919). Edited and with an introduction by Orest Zilynsky, 1978. 439 pp. *In Ukrainian.*

Cloth \$13.95

Paper \$6.95

4. *Ukrainian Dumy: Editio Minor*. Translated by George Tarnawsky and Patricia Kilina; introduction by N. K. Moyle, 1979. 219 pp. Published jointly with the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

Cloth \$9.95

Paper \$5.95

5. *Shevchenko and the Critics, 1861-1980*. Edited by George S. N. Luckyj; introduction by Bohdan Rubchak, 1980. 520 pp. Published for the CIUS by the University of Toronto Press.

Cloth \$30.00

Paper \$8.50

Please order the above books from the *University of Toronto Press*.

6. Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*. Translated by Marco Carynnyk; with notes and an essay by Bohdan Rubchak, 1981. 127 pp. Published for the CIUS by Ukrainian Academic Press.

Cloth U.S.\$14.50

Paper U.S.\$9.50

Please order from *Ukrainian Academic Press, P.O. Box 263, Littleton, CO 80160, USA*.

Ukrainian Language

1. Assya Humesky, *Modern Ukrainian*, 1980. 438 pp. Paper only \$8.00. Please order from the *University of Toronto Press*.

2. George Y. Shevelov, *A Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language*, 1979. vi, 809 pp. Published for the CIUS by Carl Winter Universitätsverlag.

Cloth 500 Dm

Paper 460 Dm

Please order the above book from *Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Postfach 10 61 40, 6900 Heidelberg 1, West Germany*.

3. *Ukrainian-English Dictionary*. Compiled by C. H. Andrusyshen and J. N. Krett. Published for the University of Saskatchewan by the University of Toronto Press; reprinted with the assistance of the CIUS, 1981. xxix, 1,163 pp.

Paper only \$19.95

Please order the above book from the *University of Toronto Press*.

Journal

Ukrainian-Canadian Studies

1. Frances Swyripa, *Ukrainian Canadians: A Survey of Their Portrayal in English-Language Works*, 1978. 169 pp. Published for the CIUS by the University of Alberta Press.

Cloth \$9.95

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2. Manoly R. Lupul, ed., *Ukrainian Canadians, Multiculturalism and Separatism: An Assessment*, 1978. 177 pp. Published for the CIUS by the University of Alberta Press.

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3. W. Roman Petryshyn, ed., *Changing Realities: Social Trends among Ukrainian Canadians*, 1980. 249 pp.

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4. William A. Czumer, *Recollections about the Life of the First Ukrainian Settlers in Canada*. Translated by Louis L. Laychuk; introduction by Manoly R. Lupul, 1980. xvi, 176 pp.

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5. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, ed., *Ukrainians in the Canadian City*. A special issue of the journal *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1980. ix, 138 pp. Published for the CIUS.

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6. Jars Balan, ed. *Identifications: Ethnicity and the Writer in Canada*, 1982. xii, 158 pp.

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In general, articles should not exceed 25 double-spaced pages, except where especially justified by extensive documentation, tables, or charts. For purposes of style and footnoting, the University of Chicago Press *Manual of Style* should be consulted. Authors should send a short academic biography with their submissions. Manuscripts will not be returned unless specifically requested and postage provided. The policy of the *Journal* is not to consider articles that have been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. The editors reserve the right to edit all submissions.

A TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION

(Modified Library of Congress)

а — a	ї — i	ф — f
б — b	й — i	х — kh
в — v	к — k	ц — ts
г — h	л — l	ч — ch
ґ — g	м — m	ш — sh
д — d	н — n	щ — shch
е — e	о — o	ю — iu
є — ie	п — p	я — ia
ж — zh	р — r	ь — -
з — z	с — s	-ий — y in endings
и — y	т — t	of personal
і — i	у — u	names only

